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Summary
Islamist terrorism has, in academic and lay discourse, been misunderstood in the register of 
‘extremism,’ ‘radicalism’ and ‘fundamentalism.’ The concepts of ‘terrorism’ and ‘ideology’ 
have frequently been misused as pejoratives to prevent understanding of Islamist terrorism. 
This does not mean that they are beyond repair and we attempt to re-establish the terms as 
useful critical concepts for understanding the Islamist movement. This study takes the 
Islamist ideology seriously; it is comprehensive, complex and internally coherent. We claim 
that Islamist movements and the terrorism they engage in can be usefully understood by 
examining the historical evolution of the ideology. In particular we examine the dynamic 
interplay between the theory and practice of Islamist movements. Using the tools of social 
and political philosophy the study critically examines the historical and intellectual evolution 
of the Islamist ideology and movement from the inception of the Society of Muslim Brothers 
in 1920s Egypt, the radical philosophy of Sayyid Qutb in the 1950s and 60s through to al- 
Qaeda and the 9/11 attacks.
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Glossary of Arabic and Islamic Terms
Al-Hakimiyya Absolute sovereignty of Allah
Bay'ah Oath of allegiance
Bida' Innovations or additions
Dar al-Islam Muslim land, literally land of peace
Da'wa Call to Islam
Emir Leader of a group
Fard Ayn Duty that falls on the individual
Fard Kifayah Collective duty
Fatwa Religious/legal ruling
Fellahin Rural peasants
Fitna Division. Also trial or temptation.
Franji Foreign or alien
Gama'a al-Islamiyyah The Islamic Group
Hadith The sayings of the Prophet
Haraam Forbidden
Hijra Migration
Ijtihdad Independent interpretation of religious texts
Infidels Non-believers
Jahiliyya Ignorance of Islam
Jihad To struggle or to strive
Kafir/kufr Unbeliever/apostate. Someone who has knowingly rejected 
Islam
Khedive Lord or Ruler
Mujahedeen Muslim 'ffeedom-fighter'
Mujtahid Learned scholars of shar ’ia
Rashidun First four rightly-guided caliphs after the death of the Prophet
Salaf Predecessor, early generation of Muslims
Salaf Righteous ancestors
Shahada Islamic declaration o f faith and the unity of Allah
Shar'ia Islamic law
Sunna Collected traditions of Prophet's practice and habits
Takfir Declaration of unbelief against a fellow Muslim
Tawhid Unity of Allah - literally 'making one'
Ulema Religious leaders
Wafd Delegation - The Egyptian Wafd party
Waqf Islamic endowment
Zakat Charity
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1 Accounting For Terrorism
1.1 Introduction
There are two main barriers to understanding Islamist terrorism. The first, widespread in the 
mainstream media, lay and academic discourse, is the caricature of the Islamist terrorist as the 
fanatic. According to this position terrorists are variously fundamentalists, extremists, 
radicals or militants—they may believe something very strongly—but exactly what they 
believe either does not make sense or cannot be understood; in other words the terrorist is 
irrational. The second barrier is the related claim that Islamist terrorism is, if using secular 
categories, morally reprehensible, or from a theological perspective, evil. From this 
perspective terrorists not only cannot be understood but also should not be understood. This 
study aims to go beyond these two barriers. We shall argue that understanding Islamist 
terrorism is an important philosophical pursuit. There are two central theses that shall guide 
our investigation: one, the Islamist ideology informs the actions of the Islamist movement, 
and thus understanding the ideology is crucial to understanding Islamist terrorism. Two, the 
Islamist ideology can only be comprehensively understood through a critical examination of 
its historical evolution. Underlying both these theses is the claim that all ideas can, and 
should, be taken seriously without resorting to moral judgements or accusations of 
irrationality.
The remainder of this chapter is divided into three sections. The first section will survey the 
literature and critically examine the various approaches that have been used to examine 
terrorism in general or Islamist terrorism in particular. Through the critique of these 
methodologies we will propose an alternative methodology that seeks to understand Islamist 
terrorism through a critical examination of the historical evolution of the Islamist ideology. 
The second section discusses the history of the concept ‘ideology’ and argues that if a 
definition and theory of ideology is correctly formulated then it can be utilized as a critically 
productive mode of understanding action. The final section attempts to carve out a definition 
of terrorism that, without, attempting to be definitive, is at least fit for the purposes of this 
study.
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The final three chapters will fulfil, within the limits of the study, the second of our two main 
theses—a critical historical study of the evolution of the Islamist ideology. The second 
chapter will examine the early modem period of the creation, rise and fall of the Egyptian 
Society of Muslim Brothers led by Hasan al-Banna. The third chapter will study the seminal 
writings of Sayyid Qutb in the 1950s and 60s that had a powerful influence on the evolution 
of the Islamist ideology. The final chapter will examine the late modern period from the 
Afghanistan jihad in the 1980s, the formation and development of al-Qaeda, to the attacks of 
September 11th, 2001.
1.2 Methodology
How should we best account for Islamist terrorism? A preliminary step would be to narrow 
our terms of reference. At this stage it will suffice to utilise an intuitive definition: ‘Islamist’ 
shall be used to designate an act (terrorism) committed in the name of Islam i.e. the actors 
involved self-identify the meaning and purpose of their behaviour within the terms of 
‘Islam.’1 We shall discuss the problem of defining and conceptualising ‘terrorism’ later on in 
this chapter, and the notion of ‘Islamist’ will be refined at a later stage. For now it will suffice
tj.
to note that the archetypal acts of Islamist terrorism were the attacks on September 11 , 2001 
in New York, Arlington and Pennsylvania (henceforth 9/11). Although this study will 
examine this particular attack it will be primarily concerned with the historical, social and 
ideological development of the Islamist movement and terrorism that stretches back decades 
before 9/11.2 Obviously the phenomenon of Islamist terrorism did not end on 9/11 but every 
historical study requires its temporal limitations and 9/11 will serve as a logical cut-off point 
for this one.
Having offered a preliminary definition of terms and narrowed down our subject we can now 
return to our original question ‘how should we best account for Islamist terrorism.’ The 
italicised ‘account’ is deliberately ambiguous. It is intended to highlight the methodological 
difference between the rival modes of ‘explaining’ or ‘understanding’ social phenomena. It is 
beyond the scope of this work to offer a comprehensive discussion of the various
1 ‘Islamist’ is ordinarily used to refer to politicised Islam. As we shall see whilst this is broadly correct it is not 
entirely accurate.
2 As will be made clear not all strains of Islamist terrorism led to 9/11 and there are some more-or-less discrete 
modes of Islamist terrorism, between which there have been some violent disagreements. The particular 
collection of strains we are interested in, however, are the cmes that are ideologically connected to 9/11.
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philosophies of social science but it will be necessary to justify our chosen methodology for 
accounting for Islamist terrorism over other competing methodologies.
We shall examine several methodologies that have been used to theorise terrorism and 
highlight their deficiencies. What they have in common is a conspicuous lack of any serious 
attempt to understand, or take seriously, the Islamist ideology as a conceptual framework for 
understanding the Islamist movement. Some naturalist models ignore the ideology altogether 
or explain it away as a rationalisation of more fundamental psychological or sociological 
drives. Neoconservatives dismiss the ideology as ‘fanatical’ or ‘evil’ and therefore beyond 
rational understanding. Some political theorists directly map their own ideology onto that of 
the Islamists and so fail to take the Islamist ideology seriously. Rational-choice theorists 
model the ideology as a set of preferences without attempting to explain why those 
preferences exist. Narrative-driven historical accounts will take some account of the Islamist 
ideology but have often sidelined its importance in understanding the development of the 
movements. The history of the Islamist movement has been told in many different ways but 
the failure to take ideology seriously has left an explanatory void at the heart of these 
narratives.
We will propose a methodology that has at its centre the claim that ideas matter deeply and 
that to understand the Islamist movement and Islamist terrorism we must understand the 
Islamist ideology. We will claim that the ideology has deep historical and intellectual roots, is 
cogent, comprehensive and comprehensible. Furthermore our conceptual framework will 
demonstrate that the ideology is dynamic; it evolves with the movement and the historical 
path and actions of the movement are intimately linked with the ideology. This 
interdependency will allow us to understand the Islamist movement, ideology and terrorism 
in new and important ways.
We are not seeking to entirely discredit rival methods of accounting for terrorism—all of 
v which possess some merit—nor claiming that our chosen methodology is without defect. The 
phenomenon and history of Islamist terrorism is far too large and complex to be completely 
understood or explained from a single perspective or theoretical model. Our aim is to explore 
a fruitful methodology for accounting for Islamist terrorism that has been broadly neglected 
in the extant literature on the subject.
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In the first part of this chapter we shall briefly examine the difference between the two major 
modes of accounting before broadly rejecting ‘explanation’ in favour o f ‘understanding.’ We 
will then turn to the various disciplines that have been used to account for terrorism and 
examine problems associated with each approach. We shall then suggest a hybrid 
methodology—combining elements of philosophy, social science and history—that seeks to 
describe and account for the evolution of the ideology that both animates and gives meaning 
to Islamist terrorism. Paul Wilkinson’s thesis shall provide guidance: ‘understanding 
terrorism is an historical and philosophical, as well as scientific task.’
1.2.1 Explanation versus Understanding
The distinction between explanation and understanding rests on one’s epistemological 
account of the social sciences.4 Those who believe that the behaviour and actions of humans 
and societies can, and should, be studied objectively, claim that the methodology of natural 
sciences should be applied to the social sciences. This naturalistic or positivist view supposes 
that the behaviour of man is of no essential qualitative difference to the behaviour of the 
physical world. According to this view the behaviour of humans and gas molecules—to use 
one example—can fundamentally be explained and eventually predicted in the same way. 
Laws can be formulated that explain and predict the behaviour of both, and underlying causes 
may also be discovered that explain the laws. Although proponents of this view might accept 
that the behaviour of the interaction of large groups of humans is so complex, with effectively 
an unlimited number of uncontrollable and unquantifiable variables, that in practice much of 
social human behaviour is beyond the scope of scientific knowledge. Despite this, it is argued 
that the naturalistic theory still stands: the quantity and complexity of human social behaviour 
does not mean that there is a qualitative difference between men and molecules.
There are many problems with the naturalistic approach to human sciences, not the least of 
which is the fact that the methodology, epistemo logy and ontology of the natural sciences are 
hardly beyond philosophical controversy. Leaving this aside there are more fundamental 
problems with the explanatory framework; to put it starkly, molecules cannot answer back—
3 Paul Wilkinson Terror and the Liberal State p.96
4 Only the barest of schematic discussions, of what is a complex topic, will be necessary to draw out the 
conclusions required for our purposes.
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humans can. The objects of natural science may be indifferent to the scientist’s gaze, but 
humans certainly are not. There is the further level of reflexive complexity that we shall 
discuss in some more detail later, that scientists, despite their attempts at attaining objectivity 
through the scientific method, remain human too, which when faced with the subject of 
human behaviour, will almost inevitably affect their research. When studying molecules, the 
object remains necessarily indifferent, and in theory so too does the scientist; when studying 
humans both the subject and scientist will struggle to remain objectively detached. Lyotard 
encapsulates this problem in The Postmodern Condition:
It is generally accepted that nature is an indifferent, not deceptive, opponent, and 
it is upon this basis that the distinction is made between the natural and the human 
sciences. In pragmatic terms this means that in the natural sciences “nature” is the 
referent -  mute, but as predictable as a die thrown a great number of times -  about 
which scientists exchange denotative utterances constituting moves they play 
against one another. In the human sciences, on the other hand, the referent (man) 
is a participant in the game, one that speaks and develops a strategy (a mixed 
strategy, perhaps) to counter that of the scientist: here, the kind of chance with 
which the scientist is confronted is not an object based or indifferent, but 
behavioural or strategic -  in other words, antagonistic.5
A deeper problem than that of the interested subject for the naturalist methodology is the idea 
that humans usually ‘mean’ something by their actions, in a way that molecules cannot mean 
something by their behaviour. If this is true then only observing, theorising and predicting the 
external behaviour of humans will leave out what the behaviour means. The idea of 
‘meaning’ is a philosophically complex one—for instance does meaning lie in the intentions 
of the actor i.e. what is meant, or the meaning that is ‘understood’ by others?
For our purposes only a brief exposition of the topic is necessary. The hermeneutic tradition’s 
central claim—in contrast to the naturalist—is that ‘the social world must be understood from 
within, rather than explained from without.’6 This understanding is to be sought in the shared 
meanings that actors give to, and interpret in the actions of others. The idea that shared social 
meaning is both unique to human behaviour and is essential to interpreting and understanding
5 Jean-Francois Lyotard The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge p.57
6 Martin Hollis The Philosophy o f Social Science pp. 16-17 Emphasis added.
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human action means that the tools of the natural science will be ultimately inadequate for the 
human or social sciences.7
A classic distinction between explanation (erklareri) and understanding (verstehen) was made
by Max Weber in the first volume of Economy and Society. ‘Sociology’ writes Weber ‘is a
•  •  8 •science concerning itself with the interpretive understanding of social action... .’ By ‘action’ 
Weber refers to behaviour to which the actor attaches a ‘subjective meaning.’ ‘Social action’ 
is that which ‘takes account of the behaviour of others’ i.e. the subjective meaning is located 
within a shared or intersubjective universe of meaning.9 Meaningful behaviour—social 
action—should be analysed through interpretive understanding in contrast to the non­
meaningful behaviour of the physical world that can be theorised using explanation. The 
implicit and irreducible connections between action, meaning and society are recognised by 
Peter Winch: ‘all meaningful behaviour must be social, since it can be meaningful only if 
governed by rules, and rules presuppose a social setting.’10 A central thesis in this work is 
that in order to account for the phenomenon under study, Islamist terrorism, the behaviour of 
the actors must be meaningfully interpreted and understood within its social context. The 
correlate of this thesis is the claim that Islamist terrorism must be meaningful as it is always a 
social action.11
“ Understanding,’ Winch goes on to state, ‘is grasping the point or meaning of what is being 
done or said. This is a notion far removed from the world of statistics and causal laws: it is 
closer to the realm of discourse and to the internal relations that link the parts of a realm of 
discourse.’12 If Islamist terrorism can be conceptualised as the type of social action under 
study then we shall claim that the Islamist ideology is the set of rules or discourse that 
governs its practice and lends it its meaning. Understanding the Islamist ideology and its 
internal relations will therefore be essential for grasping the meaning of Islamist terrorism. 
When framed in this way it should be clear that we are not asking ‘what causes Islamist 
terrorism?’ or ‘why does Islamist terrorism happen?’ as these types of questions operate 
within the explanatory mode of a naturalist science. These questions misconstrue, or avoid,
7 We will ignore the possibility that some behaviour in the animal kingdom possesses a shared meaning. Even if 
this was true our understanding will be necessarily limited by our ability to interpret this meaning.
8 Max Weber Economy and Society p.4
9 Max Weber Economy and Society p.4
10 Peter Winch The Idea o f a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy p.l 16
11 As we shall see these two claims are certainly not universally accepted.
12 Peter Winch The Idea o f a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy p.l 15
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the essential meaningfulness of social action. Instead our central questions are ‘what is the 
meaning of Islamist terrorism?’ and ‘how can Islamist terrorism be best understood?’ Our 
claim, therefore, is not that the Islamist ideology causes terrorism, but that only an 
interpretative understanding of the ideology will allow us to reconstruct the meaning of the 
terrorism and the behaviour of the wider Islamist movement.
The fourth element—along with action, meaning and society—that Winch introduces into the
hermeneutic nexus is the fruitful Wittgensteinian concept of ‘rules’ and the related ideas of
‘forms of life’ and ‘language games.’ We shall find opportunity to use Wittgenstein further
on in our exploration of the ideas of ‘terrorism’ and ‘ideology’ so we shall restrain ourselves
to some brief remarks at this point. The idea that social action is ruled-governed, and that the
rules are socially-constructed, will be important for our interpretative understanding of the
Islamist ideology. It will be useful to conceptualise the ideology as a type of dynamic
discourse that generates rules of behaviour for its adherents. This process however, as we
shall argue, is not one-way, the actors both act according to the rules of the ideology, but they
1 ^simultaneously construct and shape the ideology and its rules.
1.2.2 Explaining Terrorism: Psychological Account of Terrorism
To illustrate the difference between the ‘explanation’ and ‘understanding’ methodologies we 
shall examine some examples of each. The first approach to explaining terrorism is what can 
be broadly called the psychological account. This usually takes either the strong form of 
identifying certain psychological traits that cause people to seek to engage in terrorism, or a 
weaker version that identifies a shared psychological profile of the subject without claiming 
that it is this that specifically and sufficiently causes the terrorist behaviour. The strong claim 
would be difficult to defend as it seems clear that even if a study identifies the psychological 
traits (a, b and c) as being common amongst terrorists it would be possible to identify non­
terrorists who share those traits and find terrorists who do not possess all or any of them. The 
weaker claim by contrast only identifies psychological dispensations that indicate a person is 
more likely to engage in terrorism, rather than necessary or sufficient conditions and would 
therefore be easier to defend but would also suffer from being a far weaker predictor of 
terrorist behaviour.
13 The complex interplay between actors and ideology will form a central concern of this study.
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Despite these problems there are commentators who are committed to the psychological 
account of terrorism albeit using more sophisticated versions of the basic types above. Jerold 
Post, for example argues that people join terrorist groups because they are ‘driven by 
psychological forces.’14 In other words actors do not sign up because they believe in the 
group’s cause or its ideology but they join the group to facilitate, rationalise and justify the 
'acts o f violence ... that they are psychologically compelled to commit.AS Post concludes that 
'the cause is not the cause ... individuals become terrorists in order to join terrorist groups 
and commit acts o f violence}6 The alleged inversion of means and ends, whereby the 
professed ends are used to justify the means, is present to some extent in a range of theories 
about terrorism. According to these theorists the means are actually the ends, and the 
professed ends are merely justifications or rationalizations for engaging in the violent 
means.17 The end point of this inversion occurs when the means and ends become 
indistinguishable and terrorist violence is committed for its own sake. As a general rule the 
more violent or arbitrary the terrorism appears to be, and the less clear or feasible the 
professed end, then the more likely it is that this ‘fanatic’ model of terrorism prevails. Walter 
Laqueur’s writings on fanaticism provide a striking example of this mode of reasoning:
The murkier the political purpose of terrorism, the greater its appeal to mentally 
unbalanced persons. The motives of people fighting a cruel tyranny are quite 
different from those of rebels against a democratically elected regime. Rather than 
idealism, a social conscience, or ardent patriotism, one finds among the latter free- 
floating aggression, boredom, and mental confusion.18
Laqueur is writing about Islamist terrorism in this instance and it is clear to see how Islamists 
have become the archetypal ‘fanatical’ actors in both the popular imagination and with 
several commentators. They meet Laqueur’s criteria of committing apparently 
disproportionate and arbitrary violence—with 9/11 serving as the paradigmatic case—and for 
their sometimes professed, and sometimes imagined end, being both difficult to clearly 
discern and impossible to achieve. The ends of Islamists that are often cited range from the
14 Jerold M. Post “Terrorist psycho-logic: Terrorist behavior as a product of psychological forces” p.35
15 Jerold M. Post “Terrorist psycho-logic: Terrorist behavior as a product of psychological forces” p.35 
Emphasis in original.
16 Jerold M. Post “Terrorist psycho-logic: Terrorist behavior as a product of psychological forces” p.35 
Emphasis in original.
17 For example a person joining a national liberation movement does so in order to engage in die means of 
violence rather than to achieve the aids of liberation.
18 Walter Laqueur The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms o f Mass Destruction p.40
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destruction of America, Israel and the West to the creation of a global caliphate. Although 
when presented so starkly it seems that the ‘fanatic’ model of terrorism should be dismissed 
as a hackneyed caricature of the crazed terrorist, the problem of the relationship between 
means and ends is a serious one and so we shall find opportunity to discuss it in more 
nuanced terms and in greater detail later. For now we shall raise some ftuther objections to 
the psychological explanation of terrorism.
1.2.3 Problems with the Psychological Account
t
We have already noted that psychological accounts of terrorism will either be too strong and 
therefore overly deterministic, or too weak and thus are poor predictors of terrorism and lack 
explanatory power. They are also problematic within their own terms; an overview of 
empirical studies of terrorism found they are ‘nearly unanimous in [the] conclusion that 
mental illness and abnormality are typically not critical factors in explaining terrorist 
behaviour.’19 A related explanatory approach to the psychological account is one that 
identifies socio-economic predictors of terrorist behaviour. Although socio-economic data 
might be easier to collect and analyse than psychological traits it suffers from the same flaws 
inherent in the psychological account. In an empirical study of several hundred subjects 
connected with al-Qaeda, Marc Sageman found that despite the stereotypes of poor, religious 
and uneducated men driven to join terrorist organizations:
Most of the terrorists ... do not come from the poorest countries in the world ... 
three-fourths come from upper and middle class families. ... They grew up in 
caring intact families, mildly religious and concerned about their communities. ...
Over 60 percent have some college education. Most are in the technical fields, 
such as engineering, architecture, computers, medicine, and business.... Far from 
being immature teenagers, the men... joined the terrorist organization at the age of 
twenty-six years, on average.
Although Sageman discovers some socio-economic correlations between the actor’s 
background and terrorist activity they are neither the sort of correlations that we might have 
naively expected nor do they help us understand either why these particular people, and not 
others with similar backgrounds, engaged in terrorist activities.
19 Randy Borum “Psychology of Terrorism”
20 Marc Sageman “The Normality of Global Jihadi Terrorism”
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The major flaw with both these explanatory approaches, however, is that they fail to 
understand terrorism. They bypass meaning in their search for causal determinates of terrorist 
behaviour. Even if socio-economic or psychological correlations could be identified—which 
as we have demonstrated is unlikely—we would still have a myopic account of terrorism. 
Ultimately, unless we suppose that one ‘fanatical’ terrorist ideology is perfectly substitutable 
for another, and therefore the terrorist behaviour is literally without meaning, then the 
psychological and other similarly structured explanatory accounts cannot be accepted. They 
cannot, for instance, explain the particular features or shape of an ideology—as the ideology 
is arbitrarily disconnected from the violence—or account for the ideology’s historical 
development. There is a surfeit of meaning that the psychological and socio-economic models 
simply do not and cannot account for and thus entirely ignores.
1.2.4 Politicised Accounts of Terrorism
We have already examined the poverty of explanatory accounts that fail to attempt to 
understand the ideology behind terrorism; by contrast politicised accounts not only fail to 
understand ideology but implicitly, or sometimes explicitly reject the task altogether. We 
refer to ‘politicised’ accounts to describe theorists who interpret terrorism from the political 
perspective of the author. As we shall examine later the ideological disposition of the 
observer cannot be fully escaped and thus will inevitably distort their ability to describe 
another ideology. With the politicised accounts of terrorism however the author’s ideology 
infects their perspective on the subject so deeply that almost nothing useful can be discovered 
about the practice and ideology under examination.21 These accounts neither explain nor 
understand terrorism; they simply use terrorism to reinforce their own political philosophy. 
To illustrate this model and its flaws we shall examine two opposing political paradigms 
through which terrorism is explained; we shall label them ‘neoconservative’ and ‘left-wing’ 
accounts.
1.2.5 Neoconservative Account of Terrorism
For the purposes of this study we will use the term ‘neoconservative’ to refer to the political 
philosophy popularly associated with the George Bush Jnr. administration following the
21 It is, however, possible to learn something about the commentator’s ideology by studying the distortion.
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attacks of 9/11.22 One broad feature of neoconservatism is a belief in an interventionist 
foreign policy that actively utilises American political, military and economic capital to 
export pro-Western, ffee-market, liberal democratic regimes abroad. From this perspective 
9/11 was interpreted not only as an act of aggression against the United States but more 
fundamentally as an existential attack on the Western values of freedom, democracy, security 
and the rule of law. The binary worldview of enlightened Western values against those of the 
terrorists meant that the latter could be described in the register of ‘fundamentalism’ that 
appears as a purely reactive, retrograde and reactionary force.
The neoconservative account shares some features with the psychological model, for example 
terrorists are often thought to be fanatical, fundamentalist and irrational. However there is a 
key difference, the neoconservative uses these labels as a way of cutting off any further 
enquiry. This is based on three moral convictions: firstly, terrorism is always essentially 
wrong or evil; secondly, understanding terrorism is tantamount to justifying it; and therefore 
thirdly, to understand terrorism is to justify it and therefore to justify evil. A related argument 
amounts to the same the conclusion—terrorism is evil and evil cannot be understood. The 
political upshot of this reasoning that provided the political philosophy behind the ‘war on 
terror’ is the belief that terrorists must be uprooted from their strongholds and destroyed, as 
opposed to any attempt to understand their actions or enter into dialogue and political 
engagement.23 This zero-sum reasoning can be simplified into the maxim: they will do 
anything to destroy us, and our way of life, so we must do everything to destroy them first.
There are two interlinking strands of argument that are used to support the neoconservative 
account of terrorism and it is this linkage that exposes a paradox inherent in the account. The 
first strand is akin to a pejorative version of the psychological account; it claims that terrorists 
are variously irrational, fanatical, or even insane. These pejoratives are often packed into the 
terminology of fundamentalism, extremism and radicalism—although often just the word 
‘terrorist’ is used to indicate these subsidiary properties. The ‘irrational’ terrorist model is
22 Elements of the modem neoconservative political philosophy have been traced back to the ideas of Carl 
Schmitt In particular his ideas of dictatorship and the executive licence afforded by the declaration of state of 
emergency have been linked by critics of neoconservatism as providing the illegitimate justification for the 
tactics employed in the ‘war on terror.’
23 This thesis shall not be directly concerned with the Western response to Islamist terrorism or the ‘war on 
terror’ except insofar as it has influenced the evolution of the Islamist ideology. As we shall be ending our 
account at 9/11, the point at which the Western counterterrorist efforts began in earnest, the historical 
significance of the ‘war on terra*’ is minimal.
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sometimes backed by a more nuanced argument than mere dogma. Jessica Stem, for example 
claims that:
Politically motivated terrorists do not appear to be “rational actors.” Political 
terrorists have rarely achieved their putative goals, and yet politically motivated 
terrorism persists. This suggests that the terrorists are motivated by something 
other than cost-benefit calculations about how to achieve the goals of their 
organization. Their individual motivations and the dynamics of their groups may 
lead to acts of violence that are inconsistent with their purported objectives.... For 
ad hoc groups seeking revenge, acts of violence are likely to be expressive rather 
than instrumental. Religious extremists, similarly, may be actively aiming for 
chaos or, in some cases, for martyrdom. It is hard to deter a group that is seeking 
to bring on Armageddon.24
Stem’s argument rests on the claim that whatever rhetoric terrorists employ to justify their 
actions, their ‘putative goals,’ this is bellied by their actions. The real motivation for their 
violence is first identified as ‘revenge’ but finally located in the irrational, nihilist desire for 
‘chaos, ... martyrdom ... [and ultimately] Armageddon.’ Some commentators embellish 
Stem’s claim by making a qualitative distinction between ‘old’ and ‘new’ terrorism. ‘Old’ 
terrorism such as the European left-wing groups of the 1970s exemplified by the Red Army 
Faction, or national-separatist terrorism including the Provisional IRA, are said to have 
discrete and explicit political objectives that, if achieved, would result in the end of terrorist 
activities. These groups acted more or less rationally by using terrorism as an appropriate tool 
to achieve their ends. The ‘new’ terrorism by contrast has no clearly demarcated or achievable 
political goals, and the violence that they inflict cannot obviously bring about the ill-defined 
utopian world they imagine. The ‘new’ terrorism is irrational, open-ended, unpredictable and 
unlimited—with no act of destruction too dire to contemplate. The only limit that these groups 
face is their ability to acquire and deploy means of mass destruction. The most prominent 
proponent of this view, Walter Laqueur, writes:
In its most extreme form, this new terrorism intends to liquidate all satanic forces, 
which may include the majority of a country or of mankind, as a precondition for 
the growth of another, better, and in any case different breed of human. In its 
maddest, most extreme form it may aim at the destruction of all life on earth, as 
the ultimate punishment for mankind’s crimes.25
24 Jessica Stem The Ultimate Terrorists pp. 130-131
25 Walter Laqueur The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms o f Mass Destruction p.81
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One feature that Laqueur and others identify in the ‘new’ terrorism is the role that religion 
plays in motivating the actors and providing rhetorical justification for its unbounded 
violence.26 Religion, in the hands of the fundamentalists, becomes an irrational, dogmatic and 
immutable force that is closed off from reason. Commentators suggest that religious terrorists 
consider themselves as God’s agents on earth whose irrevocable duty is to carry out His 
divine will. This provides them with ‘an absolute certainty as to the justness of their cause, the 
legitimacy of their leader, the inability, to recognize other moral values and considerations, 
and the abdication of critical judgement.’27 The prevalence of the religious suicide terrorist— 
sometimes expressed as a cult of martyrdom—is identified as the final seal on the fanatic 
argument. The willingness with which the religious terrorist destroys himself, it is claimed, at 
the same instance of destroying others, demonstrates the awful purposefulness with which 
they carry out their imagined duty and the absence of reason in their actions.
The second, less prevalent—particularly in academic circles—strand in the neoconservative
28account of terrorism is the ethical argument that conflates understanding and justification. 
This mode of argumentation is often couched in theological terminology that categorises the 
terrorists as evil. Although differing from the ‘fanatical’ strand of the neoconservative account 
the upshot of the argument is similar. The ‘fanatic’ or ‘irrational’ strand claims that a certain 
type of terrorism cannot be understood; the ethical strand claims that they should not be 
understood. Furthermore, the depiction of the terrorist as a fanatic and therefore beyond 
reason in the first strand is mirrored in the second strand by the terrorist as a ‘perfect nihilist’ 
or ‘moral monster’ and therefore beyond moral reasoning.29 A classic example of this mode of 
reasoning appears in a polemical essay by Benjamin Netanyahu:
The terrorist represents a new breed of man which takes humanity back to 
prehistoric times, to the times when morality was not yet bom. Divested of any 
moral principle, he has no moral sense, no moral controls, and is therefore capable 
of committing any crime, like a killing machine, without shame or remorse.... The 
root cause of terrorism lies not in grievances but in a disposition toward unbridled 
violence. This can be traced to a world view which asserts that certain ideological 
and religious goals justify, indeed demand the shedding of all moral inhibitions. In
26 Walter Laqueur The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms o f Mass Destruction p.92
27 Walter Laqueur The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms o f Mass Destruction pp.98-99
28 Some theologically-oriented academics slip easily between the two strands of the neoconservative argument. 
See Jean Bethke Elshtain Just War Against Terror: Ethics and the Burden o f American Power in a Violent 
World
29 Benjamin Netanyahu “Terrorists and Freedom Fighters” p.30
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this context the observation that the root cause of terrorism is terrorists is more 
than a tautology.30
Having identified the implacable evilness of terrorists and terrorism the neoconservative 
argument then goes on to claim that any attempt at understanding terrorism amounts to 
justifying it. Michael Walzer in his essay, ‘Terrorism: A Critique of Excuses’ argues that 
understanding terrorism ‘takes the form of apologetic descriptions and explanations, a litany 
of excuses that steadily undercuts our knowledge of the evil.’31 The ‘excuses’ that he alludes 
to include claims such as: terrorism is a last resort, terrorism is a weapon of the weak, 
terrorism is the only available means justified by a higher end, and finally terrorism is the 
‘universal resort’ i.e. all politics is terrorism. By examining and rejecting each of these 
arguments Walzer claims to demonstrate that the explanations, offered by commentators and 
terrorists, are in fact excuses and therefore invalid justifications for terrorism. One problem 
with Walzer’s argument is that the standard ‘explanations’ that he identifies are in fact straw 
men and so are easily knocked down. The ‘explanations’ are often presented, in more 
complex forms by left-wing commentators. As we shall see, however, these arguments fall far 
short of a sincere and serious attempt to understand terrorism and so Walzer’s claim does not 
stand up to scrutiny. Understanding and justification are not necessarily linked, but we ought 
to take the neoconservative claim as a warning, and ensure that we do not carelessly slip from 
one mode to the other.
1.2.6 Problems with the Neoconservative Account
By attempting to forestall serious investigation and understanding of terrorism the 
neoconservative account only serves its own political prejudices and aims. It leaves us with an 
anaemic and polemical account of terrorism that is dangerous and ill-conceived. If terrorism 
cannot, and should not, be understood, only exorcised and destroyed, then we are left with the 
terrifying prospect of an endless and escalating spiral of state and non-state violence. Terry 
Eagleton makes the same basic point, but also draws our attention to an interesting 
contradiction in the neoconservative account of terrorism:
In the so-called war against terror, ‘evil’ is used to foreclose the possibility of 
historical explanation. [...] In the disparagement of rational analysis which it
30 Benjamin Netanyahu “Terrorists and Freedom Fighters” pp.29-30
31 Michael Walzer “Terrorism: A Critique of Excuses” p.238
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suggests, it reflects something of the fundamentalism it confronts. Explanation is 
thought to be exculpation. Reasons become excuses. Terrorist assault is just a 
surreal sort of madness... [...] On this somewhat obtuse theory, to explain why 
someone behaves as they do is to demonstrate that they could not have acted 
otherwise, thus absolving them of responsibility. [...]
The truth is that unless you act for a reason, your action is irrational and you are 
probably absolved of blame for it. [...] Acting for a reason involves creatively 
interpreting the forces which bear in upon us, rather than allowing them to smack 
us around like snooker balls; and such interpretation involves a degree of freedom.
It is inadvisable to caricature your enemy as crazy or spurred on by bestial 
passion, since morally speaking this lets him off the hook. You must decide 
whether you are going to see him as evil or mad. Unless we can propose some 
reasons for why people act as they do, we are not speaking of specifically human 
behaviour at all, and questions of innocence or guilt become accordingly 
irrelevant. Moral action must be purposive action: we would not call tripping over 
a stone morally reprehensible, or wax morally indignant over a rumble in the gut. 
Reasons may be morally repugnant, but actions without them cannot be.32
If terrorists are truly irrational and thus acting without any intelligible reason, then their 
actions must have been sufficiently determined by forces outside of their control. If this is the 
case then they cannot be held morally culpable for their actions—a conclusion that would 
certainly not be palatable for neoconservatives.
The popular correlate of the neoconservative account of Islamist terrorism is the vocabulary 
commonly employed by the Western media and in political discourse to describe the 
phenomenon. Polemical designations including ‘extremist,’ ‘radical’ and ‘militant’ are used 
as euphemisms for words such as ‘Islamist’ and ‘terrorist;’ words that are considered to cast 
a too definitive description of the action.33 Along with the words ‘fundamentalist’ and 
‘fanaticism’ these terms do not only pick out a certain type of action, they also serve as an 
explanation for its occurrence. Or to put it more precisely the explanation consists in ending 
the possibility of understanding the action by locating the behaviour of the actor beyond the 
limits of reasonableness and thus reason. These types of words merely imply the actor 
believes something strongly (extremist/radical/fundamentalist) and as a result is willing to 
use violence (militant) occasionally against innocent civilians (fanaticism/terrorism).34 What 
exactly it is they believe is either entirely disregarded as unimportant or unknowable.
32 Terry Eagleton Holy Terror pp.l 16-117
33 See BBC Editorial Guidelines: “Guidance Terrorism, Use of Language When Reporting”
34 We are not claiming that these words cannot be useful in any circumstance—and with some care we shall find 
it necessary to utilize some of them later—but that their common usage tends to obscure our understanding of 
terrorism rather than clarify it.
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Ordinarily when the word ‘Islamist’ is employed it is used as a synonym with these other 
terms, and so firmly within the irrational mode of accounting for terrorism.
1.2.7 Left-wing Account of Terrorism
If the neoconservative account denudes terrorism of meaning in order to advance its political 
aims then the left-wing account tries to explain too much and in so doing superimposes its 
own political views onto the actions of terrorists. For example, a leftist commentator may 
broadly argue that America is a neo-imperialist actor subjugating the weak to its political and 
economic will; then they will explain a terrorist attack against America as the lashing out of 
the global dispossessed against the powerful. The political grievances of the commentator are 
thus mapped directly onto the terrorists; even if the terrorist’s rhetoric suggests that the 
reasons for their action lie elsewhere, the commentator argues that these are manifestations of 
the real grievances masked in a local idiom. Noam Chomsky is the best known public 
commentator who utilises this mode of explanation. In several books and interviews 
following 9/11 Chomsky follows a standard leftist model for discussing terrorism. First there 
is a perfunctory condemnation of the act of terrorism, the ‘horrifying atrocities,’ followed by 
a wholesale attack on U.S. neo-imperialism and hypocrisy, their support for Israeli 
aggression, Western neo-colonial economic globalisation and so on.35 The underlying 
argument is that the terror of the weak is a reaction to the vastly more destructive, structural 
terror of the strong.
1.2.8 Problems with the Left-wing Account
The main force of Chomsky’s argument is not to seriously understand terrorism, but is a 
critique against both the neoconservative account of terrorism and the political positions that 
inform this account. The terrorism itself is treated as a mere symptom of a much more 
fundamental and important problem and as such is more-or-less ignored by the leftist critique. 
The ‘terrorism’ that they want to talk about rests on a definition of terrorism that conflates the 
violent and coercive activities of states with that of non-state actors.36 ‘Is there any political 
violence,’ Ted Honderich rhetorically asks, ‘that is not intended to work by causing terror or
35 Noam Chomsky 9-11 p. 11
36 The conflation of terrorism with other violent activities will be discussed further in the section on defining 
terrorism.
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fear?’37 It is the ‘war on terror’ that concerns them and the dominant Western political- 
economic neo-liberalist ideology, globalisation, capitalism and even Zionism that lies behind 
it. One further problem with both the politicised modes of explanation is that their accounts 
of terrorism are often aimed at denouncing the political-philosophy of the other. We have 
already seen Walzer’s ‘critique of excuses’ that was levelled against the explanations of the 
leftist commentators and Eagleton’s attack on paradoxes inherent in the neoconservative 
logic. By aiming their conceptual guns at one another any possibility of understanding 
terrorism is lost in the din of the crossfire.
The fixation on the Western response to terrorism eventually leads, according to many leftist 
academics, to the inversion of non-state terrorism and state counterterrorism—it is the latter 
that causes the former:
On this basis, my conclusion is that terrorism is not the first, original cause of the 
so-called war against terrorism formulated and declared by Bush (a first cause that 
would justify this war precisely as war against terrorism); nor does anti-American 
terrorism precede the war that has been waged against it as a response to it. 
Terrorism (as well as its symbol, 9/11) is instead the true effect or the real 
consequence of the war against terrorism that the United States has been waging 
for decades in numerous parts of the world. In other words, war is the true cause 
of that which it declares it is fighting—namely terrorism.
Whilst we do not wish to deny the complex interplay between non-state terrorism and the 
actions of the state, it is disingenuous to effectively ignore the ideology of the terrorists and 
instead transpose one’s own political grievances onto their behaviour. Not only does it come 
close to justifying terrorism, as the neoconservatives claim, but much more problematically it 
stymies any possibility of understanding terrorism. The strident polemic of the left-wing 
commentators effectively mutes the voice and ideas of the Islamists in a similar way as the 
neoconservative account.
1.2.9 Rational Choice Account of Terrorism
So far we have discussed the deficiencies in the psychological and politicised accounts of 
terrorism. The former was easily located in the explanation methodology however it is more
37 Ted Honderich After The Terror p.97
38 Angelica Nuzzo “Reasons for Conflict: Political Implications of a Definition of Terrorism”
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difficult to categorise the politicised accounts. By superimposing their own partisan political 
beliefs onto the topic they fail to engage seriously in explanation or understanding. We shall 
now examine one last explanatory framework that is quite different from the psychological 
account. The rational choice account of terrorism explicitly rejects the ‘irrational’ or ‘fanatic’ 
model of terrorists and instead claims that the actions of terrorists are best explained if we 
consider them to be rational actors efficiently pursuing their preferred ends.
Rational choice theory is most vigorously pursued by Robert Pape in his precisely named 
book Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic o f Suicide Terrorism. His study is a rejection of the 
‘irrational,’ or ‘religious f  ndamentalist’ account, stating that ‘most suicide terrorism is 
undertaken as a strategic effort directed toward particular political goals; it is not simply the 
product of irrational individuals or an expression of fanatical hatreds.’39 He comes to this 
conclusion after conducting an empirical study of incidents of suicide terrorism and 
discovering a statistical correlation between its repeated occurrence and national-separatist 
struggles. ‘What nearly all suicide terrorist attacks have in common,’ Pape claims, ‘is a 
specific secular and strategic goal: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military 
forces from territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland.40 Fundamentalist 
religious beliefs, by contrast, are poor predictors of suicide terrorism, as is demographic 
profiling.41
1.2.10 Problems with the Rational Choice Account
As with the psychological account Pape uses empirical data to uncover correlations between 
certain variables and terrorist behaviour. The psychological account looked for these 
variables in the psychological properties of individuals; the sociological account looked for 
them in the socio-economic background of terrorists. Pape’s search for the relevant variables 
took place in the professed causes of terrorist groups. By indentifying in the data a correlation 
with a specific political end, Pape can model suicide terrorism as a strategic, and therefore, 
rational behaviour that is employed as the most efficient and effective method to pursue this 
end.42 One advantage of using rational choice theory over other explanatory accounts is that it
39 Robert A. Pape Dying To Win: The Strategic Logic o f Suicide Terrorism p.27
40 Robert A. Pape Dying To Win: The Strategic Logic o f Suicide Terrorism p.4
41 Robert A. Pape Dying To Win: The Strategic Logic o f Suicide Terrorism p. 17
42 The reason for Pape’s result is the predominance in the data of the Tamil Tiger group, a national-separatist 
movement who pioneered the use of suicide terrorism. It seems probable that if Pape’s dataset—covering the
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links means and ends so we at least have purposeful actors who commit terrorism as a means 
of attaining a goal. However with rational choice theory the preferences are always given and 
ordered, it has nothing to say, for instance why the actor holds those preferences and not 
others, or why certain preferences are ordered above others. We end up with an account that 
views terrorists as automata rationally, efficiently and mechanically pursuing their goals. In 
other words like all the other explanatory account there is a barrier to understanding, the thing 
that makes the actions, and the actors, meaningful, is ignored. Furthermore, the exclusive 
focus on instrumental rationality precludes the possibility that terrorist acts are in part 
symbolically orientated.
One final problem is that Pape treats the goals of groups and individuals who employ suicide 
terrorism as discrete and clearly identifiable. The Tamil Tigers, who form the largest sub­
dataset in Pape’s study, are taken to be pursuing a national-separatist goal, to form an 
independent Tamil state. It is unlikely, however, that this was their only objective; no doubt 
goals to correct issues surrounding identity, historical political, economic and social 
discrimination were also mixed together with their overarching aim. Furthermore, the goals 
of movements are often not fixed, but are malleable depending on the successes or failures of 
the group, changes in leadership and so on. Priorities also change over time; sometimes the 
mere survival of a movement becomes the ultimate goal. Communication is also imperfect 
both internally and externally and it is likely that there will be intra-group divisions regarding 
goals and the best way to pursue them—and some of these divisions will lead to paradoxical 
goals and means being pursued. All this means that within a terrorist movement multiple ends 
are not known fully either to insiders or outsiders. Essentially the ends of a movement are 
multiple, changeable, shifting in priority, paradoxical and not entirely known to insiders or 
outsiders; rather than discrete, known, and ordered as rational choice theory necessarily 
assumes.
1.2.11 Understanding Terrorism: Historical-Narrative Understanding of Terrorism
Having examined politicised and explanatory accounts of terrorism we can now turn to 
methodologies that aim to ‘understand’ terrorism. The principle category here is meaning; 
actors are assumed to mean something by their actions and it is possible to discern this
period 1980-2003—was updated by a few years the results would be drastically altered by the vast number of 
‘suicide terrorist’ attacks in Iraq.
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meaning through interpretive understanding. One way in which terrorism has been 
understood, especially after 9/11, is through what we shall call the ‘narrative’ methodology. 
The central claim is that the existence and actions of a movement and individuals can only be 
understood by constructing a narrative retelling of their history. This involves telling the 
stories of the principle individual actors, movements and texts and discovering their 
connections, continuities, discontinuities and pathways of influences upon each other. A good 
narrative will also describe and link the historical and social context of a movement with its 
inception, growth and development. Narrative accounts of Islamist terrorism range from the 
journalistic style that include first-hand experiences of the personalities and movements by 
the author and tends to be driven by the excitement of the narrative, to the academic style that 
primarily utilises second-hand sources and texts and concentrates on historical detail and 
accuracy.43
There are several advantages to the narrative approach to understanding terrorism. Hannah 
Arendt argues that ‘action reveals itself fully only to the storyteller, that is, to the backward 
glance of the historian, who indeed always knows better what it was all about than the 
participants.’44 It requires the backwards gaze of the historian as a storyteller to discern the 
meaning of actions: ‘even though stories are the inevitable results of action, it is not the actor 
but the storyteller who perceives and “makes” the story.’45 The relationship between 
narrative, history and meaning is complex and the use of the term ‘storyteller’ is in itself 
telling. There is no singularly truthful narrative to be told but a multitude of competing 
narratives some of which will contradict one another, others that can co-exist side-by-side.
The ‘story’ or narrative is not discovered but is necessarily constructed by the historian as the 
storyteller. Certain events, actors and context will need to be weighed for their significance. 
Connections, currents, continuities and discontinuities are theorised that link disparate events 
into a coherent narrative. Order is imposed on the chaos of events; coherence is discerned in 
the flux of history. The multiplicity of narratives does not necessarily mean that all narratives 
are equally valid; certain narratives are judged—by the sense they make of history—better or 
more valid than others. There is not, however, a singularly truthful narrative that can be
43 Examples of the journalistic style includes Jason Burke’s Al-Qaeda, Lawrence Wright’s The Looming Tower, 
Rohan Gunaratna Inside Al Qaeda and Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon’s The Next Attack. The more 
scholarly narrative studies include Giles Kepel’s Jihad and Marc Sageman’s Understanding Terror Networks.
44 Hannah Arendt The Human Condition p. 192
45 Hannah Arendt The Human Condition p. 192
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discovered in practice, or postulated in theory. By definition interpretive understanding seeks 
to interpret human action to discern its meaning, but all acts of interpretation are open to 
revision; there is no God’s eye view of human history—or at least not one we have access to.
The impossibility of finally discovering the meaning of a human action is the reason that the 
naturalists shy away from the category of understanding, preferring instead the presumed 
stability and objectivity of the natural sciences. The charge of relativism is the price that one 
pays by utilizing interpretive understanding but the anaemic state of explanatory accounts 
that ignore meaning, means that this is a price that must be paid. There are ways that absolute 
relativism—to coin an oxymoron—can be mitigated against through the device of 
storytelling. The insights into human meaning that are revealed by the historical-narrative 
method are balanced against its deceptions—its strengths are also the source of its 
weaknesses. Storytelling will always include an element of fiction that postulates connections 
where there are none, glosses over discontinuities, and where events are unknown there will 
be a temptation to fill out the gaps. The narrative author, when telling a history, will be 
tempted to sacrifice accuracy and detail in favour of a compelling storyline, to impose one’s 
narrative on events, rather than to read narratives from events. Entertainment, especially with 
an exciting subject like terrorism, may be preferred over accuracy.46
Despite these problems the narrative-historian is still necessary for interpretive 
understanding. The actors caught up and enmeshed in the unfolding of history can only attain 
a partial understanding of the significance and meaning of their actions. ‘All accounts told by 
the actors themselves, though they may in rare cases give an entirely trustworthy statement of 
intentions, aims, and motives, become mere useful source material in the historian’s hands 
and can never match his story in significance and truthfulness.’47 The most significant benefit 
provided by a narrative is that by placing events in their historical context we can make sense 
of them. History, meaning and narrative are conceptually inseparable. Terrorism, and terrorist 
movements, do not spontaneously arise out of nowhere, they have a history—or more 
precisely histories—and only through these histories can we hope to understand terrorism.
Many academic texts on terrorism treat the phenomenon as though it can be talked about 
abstracted away from the history of terrorist movements, discussing, for instance, the
46 This is especially problematic with joumalistic-style accounts of terrorism.
47 Hannah Arendt The Human Condition p. 192
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networks that constitute terrorist movements, how they organize themselves and recruit new 
individuals, and the technologies of violence that they exploit—as though terrorism is ‘just 
there’ waiting to be theorised.48 Others acknowledge a history but diminish its significance 
through a cursory examination that takes the history for granted or do not recognize Islamists’ 
deep historical roots 49 We dispute both of these types of accounts because terrorism is 
always a concrete phenomenon embedded in the history and context of the particular 
movement that practices it. Terrorism as a purely abstract action-type, therefore, cannot be 
usefully understood.
As we have discussed there are multiplicities of narratives that can coexist alongside one- 
another—there are different types of histories to be told. Narratives cannot help but identify 
historical currents; otherwise they would just be temporally-ordered lists of unconnected 
events of unknown significance and thus meaningless. Just as there is no singularly truthful 
history, so too there is no singularly compelling historical force. The only way that we can 
extricate ourselves from hopeless relativism is to ask how much sense the historical forces we 
identify, make of events. If a particular history helps us understand events and discovers 
meaning in human action, then it is useful history, no more and no less.
One example of an excellent but flawed historical narrative of Islamist terrorism is Gilles 
Kepel’s Jihad: On the Trail o f Political Islam. Kepel examines the historical rise and spread 
of political Islam from the 1960s to the 1990s and its decline from the mid-1990s to 9/11. He 
charts Islamism’s development in Egypt, the Arab states and Pakistan, and its subsequent 
spread to Southeast Asia, Sudan and Afghanistan; followed by its degeneration into violent 
jihad and terrorism in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Bosnia and Algeria. The historical narrative 
that Kepel constructs is one of rise, spread and decline. Broadly speaking the historical 
driving force that he identifies behind Islamism’s rise is the alignment of economic, social 
and political interests of the urban poor, students, the devout middle class and bazaar-owning 
entrepreneurs that allowed them to unite under the Islamist ideology against repressive ruling 
classes. When these interests inevitably become misaligned the movement falls apart, the
48 See Jessica Stem The Ultimate Terrorists and Marc Sageman Understanding Terror Networks
49 See Quintan Wiktorowicz Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West and Stephen Vertigans 
Militant Islam: A Sociology o f Characteristics, Causes and Consequences
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ideology loses its social base and the fanatical element, the ‘jihadist-salafists’ takes control 
resulting in outbreaks of undirected terrorist violence.50
The Islamist ideology for Kepel is a useful political fiction for coordinating the actions of 
disparate groups with shared interests. In other words it is the socio-economic interests that 
provide the real motivation for action, but they are cloaked in an ideological disguise. Kepel 
makes the dependent relationship of ideology on social interests clear:
In the final analysis, any ideology’s attractions, and the limits of those attractions, 
depend on how it adapts to the perceived needs of a society. The successes and 
failures of the Islamist movement in the twentieth century, from the time of the 
Muslim brothers to the present, show this trend very clearly.51
Kepel makes an error by not taking the Islamist ideology seriously enough and so makes the 
mistake of interpreting Islamist terrorism as the final ‘paroxysm of violence’ for a movement 
that, having lost its social base, was in terminal decline.52 Kepel identifies in the al-Qaeda 
ideology the transcendental impulse, what he calls ‘the mystique of jihad,’ that tends towards 
acts of symbolic, spectacular but irrational acts of violence, but he fails to acknowledge the 
rational pragmatism that contains and directs this violence.53 Kepel also fails to account for 
the power and durability of an ideology that was able to evolve and adapt to new political 
realities and balances of power. We are not denying the usefulness and thus validity of 
Kepel’s narrative, but offering a critique of his conceptual account of ideology. Like the 
psychological and neoconservative account Kepel fails to interpret meaning in Islamist 
terrorism, felling back instead on the inscrutable language of irrational fanaticism. Our 
particular historical-narrative of the Islamist movement aims to correct this mistake by taking 
ideology seriously. For that we must turn to an examination of what we shall call the 
ideological understanding of terrorism.
1.2.12 Understanding Terrorism through Ideology
Most of the explanatory methods that we have examined share an attempt to theorise a 
general a type of social action—terrorism—rather than the historically specific phenomenon
50 Gilles Kepel Jihad: The Trail o f Political Islam p.220
51 Gilles Kepel Jihad: The Trail o f Political Islam p.30
52 Gilles Kepel Jihad: The Trail c f Political Islam p.225
53 Gilles Kepel Jihad: The Trail o f Political Islam p.376
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of Islamist terrorism. The basic premise is that the particular cause for which the action is 
undertaken (religious, nationalist, anarchist) is of secondary importance for explaining the 
type of behaviour that is common to them all. It is doubtful that studying ‘terrorism’ in the 
abstract is a useful exercise. Removed from its context terrorism becomes a mere technique 
devoid of meaning. Robin Collingwood conceived of all human history as the history of 
thought and it is the history of the ideas that together form the Islamist ideology that we shall 
attempt to capture.54 This study is concerned not with terrorism as a generic category of 
action but with the Islamist movement, its ideology and its terrorist behaviour. Our central 
claim is that terrorism committed in the name of Islam can be usefully understood by charting 
the historical development of the Islamist ideology and Islamist movements.55 This means 
that we shall take all ideas and beliefs seriously including religious ideas. What may appear 
as ‘fanatical’ or ‘irrational’ religious beliefs must remain open to interpretive understanding. 
Steve Bruce, in his study of fundamentalisms writes in this regard:
I cannot accept that, as a matter of principle, we should suppose religion to be 
without consequences. It would be bizarre of something that took up so much of 
so many people’s wealth and time, and that so dominated so many cultures, did 
not matter: that it merely served as a cafeteria of convenient legitimations for any 
sort of behaviour.56
Although Bruce refers specifically to religious beliefs we shall extend his principle to all 
ideas and beliefs contained within the Islamist ideology. Further on in his study Bruce 
identifies a:
major divide among social scientists in their general orientation to the role of 
religion in social action. Do religious beliefs cause people to do things or do 
people act as they do for mundane economic, political or social reasons and then 
use their religious repertoire to provide a justification for their actions?57
We have already discussed the problems with the second option where religious ideological 
beliefs are presumed to rationalise more basic drives. The first option, whereby religious 
beliefs are said to cause actions, is too deterministic and simplistic. The relationship between 
ideology and action is complex and will be discussed in more detail later. A third option is
54 R.G. Collingwood cited in Peter Winch The Idea o f a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy p. 131
55 One example of an attempt to analyse the post-9/11 Islamist ideology is Jeffrey Haynes’s “Al-Qaeda:
Ideology and Action.”
56 Steve Bruce Fundamentalism p. 103
57 Steve Bruce Fundamentalism pp. 102-103
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that religious beliefs—or more precisely religious elements of ideology—are just as 
mundane, ordinary and basic as ‘economic, political [and] social’ reasons. Only by taking 
religious beliefs seriously, and not as rationalisations or pseudo-beliefs, can we seek to 
genuinely understand religious ideologies. One may be required to undertake the initial ‘leap 
of faith’ to accept the basic fundamental truth of Islam in order to entertain the Islamist 
ideology, however this merely the starting point, it does not follow that the rest of the 
ideology is a matter of irrational or blind faith. This is particularly the case when the central 
core of the ideology explicitly subsumes political, economic and social truths into religious 
claims. Instead of saying ideology causes action, we say that ideology allows us to 
understand actions, but to understand ideology we must also understand actions. It is clear 
that interpretive understanding is not a linear process: understanding ideology requires 
understanding of actions, and to understand actions one must understand ideology. Earlier we 
stated that history, meaning and narrative are conceptually intertwined; we can now add that 
ideology, actions and meaning are similarly interconnected.
This study aims to enter into this web and make some sense of it. To understand human 
action, as we discussed earlier is ‘grasping the point or meaning of what is being said and 
done.’58 Although understanding a foreign ‘form of life,’ to use Wittgenstein’s phrase, is 
difficult and exposed to the danger of imposing one’s own conceptual structure onto the 
discourse under study the alternative of turning one’s back on understanding is intellectually 
tempting but unacceptable. Other academics who have been superficially committed to the 
method of interpretive understanding baulk when faced with its sheer otherness. Bruce, 
despite striking out in the right direction eventually capitulates to this temptation when he 
describes ‘the thoroughly religious crusade or, in the language of Islam, the jihad. In pursuit 
of its universal mission to conquer the entire world for Allah, Iran attempted to export its 
Islamic revolution. Osama Bin Laden is a Saudi Arab but he fought against the Great Satan in 
Afghanistan.’59 The hyperbole of fanatical irrationalism is never far away when talking about 
the Islamist ideology and terrorism and so must be constantly guarded against. Just as we 
shall not exclude any ideas from interpretive understanding we shall also not exclude any 
actions—no matter how morally abhorrent—from the possibility of containing meanihg. 
Unlike the neoconservatives who claim that evil cannot or should not be understood we shall
58 Peter Winch The Idea o f a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy p.l 15
59 Steve Bruce Fundamentalism pp.8-9 Emphasis added.
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endeavour to describe and understand the evolution of the Islamist ideology and movement, 
not to evaluate it.
One major advantage with the ideological approach to terrorism is that it can at least begin to 
reconcile the extremes presented by the ‘irrational’ and ‘rational’ models of terrorism. Martha 
Crenshaw struggles with these two paradoxical aspects of terrorism when she writes:
Even the most extreme and unusual forms of political behavior can follow an 
internal, strategic logic. If there are consistent patterns in terrorist behavior, rather 
than random idiosyncrasies, a strategic analysis may reveal them. ... Terrorism 
can be considered a reasonable way of pursuing extreme interests in the political 
arena.... It is one among the many alternatives that radical organizations can 
choose. Strategic conceptions, based on ideas of how best to take advantage of the 
possibilities of a given situation, are an important determinant oppositional 
terrorism, as they are the government response. However, no single explanation 
for terrorist behavior is satisfactory. Strategic calculation is only one factor in the 
decision-making process leading to terrorism. But it is critical to include strategic 
reasoning as a possible motivation, at a minimum as an antidote to stereotypes of 
“terrorists” as irrational fanatics.60
We cited Jessica Stem’s argument earlier that claimed that the more ‘extreme’ terrorism was 
‘expressive’ and it is this aspect that Crenshaw seems to be trying to grasp. A more 
productive way of understanding the ‘irrational’ element of terrorism is to reconceptualise it 
as either ‘expressive’ or ‘symbolic.’ ‘Most social scientific attempts at theory of terrorism,’ 
Wilkinson correctly points out, ‘suffer from a fatal flaw: they neglect the role and influence 
of terrorist ideologies and beliefs in inspiring and guiding revolutionary terrorist 
organisations and in nourishing hatred and violence.’61 Only by understanding the Islamist 
ideology can both the rational-strategic explanation of terrorism be reconciled with the 
expressive value-rationality aspect of terrorism to synthesise an interpretive understanding of 
terrorism within its historical context. As we shall see in detail later only by recognising the 
ability of ideology to contain both instrumental and value rationality can these two 
paradoxical aspects of terrorism be understood and adequately accounted for.
Wittgenstein’s analogy of a length of thread—one that he used in relation to language—is 
instructive for understanding ideology. Within a length of thread fibres overlap and 
intertwine together to create the thread. Although no single fibre runs the entire length of the
60 Martha Crenshaw “The Logic of Terrorism” p.24
61 Paul Wilkinson Terror and the Liberal State p.96
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thread their overlapping creates the appearance of a single continuous thread and its 
continuity along its entire length.62 Likewise the history and development of ideologies, and 
ideological movements, may not have a single shared idea that runs unchanged from 
beginning to end, but are instead composed of overlapping ideas and movements, that 
combine to create the appearance of a homogonous, static ideology, or ideological 
movement. We have to recognise, however that ideologies, are in fact dynamic, and so to 
understand an ideology we must examine its history, its continuities and discontinuities, the 
wax and wane of ideas, the paradigm shifts that occur at critical moments of crises and
• • 63triumphs; in short we should seek to describe the evolution of the Islamist ideology. 
Furthermore, as we have already stated, theory and practice are intimately linked, so we must 
study the history of the movements that embody the ideology and its evolution—the changes 
in organization, the shifts in power, the rise and fall of its intellectual and political leaders, 
and so forth. Finally, we must undertake these examinations in tandem to see the links 
between ideological theory and its practice in-the-world, how they interact with one-another, 
and examine the complex ways that changes in one ripple across to effect the other. By 
collecting together the threads of these connected histories we hope to draw a coherent and 
compelling narrative that ultimately helps explain the forms of both the movement and the 
ideology at a moment in history, and perhaps point to their evolving forms in the future.
1.2.13 Limitations of the Ideology-Narrative Methodology
As we saw in the previous section the idea of constructing a narrative is also problematic— 
once again we should note that there will certainly be more than one narrative that can be told 
of any ideology or its movements, thus it would not be correct to describe our narrative as 
‘true’ in a definitive and exclusive sense. However, if we define a narrative as a fiction that 
makes useful sense of the facts, or to return to the previous analogy, the collecting together of 
fibres—historical events, important writings etc.—into a coherent and understandable thread 
of a story, then we can tentatively claim that some narratives are ‘truer’ than others. Every 
history is an imagined narrative—one that must discriminate against and for, select and
62 Ludwig Wittgenstein Philosophical Investigations §67
63 The source texts that we shall use in this study will be a mixture of historic and journalist accounts of the 
history of the Islamist movement—in order to provide us with the historical and intellectual context—and 
translations of the works of the main Islamist thinkers. We should note that this does not constitute primary 
historical research as we are not returning to the original source material. However this is not the aim of the 
study, we are merely using the history to understand the evolution of the ideology, and using the ideology to 
understand the historical development of the movement.
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disregard, and rank in importance, certain documents, events and characters over others, in 
telling its story—and this is a problem that this thesis will not attempt to overcome. This does 
not mean, of course, that all histories are equal and the value of our narrative will be judged 
on the ‘sense’ that it makes of the events and texts it examines—it will however, always be a 
provisional narrative that is open to the discovery of new historical facts, and the application 
of new modes of interpretation.
The challenge of critically describing a narrative of the evolution of an ideology and its 
movement must be tempered in several respects. We have already noted that to talk about 
ideology in the singular is misleading—ideology, by containing competing or even 
contradictorily ideas will always tend to split apart; it is inherently fractious. Therefore it is 
more correct to talk about ideologies in the plural although for the sake of style we shall 
continue to use the singular form, but this will not distract us from the discontinuities, 
disjunctions and cracks in the ideology’s history. Similarly, and for largely the same reasons, 
there are usually movements—rather than a single movement—connected with the ideology, 
and the alliances, affinities, differences and power struggles will both reflect and cause 
ideological fracturing, as well as play a major role in the historical evolution of the 
movements.
We have argued that advancing our understanding of an ideology and its ideological 
movements can be achieved through critically describing and analysing their historical 
narratives. At the same time we have highlighted the broad difficulties and dangers in this 
methodology; there is however, an interesting, even ironic, separate problematic that is worth 
noting. Ideology, in its functional role as a map for understanding the socio-political world, 
also tends to simplify complex situations—to make them comprehensible and navigable for 
the actor—and this extends to imagining simplified and narrowly partisan narratives for 
complex histories. To use a stark example, we should expect that the history of the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict would appear as very different narratives to a Jewish settler and a 
Palestinian refugee.64 As with every aspect of ideology historical narratives are imagined 
through a complex and interactive process. The core beliefs that constitute the ideology will
64 The narrative of this history would presumably stretch much further back than the founding of the state of 
Israel, perhaps as far back as biblical times. The stitching together of history and mythology would be 
unproblematic as ideology produces a ‘narrative’ which is more concerned with creating a coherent and 
compelling story—an imagined past—than a factually accurate account of past events.
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guide the imagining of the narrative and likewise the imagined narratives will dynamically 
shape and reinforce the core beliefs. The fact that ideology plays a fundamental role in 
shaping historical narratives means that it will also create narratives that explain, mythologize 
and naturalise its own history and existence. This will often take the form of an ideology 
imagining itself to be permanent and unchanging, and present its beliefs as non-ideological.65 
These points are worth noting both because they constitute an interesting aspect of ideology 
theory, but also as a warning that we should be careful not to uncritically accept the historical 
narrative myths imagined by the ideology under study, and in particular the myths that justify 
and explain the core beliefs that constitute the ideology.
Any ambiguities that disrupt the cogency of the imagined narratives are either ignored or 
resolved—often with reference to some unseen event or text. The more imaginative the 
narrative has to be to account for anomalous ‘facts’ the more it acquires the characteristics of 
paranoia by frequently referring to hidden conspiracies that exert great power behind the 
scenes of history. These observations should help to resolve a fundamental question for the 
study of ideology. Although we have pointed out the numerous difficulties of attaining a 
neutral viewpoint from which to describe and understand ideologies, there is a more 
fundamental question that should determine our methodology: is an ideology better 
understood from the ‘inside’ or ‘outside?’66 Does one, for example, have to subscribe to an 
Islamist ideology to be able to fully understand it?
We have already seen that by definition there is no singularly truthful description that can be 
made of an ideology; however this does not automatically lead to the relativist position that 
all claims are equally valid. We could, therefore, say that both the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ 
perspectives will yield interesting but partial accounts of the ideology. However, given the 
self-reflective nature of ideology and its internal mechanisms to mythologize its own history, 
and the histories that concern it, the ‘inside’ perspective is particularly fraught with difficulty. 
In fact, an ‘inside’ perspective that attempts to objectively describe their ideology will either 
just re-describe the ideology’s internal narratives or, if successful in attaining a degree of
65 The appearance or claims, of an unchanging, permanent, singular non-ideological truth are, paradoxically, the 
hallmarks of ideological thinking. With our previous example we could speculate that the presence of such 
divergent ideologies with their historical narratives at striking odds could account for the obsession exhibited by 
all sides to create (superficial, but explicitly labelled, non-ideological) ‘facts-on-the-ground.’
66 This question is sometimes raised through the assertion that it is impossible to understand an ideology from 
the ‘outside’ (or the ‘inside -  depending on one’s perspective).
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objectively, the actor will have, to some extent stepped outside of their ideological beliefs. In 
either case it should be clear that the ‘outside’ perspective will be more likely to yield a 
useful, semi-objective, understanding of the ideology—but to do so it would need to draw
67upon the resources provided by ‘insider’ accounts of the ideology.
1.3 Ideology: Introduction
We have been using the concepts o f ‘ideology and ‘terrorism’ quite freely but it is important 
to note that in both academic and lay discourses both are problematic. One could denounce 
terrorism as an irredeemably ideological concept. Accordingly, who is, or is not, a terrorist 
depends entirely on one’s partisan ideological viewpoint. This is captured in the perennial 
cliche ‘one man’s terrorist, is another man’s freedom fighter.’68 Does this mean that we 
should dispose of both concepts? Cliches, despite, or perhaps because of, their endless 
repetition and uncritical internalisation, contain elements of truth. It is probably correct to say 
that the real world usage of ‘terrorism’ has rendered it with permanent negative 
connotations.69 In almost all recent regular and irregular conflicts each side will invoke the 
rhetorical, and often substantial, accusation of terrorism to condemn their enemy. Although it 
is beyond reasonable expectations to rescue the language of terrorism as an intellectually 
productive concept in everyday speech, it is our contention that it is not, to paraphrase Daniel 
Bell, ‘an irretrievably fallen word.’70
Bell, however, was referring to ‘ideology,’ not terrorism, in making that claim. His point was 
not just that ‘ideology’ had been irreversibly tainted through rhetorical abuse but that it had 
become a philosophically bankrupt concept. According to Bell’s thesis the great ideologies of 
the 20th century had reached a state of exhaustion and would now diminish and disappear to 
be replaced by a technocratic, non-ideological system of administration-led governance. As 
part of the ‘end of ideology’ movement in the 1950s, Bell was a forerunner to the ‘end of
67 Ed Husain’s The Islamist is a popular example of an ‘insider’ account and illustrates both its strengths and 
flaws. Whilst offering an interesting and detailed account of the author’s journey into an Islamist movement, the 
latter part of the book falls back on the tired stereotypes of the ‘radical’ and ‘irrational’ Islamist ideology— 
whereby the ideology merely serves as a rationalisation for violence and the channelling of frustrations of young 
British Muslims.
68 Gerald Seymour Harry’s Game: A Navel p.87
69 See Igor Primoratz “What Is Terrorism?”
70 Daniel Bell The End ofIdeology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties p.406
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history’ thesis that became fashionable in the 1990s—and equally as premature in declaring 
the cessation of human political innovation and conflict.71
Despite these substantial problems we shall not discard our tools into a conceptual dustbin, 
but shall pursue a ‘green’ ethic of cleaning, recycling and reusing these concepts whilst 
acknowledging their limitations. Our task, therefore, is to corral the two ‘damaged’ 
pejoratives of ‘ideology’ and ‘terrorism’ and utilize them in an intellectually productive 
project to understand, analyse and demystify an interesting and important modem 
phenomena—the Islamist movement and terrorism. This will require not just defining our 
terms but also providing ourselves the theoretical tools required for our ideology-centred 
conceptual framework for understanding the Islamist movement. To this end we will sketch 
the historical development of the concept in order to both critically define and outline a 
general theory of ideology. We shall concentrate on the crucial contribution to ideology 
theory made by Marx and the three thinkers who followed in his footsteps: Mannheim, 
Gramsci and Althusser.
1.3.1 Karl Marx and Ideology
The word ‘ideology’ was first coined by an imprisoned Antoine Destutt de Tracy during the 
Reign of Terror following the French Revolution. He sought to systematise the study of ideas 
and create a branch of science that would classify and decode human ideas and analyse their 
psychological and social origins: to establish a ‘science of ideas.’ The project was informed 
by the enlightenment belief in the progress of science and served as a prelude to the logical 
positivists. This is reflected by the fact that de Tracy not only envisaged this new branch of 
science to study ideas, but it was also to eventually serve, through its systematic and 
empirical methodology, as a critical test that would reject or shape ideas from a rational basis.
The influence of Marx and Engels on the concept of ideology has been profound and it is 
worth examining their contribution, and that of those who followed in the Marxist tradition, 
in some detail. Marx and Engels’ understanding of ideology, in contrast to Destutt’s positivist 
optimism, is entirely negative. In The German Ideology they attack the young Hegelians who 
they accused of examining ideas as though they had an independent existence from the
71 See Gaylir Talshir “The Phoenix of Ideology” for a critique of Bell’s ‘end of ideology’ thesis.
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material world. In so doing the German idealists systematically distorted reality and turned 
philosophy into ‘ideology’ that obscured the true foundations of the world. Using the 
metaphor of a camera obscura, that inverts light to produce an upside-down image of the real 
world, they wrote:
in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside-down ... this 
phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process as the 
inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process.72
Marx located ideology within his base-superstructure social theory. The base—the social 
relations of production and the real foundation of society—determines the forms of 
consciousness that are embodied and reproduced by the various political, cultural, religious 
and legal institutions. As social relations change so does the economic base of society and 
with it the social consciousness of society. Marx’s contemporaneous idealist philosophers had 
it precisely the wrong way round, consciousness, or ideas, do not determine social relations, 
instead the material mode of production determines consciousness.
Crucially, Marx also attached the concept of ideology to his class theory, famously stating: 
‘The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the 
ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force.’73 Ideology 
did not merely distort reality, it was also a tool of power that served the interests of the ruling 
class and subjugated the working class. The stability of the economic system is ensured by 
the superstructure—the ideological complex, composed of religious belief, and the political 
and legal systems of power. These are systems of ideas that mystify the material base of 
society and legitimise the ruling class’s privileged position and power. The ideas of these 
elite are either imposed upon or unconsciously internalized by the non-ruling classes creating 
a ‘false consciousness’ that distorts, explains or justifies their privileged economic and social 
position as natural, timeless and unchangeable facts—and conversely normalises in the minds 
of the working class their disadvantaged position and exploitation. Furthermore, ideology 
disguises itself giving it the paradoxical appearance of an unquestionable and unchanging 
non-ideological form. The contradictions that are inherent in the relations of production are 
papered over and obscured by ideology.
72 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels The German Ideology cited in Terry Eagleton ed. Ideology p.24
73 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels The German Ideology cited in Terry Eagleton ed. Ideology p.24
39
Within the Marxist theory we can detect the origins of the modem, popular understanding of 
ideology being equated with brainwashing, state-control or propaganda. Using this top-down 
model ideology is understood as the non-physical coercive means of the powerful elite 
controlling the masses who acquiesce under the delusion of freely giving consent to the 
social, economic and political order. Marx’s influence on the moulding of the concept of 
ideology extends through to the present day. One important aspect was the idea of ideology 
as unquestioned dogma—an irrational and unchallenged set of received beliefs that serve as a 
smokescreen that obscures reality. This is combined with the linking of class and ideology 
which, even when some of the Marxist terminology is shed, still leaves ideology as a concept 
fused with the nefarious mechanisms of power, exploitation and control. The severe negative 
connotations that Marx attached to ideology meant that the task for future Marxists would be 
to uncover and unmask ideological structures in order to free ourselves from its mesmerising 
grip. Essentially ideology was something to be discovered and disposed of; like the state, 
ideology was something that a communist society would do without.
1.3.2 Karl Mannheim
Mannheim’s work in Ideology and Utopia distinguishes between the ‘particular’ and ‘total’ 
forms of ideology. The former is defined as a more-or-less conscious attempt by an 
individual or group to bring their opponents round to their way of thinking or understanding 
the world. This is defined negatively by Mannheim as ‘distortions ... conscious lies to half­
conscious and unwitting disguises; from calculated attempts to dupe others to self- 
deception.’74 The recognition by the targeted group or individual of this ‘particular’ form of 
ideology would involve the realization that capitulating to the ideology would not be in their 
true ‘interests.’ Mannheim presents ideology as an intermediary between a complex form of 
both a lie and an error. As a lie as it operates through the propagation of falsehoods for the 
benefits of some individual or group, or alternatively as an error, in the case of one’s 
opponent being be unaware of the deception. The ‘total’ conception of ideology is that of ‘an 
age or of a concrete historico-social group’ and refers to the ‘total structure of the mind of 
this epoch or of this group.’75 Whilst the manifestations of a ‘particular’ ideology can be 
traced back to the interests of one’s opponent, the ‘total’ ideology is objectively determined
74 Karl Mannheim Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology o f Knowledge p.49
75 Karl Mannheim Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology o f Knowledge pp.49-50
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by ‘a given social situation.’76 This all-inclusive, comprehensive and all-encompassing 
worldview or thought-system is labelled ‘Weltanschauung’ and reflects the historical and 
social conditions of the epoch.
This conception of ideology makes some important deviations from Marx. Mannheim’s 
particular conception of ideology marks a departure from the unitary, monolithic ideology of 
Marx. It suggests that there are pluralities of ideologies representing various partisan interests 
that compete for attention. Furthermore, it recognises that there are multiple ways of thinking 
and therefore multiple ways of understanding the world and one’s place in it.77 This makes 
ideologies (as opposed to just ‘ideology’) worth examining in their own rights and opens the 
way towards a sociology of knowledge that seeks ‘to understand systems of ideas rather than 
just unmask and discredit them.’78 The move towards plurality, however, is held in check by 
the more orthodox Marxist conception of total ideology. This forms the historically 
determined conceptual mesh within which all particular ideologies are restrained. The total 
ideology operates at a deeper level than the particular conception. The latter operates at what 
Mannheim calls the ‘psychological level’ whereby it is possible for the ‘victim’ of a 
particular ideology is ultimately able to recognise his position and reject his opponent’s 
deceptions. The total conception of ideology by contrast, operates at the ‘noological level’ 
whereby different historical epochs, or different social strata, have ‘fundamentally divergent
70thought-systems and widely differing modes of experience and interpretation.’ As with 
Marx these historical epochs and social strata are essentially different modes of production, 
or the position of different classes vis-a-vis the relations of production, thus leading 
Mannheim back to the economically determined conception of ideology.
Although Mannheim compromises between a unitary and pluralist conception of ideology he 
does depart from orthodox Marxism in one further respect. Marx envisaged the withering 
away of ideology, along with the state, in a classless communist society. By contrast 
Mannheim makes the more convincing claim that ideology is a permanent feature of the 
social world. No matter what form social relations take there will always exist cognitive 
structures through which the world is interpreted and ordered by the individual. In a similar
76 Karl Mannheim Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology o f Knowledge p.50
77 The idea of a multiplicity of ideologies each with their own internally coherent configuration of interpreting 
the world can be likened to Wittgenstein’s concept o f‘forms of life’.
78 Terry Eagleton ed. Ideology p.50
79 Karl Mannheim Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology o f Knowledge p.51
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vein to Marx, Mannheim conceptualises ideologies as comprehensive sets of ideas that are 
internalized unconsciously and uncritically as uncontroversial norms. The self-obfuscating 
nature of ideology conceals its presence and form from the individual or class. If ideology is 
permanent, comprehensive and camouflaged as rationalisations how is one to study it? 
Mannheim, in a move reminiscent of the groping truth-seeker from Plato’s cave, suggests that
the role of the intellectual is to detach themselves from ideology and provide what Michael
• 80Freeden calls ‘an increasingly independent, non-subjective, interpretation of the world.’ 
However if one can only occupy one particular ideological position or another then how can 
an ideology be described by the social scientist without bias from their adopted ideological 
viewpoint?81 The very language betrays Mannheim’s position, how can one ‘interpret’ the 
world from a non-interpretive position, i.e. can something be interpreted without having an 
interpretive standard against which to understand it? It seems that by failing to escape the 
dogma of the Marxist ‘underlying reality’ thesis Mannheim remains stuck in its paradoxical 
logic. This later became known as ‘Mannheim’s paradox’ and demonstrates the impossibility 
of achieving a non-ideological position from which to objectively describe ideologies.
One useful methodological suggestion Mannheim makes to escape this paradox is to adopt 
what he pithily calls a ‘non-evaluative general-total conception of ideology’ whereby the 
social scientist conducts a ‘historical investigation, where ... no judgments are pronounced as 
to the correctness of the ideas...’82 The changing social conditions of a society are studied by 
the scientist in order to understand the corresponding mental structures and modes of 
interpretation. ‘According to this view,’ states Mannheim, ‘human thought arises, and 
operates, not in a social vacuum but in a definite social milieu.’83 One useful way for the 
social scientist to understand ideological structures therefore is to study their social origins 
and in particular the texts, both written and non-written, that are the product of the society. 
By emphasising the interpretive access that the study of texts provides Mannheim’s study of 
ideology segues with the tradition of German hermeneutics. Underlying the hermeneutical 
methodology is the claim that history, and by extension social structures and ideologies, can 
only be understood with reference to the meaning of ‘every fact and event’ and that all 
‘meaning in its turn always refers to another meaning.’84 The web of interrelated and
80 Michael Freeden Ideology: A Very Short Introduction p. 14
81 This difficulty ignores the more fundamental problem of the total conception of ideology.
82 Karl Mannheim Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology o f Knowledge p.71
83 Karl Mannheim Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology o f Knowledge p.71
84 Karl Mannheim Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology o f Knowledge p.61
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interdependent meanings can only be accessed through the careful interpretation of texts. By 
entering into the web of meanings and positively avoiding evaluative judgements the social 
scientist can mitigate Mannheim’s paradox and describe, interpret and ultimately seek to 
understand the ideological structures and their origins under study.
1.3.3 Antonio Gramsci
If Mannheim made progress in advancing and maturing the Marxist account of the theory of 
ideology, Antonio Gramsci by contrast focussed on how ideology is created, reproduced and 
operates. Gramsci’s most famous contribution was the transposition of the concept of 
‘hegemony’ to the study of ideology. He claimed that the dominant social group exercised 
control by exerting cultural hegemony over subordinate classes in order to maintain their 
privileged position guaranteed by the status quo. This was a refinement of Marx and Engels’ 
claim that the predominant ideas of an age are those of the ruling class and institutionalised 
by the state. Gramsci’s insight lay in identifying that it was through the reproduction of 
culture that ideas came to dominate. Ideology was no longer something that had its origins in 
the state and its political, economic and legislative control of citizens, but instead operated 
within civil society and through the medium of culture. The hierarchy of the state and civil 
society was reversed, now it was the latter that normalised, legitimised and maintained the 
former.
Gramsci, by recognising the importance of civil society, also made an important distinction 
between the exertion of two different types of power—coercion and consent. The state and its 
institutions such as the police, legal system and, ultimately the armed forces, exercised power 
through coercion—the manipulation of behaviour through the use, or threat, of violence. By 
contrast civil society and its non-state institutions such as newspapers, theatres, trade unions 
and the family, exercised ideological power through the manufacturing of consent. In the 
capitalist system the ideology of the bourgeoisie wields the greatest cultural influence and 
thus insinuates itself as the dominant culture by normalising the capitalist ideology as 
‘common sense;’ that is uncritically accepted norms that present themselves as universal, 
incontrovertible and uncontroversial and crucially, non-partisan.85 This process is shown to 
work when the masses come to regard their own assent as freely-given and spontaneous; or
85 Antonio Gramsci cited in David Forgacs ed. A Gramsci Reader pp.306-307
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when the dominant ideology appears as non-ideological. This theory remains firmly within
the Marxist paradigm as cultural hegemony prevents the working class from attaining
recognition of their true status as an exploited group in the capitalist system therefore
precludes them from gaining ‘class consciousness.’ These two modes of power are mutually
reinforcing: ‘the apparatus of state coercive power,’ writes Gramsci, “ legally’ enforces
86discipline on those groups who do not ‘consent’ either actively or passively.’
By remapping ideology within a cultural framework Gramsci made two important claims. 
Firstly, ideology is culturally produced and reproduced by various privileged groups and 
unconsciously consumed by others. Although Gramsci focussed on print media he 
acknowledged the theoretical power of audio and visual mediums writing that they possess ‘a 
rapidity, a field of action, and an emotional simultaneity far greater than written 
communication.’87 Secondly, we can deduce from Gramsci that certain producers will have 
greater cultural, and therefore ideological, influence than others. Dominant producers of 
culture, will tend to influence other smaller producers, therefore there will tend to be 
convergence towards a dominant ideological position.
Gramsci also thought that intellectuals wielded cultural influence due to their privileged 
position of formulating and acting as a cultural conductor of ideological positions. His 
definition of intellectuals was remarkably broad; it refers to anyone ‘whose function in 
society is primarily that of organizing, administering, directing, educating or leaving 
others.’88 The combination of the public intellectual and the exertion of cultural hegemony 
can clearly be seen in the rise to power of Adolf Hitler and Nazism. As with Marx it is often 
unclear whether Gramsci thought that the producers of culture deliberately and consciously 
promote an ideological position, or whether the ideology is unconsciously reflected in their 
cultural output. With the Nazism example it is clear that the techniques of manufacturing 
consent were carefully and purposefully harnessed to propagate and normalise the ideology 
as a consensus position, however it is less obvious whether a Hollywood director deliberately 
seeks to promote, for example, the capitalist ideology in their films. Despite this ambiguity it 
seems that Gramsci leant towards the former view when he writes: ‘ideologies for the
86 Antonio Gramsci cited in David Forgacs ed. A Gramsci Reader p.307
87 Antonio Gramsci cited in David Forgacs ed. A Gramsci Reader p.376
88 Antonio Gramsci cited in David Forgacs ed. A Gramsci Reader p.300
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governed are mere illusions, a deception to which they are subject, while for the governing
O Q
they constitute a willed and knowing deception.’
The idea of a fundamental reality obscured by ideology is reaffirmed by Gramsci and in this 
regard his conceptualisation of ideology contains the same limitations of Marx and 
Mannheim. Thus ideology is still a systematic distortion of reality that is negatively defined 
largely by its alleged function of legitimising capitalism. Despite this we can glean some 
useful insights from his work that concentrated on the production and reproduction of 
ideology. The idea that ideology is produced, reproduced, modified and subverted in a myriad 
of ways through various cultural mediums is clearly an important step towards understanding 
the complex processes involved in the formation and modification of ideologies. Instead of 
the monolithic top-down approach whereby an ideology is somehow imposed by the ruling 
class on the subaltern classes we have a more nuanced model of ideological formation. There 
is also a hint of a less authoritarian and more liberal framework for ideology, albeit one that 
Gramsci did not emphasise. In passing he claims that ‘ideology ... arose to lead the popular 
masses and ... therefore necessarily takes account of certain of their interests.’90 At a 
minimum this means that ideologies must take some account of the masses’ interests—the 
ideology cannot be entirely foreign or antithetical to the interests of its adherents. If, 
however, we were to pursue this logic it could also mean that ideologies are created and 
recreated in a dynamic and complex interchange between those in and out of power—the 
rulers and the ruled—thus ideology could be imagined as a type of discourse that tends 
towards an equilibrium of competing interests.
As well as relocating the reproduction of ideology to the cultural sphere Gramsci also 
reconceived of ideology as ‘thought-practice.’ By this he meant that ideology is constructed 
through our concrete enacting of ideas in the world. He wrote that ‘men become conscious of 
their social position, and therefore of their tasks, on the terrain of ideology.’91 This was not 
however, a one-way process, ideology was also constantly recreated and shaped through 
men’s actions in the world. Thus ideas and practice are closely linked in an interdependent 
relationship, the evidence for which lies in our recurring behaviour, utterances and thought. 
By linking together ideas and actions Gramsci was effectively intermeshing theory and
89 Antonio Gramsci cited in David Forgacs ed. A Gramsci Reader p. 196
90 Antonio Gramsci cited in David Forgacs ed. A Gramsci Reader p. 198
91 Antonio Gramsci cited in David Forgacs ed. A Gramsci Reader p. 196
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practice. To understand ideology we need to closely observe repeated behaviour, particularly 
in the sphere of cultural reproduction, and conversely to interpret actions we must have an 
insight into the ideology that informs the actor. In contrast to Marx and Mannheim, for whom 
ideology was a one-way process, for Gramsci ideology and practice flows both ways.
1.3.4 Louis Althusser
In contrast to Gramsci’s bidirectional conception of ideology Althusser reverted to Marx’s 
theory that located ideology’s principal function in ensuring the obedience of the working 
class to the ruling class. He did depart from Marxist orthodoxy by claiming that ideology 
exercised some autonomy from the economic base. Instead of simply being a systematic 
distorter of reality that should be critically exposed and discarded, ideology was considered 
by Althusser as being worthy of study. Furthermore, like Mannheim and Gramsci, Althusser 
considered ideology to be a permanent feature of the social world and so the utopian ideal of 
an ideologically-free society was chimerical to Althusser.
The autonomy that ideology enjoyed in Althusser’s theory resulted from a distinction that he 
made between Repressive State Apparatus, such as the police and army, that operate through 
‘violence’ and the Ideological State Apparatus, such as religious systems, the family, cultural 
institutions, the mass media and the education system, that exercise control through 
‘ideology.’92 Although this theoretical division had already been made by Gramsci, Althusser 
emphasised the role of institutions in the reproduction and dissemination of ideology, in 
particular the education system. Although he identified a plurality of institutions through 
which ideology operated ultimately he still retained the singular function of ideology that was 
present in Marx of maintaining the prevailing economic system. However, due to its 
autonomy ideology developed a ‘life of its own’ thus allowing a variety of ideological forms 
to develop within a single economic system. In short ideology’s fundamental function was 
fixed within the Marxist paradigm, but the form it took on was not.
One further innovation that Althusser’s work on ideology advanced was the claim that 
individuals, as opposed to classes, were ideological carriers. This idea was in contrast to 
orthodox Marxist thought that identified classes as the subjects and bearers of ideology. For
92 Louis Althusser cited in Terry Eagleton ed. Ideology pp.90-91
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Althusser the subject constructed their identity—their understanding of their place in the 
world and the frame for their actions within it—through their individual ideological 
consciousness. As with Marx however, ideology does not reveal itself readily, and the 
paradoxical mark of ideological thinking is that it appears to the individual as natural, 
autonomous and spontaneous i.e. non-ideological. This is an important advance in the theory 
of ideology as it decentres ideology from its rigidly deterministic class origins in Marx and 
accounts for the diverse range of ideologies that may be found even within a notional ‘class.’ 
It also allows for a more nuanced understanding of the origins of an individual or group’s 
ideology through a study of their particular historical, cultural and social situation. After 
Althusser ideology can no longer be accounted for solely with reference to Marxist economic 
categories; the diversity of ideological influences is recognised to be virtually limitless.
As we have discussed the Marxist theory of ideology evolved from the monolithic distortion 
of reality found in Marx and Engels through to the gradually more nuanced, variegated and 
pluralistic accounts by Mannheim, Gramsci and Althusser. During this process Marx’s 
stolidly negative concept of ideology as a thing to be rid of in a classless society has slowly 
shed its purely pejorative overtones to be reconceptualised as a permanent but ever-changing 
feature of political and social life that can have positive effects as well as negative ones. The 
work done by these three thinkers—although still caught within the Marxist framework—has 
emancipated the concept of ideology so it can now be used as a useful theoretical concept. 
However the Marxist chains of economic determinism—whereby ideology is still seen as 
primarily a product and supporting mechanism for capitalism and class society—continue to 
shackle the concept. One constant theme of Marxist theory is the intimate and irreducible link 
between ideology and power. Specifically, the principal function of ideology is the 
maintenance of the current politico-economic status quo and its systems of control. Although 
this is clearly one important way in which ideology functions, by focussing exclusively on 
this element, they obscure the idea that ideology is necessarily present—and is of crucial 
importance—for groups that presently have little or no power and wish to upset the existing 
political and social order.
47
1.3.5 Defining Ideology
The task of defining ideology is not, perhaps, as daunting as it may first seem.93 In light of 
our study of the Marxist conception of ideology it seems that a robust and value-free 
definition of ideology can be attained by removing the Marxist fixation with capitalism—and 
the critique of ideology—from the concept of ideology and seeing what is left.94 The best 
way to explain what we mean by this is to illustrate the idea using a clear example of an 
ideology in the Marxist sense of the term. An economic system of slavery could be 
maintained—at least in part—by a racist ideology that asserted the natural moral and 
intellectual superiority of a white Caucasian over black Afro-Caribbean people. If this 
ideology is internalised by both sides then we could expect general apathy and passivity from 
the slaves, and an unproblematic, naturalised moral rationalisation of the hierarchy and 
inequality for their white masters, thus maintaining the political, economic and social status 
quo. The racist ideology functions to make the existing socio-economic system of slavery 
appear to the slaves and masters alike as the natural and unchanging order of the social world.
This simplified example encapsulates the Marxist concept of ideology as a cluster of 
internalised and unquestioned beliefs that functions to maintain power for the ruling class by 
distorting reality and perpetuating an oppressive and unjust economic system. If we suppose 
however, that some people from both sides reject the racist ideology and instead adopted 
beliefs in the fundamental equality of people regardless of race, we could imagine that they 
might try to undermine the racist ideology, by argument and action, and seek to abolish the 
economic institution of slavery. It seems quite clear that this second group is subscribing to 
an ideology—let us call it a non-racist liberal ideology—in exactly the same way as the first 
group subscribe to the racist ideology. At the beginning however, the second group possess 
no actual economic or political power. In fact the only thing that permits us to describe them 
as a group is that they possess a shared set of beliefs that allows them understand the world, 
and their place in it, in a different way to the racists and, to some extent, guides their political
93 For an alternative view see Mathew Humphrey “(De)Contesting Ideology: The Struggle over the Meaning of 
the Struggle over the Meaning.”
94 We have deliberately avoided using the phrase ‘ideology critique’ here and have instead substituted the 
somewhat awkward phrase ‘critique of ideology.’ Our reasons for this choice is that the former has a specific 
technical meaning and history associated with the Frankfurt school and critical theory. We are not here 
questioning the usefulness of the critique of ideology per se, but merely trying to disassociate it from the 
definition of ideology. The connection between the two, in Marx and Engels writings at least, makes it seem that 
the two are inseparable tasks, i.e. by defining ideology one is already engaged in uncovering and unmasking 
ideology.
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and economic behaviour.95 If we were to follow the Marxist paradigm of ideology as a 
systematic distortion of reality that maintains the unjust status quo then, quite 
counterintuitively, we could not say that this powerless and progressive second group possess 
an ideology. As we have said, however, it is very clear that not only do their beliefs constitute 
an ideology and that their liberal ideology, at the start at least, is the only thing they possess 
as a group.
This is what we mean then by subtracting away the Marxist notion of the critique of 
ideology—that insists on seeing ideology as always in the service of an oppressive ruling 
power and economic system—from the concept of ideology.96 It is clear that our definition of 
ideology can, and should, remain neutral with regard to evaluating the particular ideology it 
describes. Any given ideology will have a host of effects on both its adherents and others, 
many of which could be described as positive or negative depending on one’s perspective and 
position in society—but none of this need impinge on our ability to describe it as an ideology.
We will define ideology with reference to its most general functions: ‘ideology serves as a 
map through which actors interpret the world, their place in it, and make sense of their 
actions.’ Alvin Gouldner supports this type of definition, claiming that ‘each ideology 
presents a map of ‘what is’ in society; a ‘report’ of how it is working, how it is failing, and 
also of how it could be changed. Ideology is thus a call to action—a ‘command’ grounded in 
social theory.’97 From this definition several sets of questions become immediately apparent. 
How these maps are produced, reproduced, altered, accepted and discarded forms one set of 
problematic questions. Another set is related to questions of the way in which the maps 
operate, i.e. how does the actor utilise the maps, is it a conscious or unconscious mode of 
interpretation? The final set of questions is related to the nature of the maps—are they beliefs, 
opinions, interpretations or something else—and what do they pertain to—politics, cultural 
and social life or more? At a more general level we could also ask who can hold ideologies—
95 The causal relationship between ideology and behaviour is certainly a complex issue. We could imagine that 
there will be a range of behaviours in the above example. Some people who subscribe to the non-racist liberal 
ideology will exert great energies—including we could imagine violent and illegal activities—to challenge and 
overthrow the existing system, whilst others will do nothing. Explaining die range of behaviours, and the 
specific reactions of specific individuals to the Islamist ideology, is beyond the scope of this thesis.
9 A further point to consider is the intrinsic and interactive relationship between power and ideology, or 
knowledge and power to use Foucault’s terminology. This can be considered as a separate problematic to the 
one that we have been discussing that seeks to disassociate the negative critique of ideology from the concept of 
ideology., and one that is beyond the direct scope of this thesis.
97 Alvin Gouldner “False Consciousness” pp.208-209
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is it possible for a single individual to create and subscribe to a unique ideology or do they 
operate at the level of groups—and if so what sort of groups?
The proliferation of questions points to the fact that it will not be possible to provide a 
comprehensive account of ideology in general and the multiple ways in which it manifests 
itself and operates.98 In other words we should distinguish between two types of tasks: 
finding a definition of ideology and formulating a theory of ideology. Although these two 
things are linked—our definition will rest to some extent on our general theory of ideology 
and vice versa—it is nonetheless useful to draw the distinction. At the general level our 
definition should be sufficient for the first task of defining ideology. It is clear, however, that 
any study of a particular ideology will need to examine the way in which it functions and this 
will depend on our general theory of ideology.99 This will primarily involve a close 
examination of the interaction between the ideology and its adherents—how the ideology 
shapes the actions and beliefs of the adherents; and how the adherents shape the ideology. 
The limited task of defining ideology meant that coining the definition was unproblematic 
however the much more expansive task of theorising ideology means that at best we can 
expand on our definition to provide a general sketch of a theory but we should not be 
expected to comprehensively theorise all aspects of ideology. The aim of this study is to 
understand and theorise a particular ideology—the Islamist ideology; it is not to advance the 
study of ideology in general.
We have already explored how our ideology-narrative will allow us to understand the 
Islamist movement and ideology from a frequently neglected but important perspective; we 
will now expand on our theory of ideology to see how this task can be achieved. If we return 
to our definition of ideology—‘a map through which actors interpret the world, their place in 
it, and make sense of their actions’—we can now expand on its various elements. The basic 
concept motivating this definition—present in the Marxist paradigm of ideology—is that 
ideas deeply matter. Specifically, we claim that one does not understand the social world just 
as it is, but that every act of social understanding—and action—is always already one of
98 See Gayil Tashir’s “The Intellectual as a Political Actor? Four Models of Theory/Praxis” for an overview of 
the differing approaches to theorising ideology.
99 To clarify—this thesis requires a general theory of ideology in order to study its subject—the Islamist 
ideology—but is not an attempt to advance the theory of ideology in general.
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conscious or unconscious interpretation.100 Ideologies are ubiquitous: ‘we produce, 
disseminate, and consume ideologies ... whether we are aware of it or not.’101 In other words 
the social world does not just ‘appear’ to social beings, but is constantly constructed and 
interpreted. Understanding others, and their behaviour, is not like reading numbers off a 
spreadsheet—we are not presented with the ‘facts’—instead we impose our own beliefs to 
find meaning and create order in the world. This often involves organizing and categorising 
events in order to create simplicity and meaning out of a complex and chaotic world. Freeden 
calls this process of categorisation the imposition of patterns: ‘every interpretation, each 
ideology, is one such instance of imposing a pattern ... on how we read ... political facts, 
events, occurrences, actions, on how we see images and hear voices.’102 The map that we 
refer to in our definition is the set of core ideas or beliefs that create the prism or filter 
through which the actor performs these acts of conscious or unconscious interpretation— 
something akin to Mannheim’s concept of Weltanschauung.
At this point it could be objected that our definition is too wide as to be useful; if ideology 
just means all our beliefs then it is clearly a useless concept. We must, therefore, narrow 
down the scope of the concept, specifically with regard to the field of core beliefs that make 
up ideologies, and the ‘world’ that is interpreted by these beliefs. These two parts of the 
definition are connected and so can both be delimitated by the same criteria; they are both 
concerned with the socio-political world. We use the concept ‘socio-political’ in a 
deliberately loose sense as the types of beliefs that ideologies are comprised, and the events 
that interpret, are indeed broad. The qualifier ‘socio-political’ only means that the beliefs and 
events are in some way connected with the social world and/or political events. This means 
that ideologies can include religious, economic, and cultural beliefs—and many others—as 
long as they are connected in some way with the socio-political universe. The idea of ‘socio­
political’ beliefs is related to Weber’s concept of ‘social action’—the name that Weber gave
to action that ‘takes account of the behavior of others and is thereby oriented in its course.’104
100 Although it is tempting to follow the Marxist tradition that claims that ideology always operates at the 
unconscious level, and thus normalises the existing economic system and power structures, it seems clear that 
many ideological beliefs are held consciously and that acts of interpretation can be conducted deliberately by the 
actor. This is not to say that the actor necessarily recognises their ideological beliefs as ideological, and will 
often deny their ideological character if confronted by an opponent.
101 Michael Freeden Ideology: A Very Short Introduction p.l
102 Michael Freeden Ideology: A Very Short Introduction p.3
103 The concepts of social and political are in fact so broad in this context that they probably amount to the same 
thing. We use both terms to correct against a narrow reading of the political field.
104 Max Weber Economy and Society p.4
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Our criterion is however narrower than Weber’s inclusive concept as it suggests that the types 
of beliefs and actions that we are interested in are, in some broad sense, politically, as well as 
socially orientated.
A secondary facet of ideological maps is that they do not merely interpretively describe the 
world, but also act as normative guides—mapping the world as it should be—and so guide 
the actions of the actor. We describe this normative element as a facet as it seems likely that 
separating understanding of the socio-political world from evaluating it would be an 
impossible task. Indeed acts of understanding encompass ethical and normative judgements. 
To put this differently our understanding is interdependent with normative judgements—in 
ideological maps not only are ‘ought(s)’ derived from ‘is(s)’ but what ‘is’ is dependent on 
what ‘ought.’ Thus ideological maps are not only conceptual prisms for how the world is, but 
also what is right and wrong in it, and prescribes—in varying degrees of 
comprehensiveness—how it should be. Acknowledging the interlinking and interdependency 
of interpretation and evaluation will be important for our task of understanding the Islamist 
ideology.105
1.3.6 Beliefs and Actions
Our focus thus far has been on the first two parts of our definition—the nature and scope of 
the ‘map’ and the ‘world’ that it navigates. Although we have referred to the set of ‘beliefs’ 
for the sake of consistency we must keep in mind that we are ultimately talking about ideas in 
a general sense—the ‘beliefs’ may manifest themselves as facts, intuitions, opinions, values 
or preferences and so on to the actor. As well as making claims about beliefs, our definition 
of ideology also links beliefs with actions. Michael Freeden expresses this link by claiming 
that ‘ideologies ... map the political and social worlds ... we cannot act without making
105 Admittedly this does not narrow down the scope of ideology much, but it does point us in the general 
direction of the types of beliefs and events with which we are concerned. Any further attempt to delimit the 
scope of ideology—for example by excluding certain religious beliefs on the grounds that they are private, or at 
least not political—would leave us open to the accusation that we are inserting our own secular ideological 
beliefs into our definition—a charge we certainly would want to avoid. If we have good grounds for refusing to 
restrict the scope of beliefs that can constitute an ideology, then we also have a valid reason to take the same 
position with the scope of the socio-political ‘world’ of which these beliefs make sense. We could, for example, 
delimit this ‘world’ by making the distinction between the public and private spheres: ideological beliefs pertain 
to the public world of civil society and politics, whilst beliefs that form our attitude towards, and behaviour 
within, the private sphere of family life are non-ideological. A brief glance towards the feminist ideology— 
encapsulated in the slogan ‘the personal is political’—demonstrates that this sort of restriction is once again 
open to the charge of being an ideological construct.
52
sense of the worlds we inhabit.’106 We should not be misled, however, into thinking that 
ideologies are one-way processes—an idea that was present in Marx’s writings. We do not 
have as our model, for example, actor ‘A’ who holds the ideological beliefs (a, b, c) that 
cause him to interpret the socio-political world as (ai, bi, ci) and act in the world (a2 , 1)2, C2). 
In other words actors are not unthinking automata who having internalized an ideology 
interpret and act in the world according to its dictates. As we have already said ideological 
beliefs can be reflected upon—the process of interpretation is both conscious and 
unconscious. Crucially, in the same vein as Gramsci’s concept of ‘thought-practice,’ 
ideological beliefs do not just influence actions—actions will also influence beliefs. In our 
model of ideology theory and practice are interdependent and interactive. Actor A, to 
illustrate this last point, may attend a political rally as a result of his ideological convictions 
(theory shaping practice) but his attendance and actions at the rally—listening to speeches, 
chanting slogans and so forth—will inevitably have some effect on his beliefs (practice 
shaping theory). Steve Bruce makes a similar statement relating the complex and subtle 
interplay between beliefs, ideas and action. He claims that although we cannot draw a direct 
causal map from beliefs to behaviour, we must take all beliefs seriously, including religious 
beliefs, and not assume that they act as stand-ins for more fundamental drives. He writes:
I do not want to insist that ideas or belief systems ‘cause’ behaviour in the sense 
that the same ideas always produce the same outcomes irrespective of 
circumstances. But, equally well, I see no reason to suppose religious ideas are 
without consequences. Beliefs are not merely fragments of justification that, like 
oddments of clothing in a child’s dressing-up box, can be pulled out to suit the 
occasion. Although the connections between particular beliefs, attitudes or 
values and their expression in the world are loose, connections there are.107
Although we have so far examined individuals, their beliefs and actions, we should note that 
ideologies will always be shared and will almost always manifest themselves in part through 
communal practice. The notion of a single individual creating and internalizing a unique 
ideology—knowable only to himself—runs into similar absurdities to those present in 
Wittgenstein’s private language argument and so need not be considered here.108 Ideologies, 
like languages, are essentially social in character. We should note, however, that ideologies 
are shared between groups of individuals—and often a shared ideology is what unites
106 Michael Freeden Ideology: A Very Short Introduction p.2
107 Steve Bruce Fundamentalism p. 109
108 Ludwig Wittgenstein Philosophical Investigations §243
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individuals into a grouping—they will have some interesting properties beyond those that 
operate at the level of the individual. For example, it is likely that most, if not all, individuals 
in an ideological movement will not possess, or subscribe to, the entire set of beliefs of the 
ideology as a whole. This points towards the idea that we should not consider ideologies to be 
static monoliths—as with Marx—but we should conceive of any given ideology as being 
inherently fluid, unstable, organic, plural and may contain internal contradictions.
Furthermore, ideologies are ultimately products of the various groups or movements that 
create and modify them, although how this complex process takes place will be different in 
every case and difficult to describe. Unsurprisingly, given the interdependency of theory and 
practice, this not only applies to ideologies but also to the movements that create, modify and 
embody these ideologies whose histories demonstrate a tendency to fracture, create and break 
alliances, evolve, dissolve, reform, regroup and so on. Gramsci’s notion o f ‘intellectuals’ will 
be of great utility in explaining how ideologies are shaped but this will not be the whole 
story. If, for example, an ideology gave weight to notions of democracy, and the movement 
implemented internal democratic institutions, then we might expect ideology to be shaped 
both by its ‘intellectuals’ and its ordinary ‘members.’ In the same way that beliefs and 
practices interact in complex ways, group ideologies do not necessarily operate according to a 
top-down model.
1.4 Definitions of Terrorism: The Difficulties in Defining Terrorism
Terrorism, like most political concepts, is difficult—and perhaps impossible—to define. 
‘Despite decades of academic literature on the subject,’ bemoans one author, ‘no commonly 
accepted definition has been found.’109 To broach this topic we may start by asking what a 
good definition of terrorism would look like? Put another way, what functions should it 
perform? The critical test of a robust definition would be that it consistently distinguished 
terrorism from other types of violence: crime, standard warfare, and insurgency or guerrilla 
warfare. Of secondary importance is that the definition should capture our intuitive 
understanding of terrorism. Finally, the definition must be, as far as possible, objective, it 
must not discriminate between violent acts by ‘them’ and by ‘us’ when the acts are, in all 
other respects, identical. In our search for a definition that satisfies these three criterion we
109 Thomas J. Badey “Defining International Terrorism: A Pragmatic Approach”
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understand that we are not seeking to produce a legally robust definition, which would 
require a different type and more exacting mode of language, but an analytically useful 
definition, one which enables us to speak consistently and purposefully about the concept of 
terrorism, and its real-life manifestations.
Terrorism is always a pejorative term, so much so that it threatens to be overwhelmed by its 
implicit moral evaluation. The real difficulty with defining terrorism is to extricate the 
objective content from the normative judgement. Articulating this problem, Brian Jenkins 
observers: ‘what is called terrorism thus seems to depend on one’s point of view. Use of the 
term implies a moral judgement; and if one party can successfully attach the label terrorist to 
its opponent, then it has indirectly persuaded others to adopt its moral viewpoint.’110 We must 
overcome this subjective bind if we are to arrive at a workable definition that fulfils the 
criteria set out above. Another significant problem with defining terrorism is the tendency for 
imprecise definitions that inflate the concept to a point where it engulfs other forms of 
organized violence, such as warfare and violent crime. An analytically useful definition of 
terrorism will avoid the twin dangers of moral subjectivism and inflationism; it must be 
objective and distinctive. It should be robust enough so that we can consistently identify 
terrorism, but flexible enough so that new forms of terrorism can be identified as they arise.
1.4.2 Ethical Definitions of Terrorism
In a sense defining terrorism is of less importance to this study than ideology. As we 
discussed in the first part of this chapter ‘terrorism’ is not something that can be understood 
separately from the ideological context within which it is committed. However it is necessary 
to have a reasonably robust definition to make understanding the Islamist ideology, Islamist 
movements and the associated terrorism meaningful. There are two major problems which 
threaten to render the study of terrorism impossible. At one end of the spectrum there is the 
claim, expressed in a variety of forms, that terrorism is always a pejorative term used to 
castigate one’s enemies as fundamentally evil and therefore beyond ordinary political 
dialogue or negotiation. It is usually a term applied by states to describe their non-state 
enemies; however it also used to depict state actors who, in their warfare activities, are 
portrayed as being beyond the moral pale. Rhetorically, at least, it is a mutually antagonistic
1,0 Brian Jenkins The Study o f Terrorism: Definitional Problems p.l
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term, reciprocally used to denounce one’s enemies. This is summed up in the well-worn 
cliche, ‘one man’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter.’ The argument runs that since 
‘terrorism’ will always be used to censure the activities and denounce the legitimacy of one’s 
opponents, the concept is analytically redundant. According to this argument ‘terrorism’ can 
only ever be a term of propaganda and thus cannot be usefully employed as a tool for 
understanding a mode of violence. This approach is morally subjectivist in that it denies the 
ability to neutrally define terrorism and so deprives the concept of terrorism of any 
meaningful content.
This type of subjectivism occurs in a more subtle form when terrorism is implicitly defined 
by the author with reference to whether the terrorist’s cause is, according to the author, a just 
or unjust one. If the author is sympathetic to the cause for which the protagonist acts then the 
violence ceases to be ‘terrorism’ and becomes ‘resistance,’ ‘rebellion,’ or some other more 
acceptable euphemism. In contrast, the deplored violent actions of the state are labelled 
‘terrorist,’ regardless of what sort of violence is employed by either party. If we are to accept 
this inverted definition of terrorism, where it is used entirely pejoratively as a term of 
disapproval for the cause in which the violence is committed, then we should exclude it from 
our discourse on political violence.111 Clearly, from this perspective terrorism is hopelessly 
subjective. To rescue the concept as an analytically useful tool we must be cautious to define 
terrorism entirely separately from the cause in which it is allegedly employed. If we define 
terrorism as x, then x committed for the most worthy, or most despicable aim, is still 
terrorism.
Closely connected with this subjectivist perspective is the problem of using terrorism as a 
moral term of disapproval. According to a deontological ethic terrorism is always a morally 
wrong action even if it is employed for a ‘good’ end. This may, or may not be the case, but to 
avoid the tangled webs of moral philosophy we will have to set aside any moral judgement of
0
terrorism. This or that instance of violence that meets our definition, may be morally good, 
bad or neutral, but it is still terrorism. For this to be the case our definition must be, as far as 
possible, value-neutral and so must exclude any normative or evaluative terms and consist 
solely of objective criteria. More problematically, some analysts insist that ‘terrorism’ is 
inextricably a term of moral condemnation in normal usage and therefore it is inevitably
111 A further problem with this usage of the term ‘terrorism’ is that the cause for which the violence is 
committed cannot be easily or uncontrovertibly discerned, and therefore its ‘justness’ cannot be ascertained.
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always used pejoratively to denounce the violence of which we disapprove. While the first 
part of this claim is certainly true— ‘terrorism’ is used in everyday language, by governments, 
the media and other bodies, to castigate certain types of violence, committed by certain types 
of people, for certain illicit ends—this does not mean that we must succumb to the second 
part of the claim. It does mean, however, that we have to be careful about how we define 
terrorism and how we apply this definition consistently. Our project is not to rid the language 
of terrorism of its contradictory meanings and applications in the real world—an impossible 
task—but to use it consistently, as a value-neutral concept, in order to better understand a 
specific type of violence.
1.4.3 Conflated Definition of Terrorism
Aside from the problems presented by subjectivism, another major threat to the concept of 
terrorism is presented by what we shall call conflated definitions. This occurs when the 
student of terrorism studies makes the definition so inclusive that it denotes all sorts of 
activities that have only the barest common analytical currency. The problem with conflated 
accounts is that they define the concept so widely that it becomes meaningless as an 
analytical category and thus a redundant concept. One way in which this occurs is to 
concentrate on the terror of terrorism. As any violent act, or threat of violence, contains at 
least the possibility of causing terror for the victim, then almost all acts of violence are in 
essence terrorism.112 This may seem far-fetched but the problem is real and often 
unacknowledged. Although most analysts want to draw a distinction between ordinary violent 
criminal activities and terrorism, many wish to subvert the line between organised state-on- 
state warfare and terrorism.
Lee Griffith, writing in the pacifist tradition, claims: ‘terrorism entails an element of 
calculation, an effort to generate and harness the irrational whirlwind of human fear. 
Terror/stw is the intentional effort to generate fear through violence or the threat of violence 
and the further effort to harness these fears in pursuit of some goal.’113 By defining the means 
of terrorism as the generation of fear—or terror through violence—and the ends as ‘some 
goal’ Griffith deliberately leaves the definition of terrorism open-ended and allows him to 
equate almost all forms of violence as terrorism. This leads him to pose the rhetorical
112 See Virginia Held “Terrorism and War”
113 Lee Griffith The War On Terrorism and the Terror Of God p.6 Emphasis in original.
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questions: ‘Are “terrorists” ad hoc assortments of violent individuals and non-state 
organizations that are bent on generating fear through random, bloody attacks? Or does the 
phenomenon of terror have more to do with the calculations of the powerful, with the 
intentional sowing and inevitable reaping of whirlwinds whipped up by the powers that 
be?’114 For Griffith all violence is deplorable and drawing distinctions between illegitimate 
non-state violence (‘terrorism’) and legitimate state violence (‘warfare’) conceals their ethical 
equivalence.
As with the problem of moral relativism we may accept Griffith’s contention that all violence 
is morally wrong and so all violence is, in some limited ethical sense, equivalent. This does 
not mean, however, that we cannot draw distinctions between different types of violence 
using ethically neutral boundaries. By equating all types of violence Griffith is held in an 
analytical bind of his own making; it is impossible to make meaningful or interesting claims 
about any type of violence if all violence is held to be essentially the same. To illustrate with 
an example we can see that the 1963 Great Train Robbery and the battle of the Somme 
cannot be equated—and analysed within a single conceptual framework—because they both 
involve violence, fear and terror. Any attempt to understand such disparate events using the 
same analytical framework will not get far. Similarly, the bombing of Baghdad in the opening 
nights of the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the 9/11 attacks, may have certain crude features in 
common, for example the symbolic, deliberate and instrumental use of terrifying spectacle, 
they may also, from certain perspectives be morally comparable, however this does not mean 
that both events can be understood in the same way. The differences are too significant to 
force the two events into the same category of violence. Rather than shoehoming all violent 
events into the same category, it would be more profitable to draw out and define the 
analytically significant differences between them. Paul Wilkinson makes a similar point:
It would surely be an act of sheer folly rather than mere hubris to attempt to 
explain all forms of political violence, ranging, say, from the intimidation of a 
professor for his alleged political views to acts of international war, in terms of a 
single grand scientific theory. We must bear in mind the enormous differences in 
scale, intensity, duration and effects, between small group violence and the large- 
scale collective violence of modem total war, which can engulf continents.115
114 Lee Griffith The War On Terrorism and the Terror Of God xi
115 Paul Wilkinson Terror and the Liberal State p.30
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In contrast to the vague definitions that pivot on the terror of terrorism are the comprehensive 
and strict definitions that rely on necessary and sufficient conditions. These are utilised 
primarily in legislation which require legally binding definitions to facilitate the prosecution 
of people committing, aiding or planning terrorist acts. They are also used by some 
academics and other bodies collecting data on terrorist acts that need a consistent method of 
deciding which acts are to be counted as terrorist and so to be included in the dataset. While 
there are some problems with strict definitions of terrorism we can be confident that approach 
is more fruitful for understanding certain acts of violence than the relativist method. 
Unfortunately there is not the space in this study to undertake a systematic review of existing 
definitions of terrorism. Instead we shall proceed to study the way in which definitions are 
composed.
1.4.4 Anatomy of Terrorism
Defining terrorism has turned into something of a conceptual sport for theorists of the subject 
and it is easy to see why this is the case. As we have already seen the concept is inherently 
disputable and thus malleable to the will and interests of both theorists and institutions. It is 
important to remind ourselves that we are not attempting to create a definitive definition of 
terrorism—an impossible task—but to craft a definition suitable for our particular analytical 
purposes of understanding the Islamist ideology and its attendant terrorism. Specifically we 
are searching for a definition that renders the term ethically-neutral, but allows us to 
productively distinguish the violence of terrorism from other modes of violence. At the same 
time we require a definition of terrorism that is neither so technical that it eludes our intuitive 
idea of terrorism, nor do we wish to be excessively guided by our already-existing prejudices. 
There are several different components that we can identify that make up the various 
definitions of terrorism. The one element that is common to all definitions is that terrorism 
involves violence. Some definitions also include the possibility of the threat of violence, or 
violence committed against inanimate objects, to count as terrorism.116 We shall outline the 
five basic elements that make up a robust definition of terrorism. It should be noted that these 
categories are not mutually exclusive and there will be a certain amount of overlap in any 
given case.
116 Even this most basic element, however, might be cast into doubt by the prospect of cyber-terrorism where no 
physical violence occurs.
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1.4.4.1 The delimitation of the type of actor engaging in violent activity
By the delimitation of the type of actor who engages in violence we refer to definitions of 
terrorism that define who can qualify as terrorists. For our definition of terrorism the 
perpetrators of terrorist activity would ordinarily be sub-state groups or individuals. This does 
not rule out the possibility of states sponsoring or commissioning acts of terrorism, or in 
exceptional circumstances directly engaging in terrorism. The reason that a state’s violence 
would rarely be counted as terrorism is that it is exceedingly difficult to distinguish between 
normal warfare activity that inevitably results in the death and injury of noncombatants, and 
the deliberate targeting of noncombatants. Although the distinction between state and sub­
state activity might not constitute an ethically significant boundary, it does represent an 
important analytical distinction. Put simply, the violent activities of the state and sub-state 
groups, in terms of organizational, financial, technological, decision-making and executive 
structure, are sufficiently dissimilar to require different modes of analysis. To conflate the 
violent activities of warfare resulting in noncombatants’ deaths, and the violent activities of 
sub-state groups aimed at noncombatants, would be to render the concept of terrorism 
useless.
1.4.4.2 The immediate target
Terrorism can be defined with reference to the type of target that is attacked. We will define 
the immediate target as ‘noncombatants,’ a technical term that is similar, but not identical to 
‘civilians,’ and ‘innocents.’ The immediate or direct target of the violence is crucial for a 
robust and consistent definition of terrorism. One reason is that for objective, analytical 
purposes identifying the type of target can be done fairly consistently and in most cases it is 
transparent to any reasonable, impartial observer. It is this distinction that will allow us to 
distinguish between one class of violent actions: ordinary and guerrilla warfare, and 
terrorism. There are however, some problems that blur this crucial distinction.
1.4.4.3 The means of terrorism
The means, mechanisms and ends of terrorism are closely intertwined, often blending and 
merging into one another. Discerning the content of these categories in any given instance is
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at best difficult, and occasionally impossible. It is, therefore, problematic to define terrorism 
primarily with reference to these categories. By the ‘means’ of terrorism we refer to the 
violent techniques utilised by the perpetrators against the immediate target.117 A special 
subtype of violence is suicide bombing, which although interesting for other reasons, adds 
nothing important to defining terrorism. Terrorist attacks are often innovative with an 
obvious example being the use of civilian aeroplanes, filled with aviation fuel, as guided 
missiles in the 9/11 attacks. Due to this constant innovation it is necessary to leave the range 
of types of violence open-ended and adaptable to new techniques that may be used in future 
terrorist attacks.118
The difficulty with identifying the means of terrorism as a defining condition is that at one 
end of the scale it is unclear what sort of action is required to constitute an act of terrorism. In 
many definitions the threat of violence is constituted as an act of terrorism. This is intuitively 
appealing in some instances, for example if a group plants a bomb in a public location, and 
then telephones a warning to the police, allowing time to diffuse the explosive, this could 
plausibly be counted as an act of terrorism despite the lack of an explosion. The problem is 
that the range of threats ranges from an unsubstantiated message on a website through to the 
planting and diffusing of large bombs. At one end the threat is taken very seriously—there is 
a viable explosive—the consequences can be easily imagined, and so the effects (panic, 
terror, publicity, political capital) can flow from the action in the same way that they would 
have if the bomb had exploded. At the other end of the scale the threat goes unnoticed or 
ignored, and so the act is entirely unsuccessful; should this too be counted as terrorism? If we 
are to accept that any threat of violence, for political ends, constitutes an act of terrorism then 
we will be forced to include a host of acts that would clearly impinge on the right to freedom 
of expression. Alternatively, we could only include credible threats whose outcomes are
1,7 For example the use of conventional explosives, firearms and fissile weapons, and potentially more 
destructive non-conventional weapons such as chemical, biological and nuclear (both as a fission device and a 
radioactively toxic material).
118 One further problem with defining terrorism primarily with reference to the means is the prospect of so- 
called cyber-terrorism. This term encompasses a range of non-physical attacks aimed at electronic systems, 
including critical infrastructure systems, with an aim to disrupting their normal operation. This prospect is not so 
problematic when physical harm inflicted cm noncombatants is directly caused by the attack. For example, a 
group that remotely disrupted an air-traffic control system, causing a civilian aeroplane to crash, would clearly 
be engaging in terrorism, even though the aeroplane and its passengers were not the direct target. Less clear is a 
case where a major bank’s information systems are electronically infiltrated and crashed causing the loss of its 
customer’s data. In this case harm is inflicted, both on the bank but more importantly on its customers and the 
wider economic system, precipitating a financial crises. Here the harm is both indirect and non-physical and so 
not a case of terrorism according to our provisional definition.
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similar to that of an actual violent attack, but in this case we would be classifying acts of 
terrorism on the basis of their success—clearly a subjective quality—and one that is 
impossible to quantify. Despite the intuitive appeal of including plausible threats of violence 
as actual instances of terrorism, it would be prudent to count them as precisely what they 
are—threats of terrorism—and not acts of terrorism.
1.4.4.4 The mechanisms of terrorism
By the ‘mechanisms of terrorism’ we mean the causal pathway that connects the means to the 
ends; in a sense this category is concerned with how terrorism ‘works.’ The candidate for the 
underlying mechanism of terrorism is communication, and the lexicon in which it speaks is 
terror. Although communication is no doubt implicit in all acts of terrorism, what is being 
communicated and to whom, is often unclear. At one level terrorism is an act of violent 
coercion levied against a populace in order to force their government into some form of 
political action. In other instances, however, the terrorists may merely wish to draw attention 
to their cause and have decided that violence against civilians is a particularly efficient and 
effective way of achieving this. Often this is the case with international terrorism and is 
expressed in Brian Jenkins dictum: ‘[t]errorists want a lot of people watching not a lot of 
people dead.’119
Usually, there are several messages, for several audiences, including the members and 
political constituents of the terrorist group. These are often unclear and contradictory, there 
may be an implicit message ‘give in to our demands and we will cease our attacks,’ but this is 
rarely explicitly stated and the content of the demands are almost always unclear, 
inconsistent, or even impossible to meet. The problem is not just one of interpretation by the 
multiple audiences but that the senders of the message are often confused about what their 
demands are, or divided on what they should be. Terrorist groups often do not have a 
centralised command and communication structure and so are far from monolithic structures 
with a consistent set of aims and a decision making body charged with attaining these ends. 
Furthermore, there may be a high turnover rate in the leadership structure (a natural hazard of 
the role) and they may often be in no position to communicate effectively even with their 
own group. This difficulty is augmented by terrorist attacks that are not accompanied by
119 Brian Jenkins cited in John Gearson “The Nature of Modern Terrorism” p.l 1
62
either a communication with a list of demands, or claims of responsibility. Of course, 
something is communicated, if only sheer terror, but it is difficult to establish whether a 
message has been transmitted, when the sender, and to an extent the recipients, are 
unknowable.120
So far we have seen that understanding terrorism primarily as a mode of communication is 
problematic in the many cases when interpretations of attacks are difficult or impossible. An 
alternative would be to focus on the form of communication: terror. The argument goes that 
terrorism is distinctive, as its etymology would suggest, because it engenders terror, not just 
in its immediate target but also to a wider audience. This assumption is present in the 
definitions that described terrorism as random violence; the target, timing, place, and scale of 
the next attack are unknown. Terrorism generates terror because it threatens the possibility of 
striking anybody, anywhere, anytime with any weapon and using any method available. The 
terror is unknowable, cannot be quantified or qualified, and is future-oriented. According to 
this logic any definition of terrorism that does not make some reference to terror misses the 
point entirely. This is summed up in Robert Goodin’s assertion: ‘Terrorism... is first and
191foremost a political tactic: frightening people for political advantage.’
Although it is counterintuitive to exclude terror from our definition it is clear that we should 
do so. All sorts of activities include the coercive use of fear or terror but do not constitute acts 
of terrorism. A mugging, for instance, often will only involve the threat of violence, in order 
to illicit the victim’s compliance. Furthermore, in the right setting (at night, in a quiet part of 
town) the demand for victim’s handbag, issued in a plausible way (the ‘right’ accentuation 
and language) by a convincing criminal in the appropriate dress, will result in the same 
desired outcome, without any explicit threat of violence being made. Presumably, many 
criminals rely on this implicit fear to achieve their goals without the potentially costly resort
120 The 9/11 attacks are a famous example where responsibility has never been explicitly claimed by any group, 
although Osama bin Laden praised the assault in a video recording released to coincide with the American-led 
invasion of Afghanistan. With 9/11 it was, however, clear within a few days of the attack who the perpetrators 
were—from the airlines’ manifests—and their connection to the al Qaeda network was quickly established. As 
al Qaeda had previously released statements and two infamous fatwas containing the outlines of a manifesto, 
some sense could be made of the attacks, even if the content of al Qaeda’s demands are still disputed. A more 
telling example of the problems for the communicative model of terrorism are the anthrax attacks in the weeks 
after 9/11. Responsibility has never been claimed, and on going investigation has cast little light on the 
perpetrator(s). The timing of the letters and the targets (U.S. politicians, media offices) suggests that it may have 
been linked to the ideology behind 9/11, but this is a far too tenuous assumption on which to interpret these 
attacks as terrorism.
121 Robert Goodin What’s Wrong With Terrorism p.l
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to violence. We would not, however, benefit from labelling this instrumental use of fear as 
terrorism. Defenders of the terror-centric definition could point out that no-one sets about to 
deliberately create this atmosphere of terror, it is spontaneously generated by a host of 
unconnected, independent actions, and so we may retain the definition whilst rejecting this 
example.122
1.4.4.5 The ends of terrorism
The final part of our definition concerns the ends of terrorism—the ultimate reason for 
engaging in terrorism. This is the clause that allows us to distinguish between terrorism and 
other violent activities. Many definitions make reference to political objectives and this is the 
obvious candidate for our definition. The main problem with delimiting the ends as political 
is that there are a significant range of violent activities that we would ordinarily refer to as 
terrorism, where the goals are not solely, or even partly, political. Instead they have another 
type of goal or motivation guiding their activities including, most significantly, religious 
ends. We cannot, however, just add religion to our list of ends that constitute terrorism. This 
is because it is far from clear what constitutes a religious end and how this can be 
distinguished from political ends. The difficulty of disentangling religious and political ends 
will be tackled later, for now it is worth leaving our definition open-ended. The work done by 
delimiting the ends of terrorism is to exclude certain types of activities, rather than describing 
the set to be included. So, by ‘political’ we merely mean activities where the primary goals 
are not for financial or other purely personal gains. This follows the United Kingdom’s 2006 
Terrorism Act definition, referring to ‘political, religious or ideological cause[s].’ One way of 
conceptualising this exclusionary principle would be to borrow Hoffman’s principle, that the 
terrorist ‘is fundamentally an altruist,’ his actions are to be understood in terms not of 
personal gain (although this may follow) but for the advancement of some other cause.
We are now in a position to commit ourselves to a working definition of terrorism:
“Violence, deliberately directed against noncombatants, for political or related ends.”
122 A more testing example would be the activities of a mafia-type organization, where clearly fear is 
deliberately generated by an organized group in order to ensure die easy compliance of the society it is parasitic 
upon. As with the independent criminals, however, this mafia-type group is not engaging in the terror business 
for political reasons, but for financial gain. The leaders may engage in politics, if it is seen as advantageous to 
the group, but their ultimate aim is fiscal, not political, advantage.
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This definition is deliberately pared back to the essentials of what is minimally required of a 
terrorist attack.123 It would, therefore, be useful to elaborate on what is excluded from our 
definition. To do this we can compare our working definition with another, more 
comprehensive definition provided by Alex Schmid:
Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed 
by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, 
criminal or political reasons, whereby -  in contrast to assassination -  the 
direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human 
victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or 
selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and 
serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication 
processes between terrorist (organization), (imperilled) victims, and main 
targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a 
target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on 
whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought.1 4
Unlike Schmid our definition makes no mention of terror, communication or propaganda. 
There is neither elaboration of the way targets are chosen, their various classifications 
(random/symbolic), nor how they are attacked. ‘Violence’ in our definition is a wide-ranging 
concept and no attempt is made to finesse. Likewise, the phrase ‘political or related ends’ is 
deliberately open-ended and serves to work as an exclusionary principle—excluding violence 
committed for purely personal gain—as opposed to an inclusionary principle that explicitly 
lists the qualifying ends. Crucially the justness, or otherwise, of the cause for which the 
terrorism is committed is not included; it may be a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ cause, but this will have 
no impact and our classification of the activity. Furthermore, there is no moral evaluation of 
terrorism in general contained in our definition—just because an act qualifies as terrorism
123 One important point to note is that due to the narrow definition of terrorism that we are employing, it makes 
more sense to refer to ‘acts of terra-ism’ rath a - than ‘terrorists,’ or ‘terrorist groups.’ This is because our 
definition refers to die properties of the individual action rather than the people or groups who organise and 
commit the attack. If we are to use the term ‘terrorist,’ we literally mean someone who commits a terrorist 
attack. Following on from this we can state that someone planning an act of terrorism is only a ‘terrorist’ in the 
sense that they are intending to commit terrorism. Strictly speaking an individual cannot be a ‘terrorist’ in the 
way that they could be a policeman, as policing denotes an ongoing professional activity, whilst terrorism is a 
specific type of act. This makes speaking of terrorists and terrorist groups problematic, in particular the political 
and legal identification of terrorist groups, as it suggests a permanency to terrorism that our definition does not 
allow. Despite this the terms are commonly used and it would make little sense to avoid using them for the sake 
of this consistency. Instead, we must bear in mind that strictly speaking ‘terrorism’ refers to a specific act, and 
further derivations such as ‘terrorist’ only refers to someone who commits this act.
124 Alex P. Schmid cited in Joseph S. Tuman Communicating Terror: The Rhetorical Dimensions o f Terrorism 
pp. 13-14
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according to our definition entails no moral judgement.125 Finally, there is no reference to the 
type of groups legible for committing terrorist acts. The shorter definition is preferred as it 
captures the essence of what constitutes terrorism without the cumbersome references to the 
way it might work, which will inevitably vary in different instances. The load-bearing 
element of our definition is in the middle phrase ‘deliberately directed against 
noncombatants.’
We have used the concept ‘noncombatants’ to refer to the classic Just War account of 
legitimate and illegitimate targets in warfare. For our purposes it is not necessary to enter into 
this debate but merely to utilise the concept as a useful way of distinguishing between state 
warfare and terrorist activity. We use the term to refer to non-active participants in war- 
making activities. It is obvious that this distinction—and the distinction between deliberate 
and non-deliberate targeting of noncombatants—is a difficult one with several grey areas. 
However this fuzziness is necessary due to the fluid nature of the concepts that are being 
defined. Terrorism and warfare are dynamic phenomena that are moulded by the states, 
groups and individuals engaging in these activities and the technologies available to them. 
The different forms that terrorism can take are accounted for by the open-ended terms of our 
definition. Rather than supplying a strict set of necessary and sufficient conditions, we have 
employed a ‘family resemblance’ definition in the same way as we did when defining 
ideology. Different types and tactics of violence, committed for a variety of causes are 
collected together under the same rubric, subject to the minimal clause that they are 
deliberately targeted against noncombatants. As we have seen the category of noncombatants 
is, to a degree, open-ended in order for the definition to be flexible, so that there are no 
arbitrary distinctions, and yet specific enough to be analytically useful.
125 See Charles L. Ruby “The Definition of Terrorism”
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2 The Origins and Ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood
2.1 Introduction: The Origins of the Modern Islamist Ideology
The history of modem Sunni Islamist movements and the practice of terrorist attacks 
culminating in 9/11 can be traced back to the Egyptian Society of Muslim Brothers. Although 
several organizationally discrete Islamist groups came into being after the Muslims Brothers 
it is the ideology that was formulated by the Brothers that links these groups into a coherent 
Islamist movement. The Islamist ideology was shaped by the historical development and 
practice of these movements but conversely the ideology also shaped and guided the 
organizational forms and actions of the movement. As we argued in the first chapter the 
evolution of the Islamist ideology needs to be understood by examining the intertwining and 
interplay of theory and practice. In other words the Islamist ideology cannot be understood 
separately from the historical development and practice of the Islamist movements, and the 
history of the movements including their terrorist activities cannot be understood separately 
from the ideology.
In order to understand the creation, rise and decline of the Muslim Brotherhood and the 
beginnings of the modem Islamist movement we must place the Society in its historical and 
intellectual context. There is not, however, a single history that explains the formation of the 
Brothers; there is in fact a multiplicity and it is not possible within the space of this study to 
offer an exhaustive historical narrative. In the first part of this chapter we will therefore select 
the most salient histories that help us understand the distinctive features of the Brotherhood’s 
ideology. The most general of these contextual histories is the historical social, political and 
economic background of Egypt from the modernisation of the country in the 19th century, 
through to the increasing economic, political and cultural influence of Western colonial 
powers from the mid-1800s to the 20th century and the British occupation from 1882. We will 
then examine the specific liberal conditions in Egypt at the turn of the 20th century that 
afforded an incubation period for the development of the ideologies of nationalism, Arabism 
and Islamism. The interplay between these competing ideologies both shaped the political 
history of Egypt in the 20th century and in doing so also fashioned their forms. The general 
historical context and the specific ideological context will then allow us to examine the 1919
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revolution and the commencement of Egypt’s liberal period that permitted the creation of 
non-political societies including the Muslim Brotherhood.
As discussed in the previous chapter a crucial factor in the creation and development of 
ideologies is the role that the intellectual plays—using Gramsci’s sense of the word—both 
organizationally—through the leadership of movements—and intellectually—by theorising 
the ideology. Hasan al-Banna fulfilled both these roles and was the crucial personality in the 
creation and development of the Muslim Brotherhood and the early modern Islamist 
ideology. It will therefore be worthwhile to briefly explore al-Banna’s personal biography to 
see how his formative experiences in rural and urban 1920s Egypt deeply affected the 
development of the Society and its ideology. We will then chart the formation and early 
growth of the Society both as a historical fact but also the mythological account constructed 
by al-Banna in his memoirs. In order to structure the narrative history of the Society and 
Islamist ideology it will be useful to utilize the series of annual conferences that demonstrate 
the three ideological and organizational stages the Brotherhood passed through from 1928 to 
the death of al-Banna. Finally, we will chart the decline and breakup of the Society as both 
the organization and the ideology fractured due to internal contradictions and external 
pressures.
The second section of the chapter will be an in-depth examination of how these historical 
forces gave rise to the modem Islamist movement and ideology. As in the first section with 
the examination of the historical socioeconomic context of the development of the Society it 
will be necessary to investigate the intellectual context in which the ideology developed. We 
shall therefore look both at the ideological background of the conservative Sunni orthodox 
establishment and the ideas of several influential thinkers who reacted against it in times of 
crisis. This genealogy of ideas will allow us to understand the intellectual resources that al- 
Banna drew on to forge the early modem Islamist ideology. Drawing on our study of the 
intellectual and historical contexts we will then examine the core concepts of al-Banna’s and 
the Society’s ideology and how these were utilized to understand the world and the Brothers’ 
place within it. Finally, we shall examine how the ideology was used to frame and motivate 
the actions of the Brotherhood.
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The story of the Muslim Brotherhood has, of course, already been told most notably in 
Richard Mitchell’s seminal study The Society o f Muslim Brothers; however as discussed in 
the previous chapter these histories tend to either ignore or downplay the importance of 
ideology in the development of the movement.1 By placing the development of the ideology 
in the historical context of the development of the movement we hope to draw out our thesis 
that the Islamist ideology is dynamic and adaptive, rather than static and dogmatic as it 
appears in many other texts. This study aims to not only to provide a detailed description of 
the modem Islamist ideology but also to critically chart its historical evolution and in doing 
makes the important claim that the key feature of the ideology is its ability to adapt with new 
movements in new political, social and material situations.
2.1.1 Historical Background of Egypt: 1800s-1919
In the course of the nineteenth century the export trade of cotton increased rapidly to become 
Egypt’s most valuable cash crop and source of income. Demand for cotton from Europe, and 
in particular Britain, rose as supplies collapsed in the wake of the American war of 
independence.2 The burgeoning trade required investment in Egypt’s infrastructure to 
increase output, improve internal communications and facilitate efficient exportation of 
cotton. The khedive (lord or ruler) of Egypt, Isma’il Pasha, embarked on an extravagant and 
expensive program of European-orientated modernization in order to meet these commercial 
demands. Isma’il’s aims extended beyond economic reform; having been educated in Europe 
and lived in Paris, Isma’il intentionally turned his back on Egypt’s Islamic heritage and set 
out to ‘complete the Europeanization of Egypt in as short a time as possible.’ These large 
scale projects depended on European capital investment, engineering technology and 
expertise of European personnel to facilitate the building of irrigation channels, railroads, 
canals, dams and ports.4 The construction of the largest of these projects commenced in 1859; 
ten years later the 193 kilometre Suez Canal was completed, creating a major shipping 
channel between the Mediterranean and Red Sea.
1 Although Mitchell devotes a section to ideology in his book he does not examine either the interaction between 
the history of the Society and the ideology nor does he acknowledge the dynamism of the ideology that allowed 
it to survive and adapt long after the Society had effectively been destroyed.
2 P. J. Vatikiotis The Modem History o f Egypt p.83
3 William L. Cleveland A History o f the Modem Middle East p.95
4 P.J. Vatikiotis The Modem History o f Egypt p.76
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As well as infrastructure and economic reforms, Isma’il’s Europeanization program covered 
education, the legal system and architecture. He vastly increased the budget for education, 
expanding the primary and secondary school systems and founded technical colleges.5 One of 
these, Dar al-‘Ulum, re-trained graduates of religious schools to teach in the new school 
system; Hasan al-Banna would later become one of its famous graduates. The School of 
Languages, later the Cairo School of Law, was also created at a similar time, and offered a 
francophone legal education.6 The elite graduates of this school were in an advantageous 
position to attain posts in the state’s rapidly expanding civil service. Isma’il’s controversial 
legal reforms meant the establishment of the Mixed and National Courts, which were created 
to standardize legal practice across the country and deal with cases that involved disputes 
between Egyptians and foreigners. With the creation of the Courts the jurisdiction of the 
traditional shar ’ia (Islamic law) court was curtailed to family law and the administration of 
waqf (Islamic endowments). Alongside the huge infrastructure projects Isma’il aimed to 
emulate the grandeur of the big European capitals; he transformed the appearance of Cairo by 
ordering the construction of wide boulevards, large parks and tramways.
In contrast to the sweeping changes in infrastructure, commerce, education and law, Isma’il 
was keen to consolidate, rather than reform, Egypt’s political system. Under the rule of his 
grandfather, Mohammed ‘Ali (1805-1848), Egypt had wrested power from the sultanate of 
the Ottoman Empire and gained extensive autonomy and control for his dynasty.7 Although 
remaining under Ottoman suzerainty an 1841 imperial edict granted Mohammad ‘Ali and his 
descendents hereditary governorship of Egypt.8 This process was completed when the 
Ottoman Sultan Abdul Aziz paid a state visit, and, lavishly received at great expense, 
pronounced the title of ‘khedive ’ on Isma’il.9 The sultan also devolved significant political 
rights to Egypt, including the power to raise its own army, mint its own currency and, 
perhaps most significantly, enter into foreign loan agreements without seeking consent from 
the sultan.10 Isma’il aimed to secure the dynasty by dispensing royal patronage to officials 
and powerful families whose interests aligned with those of the khedive. These influential 
families could be relied upon for support as their positions depended on continuing royal
5 William L. Cleveland^ History o f the Modem Middle East p.95
6 P. J. Vatikiotis The Modem History o f Egypt p.94
7 P. J. Vatikiotis The Modem History o f Egypt p.70
8 F. Robert Hunter “Egypt under Muhammad ‘Ali’s successors” p. 182
9 P. J. Vatikiotis The Modem History o f Egypt p.79
10 William L. Cleveland A History o f the Modem Middle East p.96
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largesse. Isma’il introduced a consultative chamber of delegates in 1866, but this remained a 
symbolic gesture to lend the khedive the appearance of popular legitimacy as no real powers 
were granted to the chamber.11 Essentially, Isma’il remained ‘an authoritarian ruler, 
dispensing and withholding royal patronage at his pleasure.’12
The rapid pace of reform of Isma’il’s rule did not just result in the influx of European capital 
and technology; alongside monetary investments came the inevitable arrival—with Isma’il’s 
encouragement—of European cultural influences.13 With the dramatic increase in the cotton 
trade and the construction of the Suez Canal the geostrategic importance of Egypt grew, 
particularly for the British. The Canal cut the distance for shipping between India and Britain 
by half and by 1881 over eighty percent of the Canal traffic was British.14 The heightened 
strategic and commercial importance of Egypt meant the European powers, which were not 
just trading partners and banks, but a civilization, exerted cultural hegemony, in a myriad of 
ways, upon their Egyptian hosts. The bloated civil service was dominated by Europeans, 
especially at the upper levels, where they comprised two percent of the workforce but drew 
sixteen percent of the pay.15 The cultural influence of Europe was predominantly felt by the 
ruling elite, large landowners and cotton traders, and the graduates of the new higher 
education colleges—many of whom were funded by Isma’il to study in European 
universities. Isma’il’s personal fixation on Europe was also a major catalyst for cultural 
penetration; he is reputed to have proclaimed: ‘My country is no longer in Africa, it is now in 
Europe.’16
One lasting effect of these upheavals was the stratification of Egyptian society. A gap 
emerged between the newly educated middle-class of Europeanized-elites who filled the 
positions created by the expansion of the administrative duties of the state, and those with 
traditional, Islamic educations, or sons of families too poor to pay for an education. The rapid 
enlargement in the scale and profitability of the cotton industry meant that productive land 
became a valuable commodity and large landowners increased their holdings, either by
11 William L. Cleveland A History o f the Modem Middle East p.96
12 William L. Cleveland^ History o f the Modem Middle East p.96
13 P J. Vatikiotis The Modem History o f Egypt p.74
14 William L. Cleveland A History o f the Modem Middle East p.97
15 Donald Malcolm Reid “The ‘Urabi Revolution and British Conquest” p.220
16 William L. Cleveland .4 History o f the Modem Middle East p.97
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purchase, seizure or royal edict.17 This came at the expense of the smallholders, who were 
forced to work in an exploitative relationship as labourers for their landlords. Land rights 
were also granted by the khedive to favoured officials in an effort designed to ensure that the 
interests of Egypt’s high-ranking officials coincided with those of the ruler. A striking 
example of the concentration of vast landholdings to a few privileged families was Isma’il’s 
ownership of one-fifth of cultivated land.18
Another legacy of Isma’il’s spending spree was the mountain of debt it created. The revenues 
from the lucrative cotton trade and a reformed centralized land tax system could not keep 
pace with his ambitious program, extravagant tastes and the penalizing rates and terms at 
which the European loan agreements were set. To meet the interest payments Isma’il entered 
into the unsustainable practice of taking out new loans to pay the interest on existing ones. In 
1875 Egypt’s financial difficulties were transformed into political problems when Isma’il 
sold Egypt’s remaining 44 percent stake in Suez Canal Company to Britain.19 A year later, 
despite last ditch efforts to stave off bankruptcy by increasing short-term land tax revenues 
Egypt effectively defaulted on its loans. The loss of control of the economy heralded 
Isma’il’s political demise. Under pressure from his creditors a commission was established to 
ensure that Egypt met its debt obligations. Under this agreement two officials, from France 
and Britain, were sent to supervise Egyptian expenditure and the repayment of its loans, a 
system known as Dual Control.20 When Isma’il attempted to resist this European 
impingement on his sovereignty, the Ottoman sultan, exercising the remaining power that the 
sultanate had over Egypt, deposed Isma’il and appointed his son, Muhammad Tawfiq, as 
khedive21
The rule of Tawfiq represented a continuation of the trends that marked the years of his 
father’s demise. Without his father’s charisma, or access to funds, Tawfiq proved to be a 
weak leader, unable to hold the country together in the face of international political and 
economic forces outside of his sphere of influence. Economic control continued to be ceded 
to Egypt’s European creditors which entailed the concurrent transfer of political power. The
17 F. Robert Hunter “Egypt under Muhammad ‘Ali’s successors” pp.192-193
18 William L. Cleveland A History o f the Modem Middle East p.97
19 William L. Cleveland A History o f the Modem Middle East p.98
20 The French and British financial controllers who, although non-voting members of the Egyptian cabinet, had 
final say on fiscal decisions, drew up the budget, and could only be removed with consent of their home 
government
21 William L. Cleveland vf History o f the Modem Middle East p.99
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transparent dependence of Egypt on Europe and the humiliating system of Dual Control 
fostered popular discontent amongst the long-suffering fellahin (peasants) as well as 
segments of the educated-elite and those who had relied on royal patronage for their wealth. 
Furthermore, elements of the army were frustrated by the dominance in the upper echelons of 
Turkish speaking officers and the routine discrimination against indigenous officers and their 
men.22 All of Tawfiq’s problems resulted in a dangerously combustible political and social 
situation.
2.1.2 The ‘Urabi Revolt
In 1879 a spark was struck that ignited the Egyptian political scene. A law was passed that 
effectively prevented the passage of indigenous Egyptians through the ranks of the army past 
the level of colonel.23 The law was interpreted as being specifically aimed at frustrating the 
progress of Colonel Ahmad ‘Urabi, who had garnered a popular following amongst the 
fellahin, both within and outside of the army, who identified with ‘Urabi’s own peasant 
background. The law backfired when ‘Urabi and his men led a revolt against the law, and 
more generally in protest at the discrimination against indigenous Egyptians in the civil 
service and government, and European interference in Egypt.24 ‘Urabi’s popularity stemmed 
from his ordinary background; he received a traditional education in al-Azhar and thus had 
not been exposed to European influence like so many of his peers.
Recognising the popular support that Urabi commanded Tawfiq conceded to ‘Urabi’s 
demands, rescinded the law that had initially caused offence and, in 1882, appointed ‘Urabi 
to minister of war. ‘Urabi and his supporters had three populist aims: 1) to reduce foreign 
influences over the country by taking back financial control; 2) to limit the power of the 
khedive by asserting constitutional restrictions on his jurisdiction; 3) to roll back Turkish­
speaking control of the army, government and the higher levels of the bureaucracy. Taken 
together, these three aims, and the ‘Urabist slogan ‘Egypt for the Egyptians,’ formed the 
beginnings of the nationalist movement that would play a vital role over the next few decades 
in Egyptian politics. ‘Urabi’s was an ideologically nationalist movement but one that easily 
appealed to the rhetorical symbolism and language of Islam as a unifying force against
22 Donald Malcolm Reid “The ‘Urabi Revolution and British Conquest” p.220
23 P.J. Vatikiotis The Modem History o f Egypt pp.146-147
24 P.J. Vatikiotis The Modem History o f Egypt p. 147
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European influence and corrupt domestic rulers. During the early period the nationalist 
rhetoric blended easily with religious exhortations to jihad (to struggle or to strive)—in its 
nascent stage the ideological outlines of resistance to occupation had yet to distil into distinct 
movements.
2.1.3 Egypt under British Occupation
Alarmed by the prospects of an uncooperative military leadership in Egypt, and preferring a 
pliable khedive, Britain reacted to a spate of antiforeigner riots in Alexandra in June 1882 by 
bombarding the port.25 Four months later a temporary military expeditionary force was 
launched to quash the ‘Urabi movement and secure the Suez Canal.26 By September their 
short-term goals were achieved, and Egypt was entirely under British military control. ‘Urabi, 
for all his success in mobilizing Egyptians against European interference ended up achieving 
the diametrically opposite end. The sidelined khedive was resurrected as a puppet figurehead, 
British strategic interests in Egypt were greater than ever before, and the temporary 
occupation did not leave for another seventy-four years.
The trends that we have identified in the lead up to the 1882 British occupation largely 
continued after this date. Society became increasingly stratified along two axes: in the 
countryside between the land-owning rich and the labouring fellahin; and in the cities 
between the European-orientated educated elite, who dominated the upper echelons of the 
state’s bureaucracy, and the traditionally-educated poor who subsisted on the edges of the 
urban environment. The political, economic, legal and cultural control that European powers 
had exerted was consolidated by the British military occupation and was gradually formalized 
as the temporary invasion solidified into a permanent state of affairs. The internal affairs of 
Egypt and in particular its economy continued to be oriented to the advantage of British and 
European interests. The corollary of the British presence was an intensification of the 
resentment felt by various Egyptian groups to the occupation. The emerging politics of post- 
1882 Egypt would be dominated by the various ideological responses to the British and the 
competition between these factions would shape the Egyptian, Arab and Islamic socio­
political landscapes to the present day.
25 PJ. Vatikiotis The Modem History o f Egypt p. 157
26 P.J. Vatikiotis The Modem History o f Egypt p. 158
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The gestation period of these ideological movements was extended by several mitigating, and 
curiously paradoxical, factors that muddied the political picture. The invasion of the British 
and the termination of the ‘Urabi revolt represented both a break and a continuation for 
Egypt. Although this was the first European military occupation since the brief Napoleonic 
expedition of 1798-1801, the political upshot of 1882 was a continuation of the long-standing 
trend of European domination, rather than a radical new reality. Tawfiq was restored as a 
hereditary khedive, albeit as a figurehead, with the real power resting in the hands of the 
British administrator; and the economic dependence of Egypt on its European creditors 
continued as before.27 Egypt technically remained an Ottoman province and the existing 
government structure continued to exist, with each ministry overseen by a British advisor. A 
second factor was the surprising flourishing of Egyptian journalism after the invasion with a 
lively trade in newspapers and periodicals facilitating open debate and the exchange of ideas 
in the large cities. This outlet for peaceful protest played a role in subduing violent protests 
against the British but also allowed the ideologies of resistance to mature and consolidate 
amongst educated Egyptians.28 A final factor that clouded the political scene was the 
ambiguous relationship between Britain and Egypt. As the British government harboured no 
desire for a long-term occupation of Egypt at the time of the invasion—aiming only to secure 
the Suez Canal and re-establish political and economic stability—it declined to define the 
precise terms of the occupation and the Anglo-Egyptian relationship. From 1882 to 1914 
Egypt was neither a protectorate nor a colony of Britain, and was only technically a province 
of the Ottoman Empire. Out of this political twilight zone the three main ideological 
responses to imperialism gradually took shape.
The pre-war period also witnessed gradual changes by the British in response to local 
uprisings however the outbreak of the First World War brought to a halt all political reforms. 
The Ottoman Empire took the fateful decision of allying with Germany, martial law was 
declared in Egypt and Britain proclaimed it a protectorate—which at least had the advantage 
of finally clarifying the British-Egyptian relationship and formalised the dismemberment of 
Egypt from the Ottomans.29
27 From 1883 to 1907 the British administrator was Evelyn Baring, later Lord Cromer.
28 Mohammed Abduh was one prominent voice during this period. We shall examine his contribution to die 
development of the Islamist ideology of resistance in detail later.
29 P.J. Vatikiotis The Modem History o f Egypt p.242
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2.1.5 Post-War Egypt
The aftermath of the First World War witnessed the painful breaking up of the defunct
30Ottoman Empire and the appearance of strange lines on maps to demarcate the new states. 
These borders were negotiated between the Great Powers of Britain, France and Russia, who 
divided up realms of influence and direct control over the region.31 With the creation of 
Turkey—from its inception a stridently secular republic—the 700 year old institution of the 
Ottoman Islamic caliphate was abolished by Ataturk in 1924. This period of Middle East 
history was marked by the search for new forms of identification that would either unite 
societies within their European imposed borders, or resist these arbitrary lines to form 
communities united by religion, race or language.
In Egypt these processes had already been set in motion before the war. Egypt had effectively 
achieved a high degree of political, if not cultural, autonomy from the Ottoman Empire since 
the rule of Mohammed Ali. Unfortunately, due to the commercial importance of the cotton 
trade and, with the construction of the Suez Canal, its strategic position as a shipping gateway 
to India, it had become too important to Britain to become fully autonomous. The search for 
identity and a new socio-political model in Egypt was historically linked to the discourse of 
resistance.
The collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the abolition of the caliphate—the defining symbol of 
the umma (community of believers) and Islamic unity—the uncompromising secularism of 
Ataturk, and the appearance of new names and unfamiliar borders on maps: all of these 
increased the urgency of the question of identity and political organization in the Middle 
East. These questions had to be addressed under the spectre of a reinvigorated European, 
Soviet, and increasingly American, contest for influence over the region and its resources; 
and within the confines of the racist terms of the mandate system imposed after the war. As 
one commentator asked: ‘Should the emerging autonomous Egyptian state have a pan-Arabist 
orientation and work toward something like the United Arab Republic, or should it be more 
strictly nationalist with secular democratic, military, dynastic, or one-party rule, or should it
30 One enduringly problematic outcome of the Sykes-Picot Agreement was the creation of Palestine, which 
according to the agreement would be placed under international control. This would prove to be impossible 
when the Balfour Declaration of 1917 pledged British support for the creation of a Jewish national home in 
Palestine.
31 Russia was forced to drop claims on the territory with the Bolshevik revolution of 1917.
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be an Islamic-based polity?’32 The search was not solely for a new politic but also for a new 
identity. William Cleveland asked: ‘What elements of the Arab heritage could best be used as 
symbols around which to rally popular resistance to the European occupation and to construct 
a positive image of Arab identity?’33 We shall briefly examine the three main forms this 
search took that began in pre-war Egypt and continued across the Middle East stretching into 
the 20th century.
2.1.6 Three Ideological Responses: Classic Nationalism
Politically, the most successful post-war political modes of identification were the various 
forms of classic nationalism.34 Nationalists emphasised a range of different cultural 
identifiers and encompassed several different political systems: from the secular 
republicanism of Ataturk to hereditary authoritarianism in Iran. The common goal shared by 
nationalists was the creation and promotion of national symbols around which citizens were 
expected to rally. National anthems were composed, postage stamps printed, and the newly 
designed flags hoisted into the air. Importantly the indigenous language replaced the old 
imperial languages of English, French and Turkish across the political, legal and bureaucratic 
landscape. The principle nationalist actors were the new populist parties, such as the Wafd in 
Egypt that needed to gamer support and legitimacy for their regimes, usually in the face of 
European obstacles that were placed in the way of the new states gaining full autonomy. 
Ironically, despite their steadfast opposition to the continued presence of foreign forces, the 
new political classes acted to reinforce the often arbitrary borders forced on them by the 
mandate system. With their construction of a national mythology and a shared, imagined past 
they attempted to solidify arbitrary boundaries into ideologically meaningful ones.
The nationalists’ attitude towards Islam was complex and variable. In general they subscribed 
to the European enlightenment ideal that equated modernity with secularism and that religion 
was an antiquated institution belonging to the past, not the future. In particular they were 
naturally orientated towards the secularist principle that religious institutions should have no 
influence over political ones.35 However, they also recognised the emotional power of Islam,
32 Albert J. Bergesen The Sayyid Qutb Reader: Selected Writings on Politics, Religion, and Society p.7
33 William L. Cleveland A History o f the Modem Middle East p.234
34 The term ‘classic nationalism’ is used to differentiate between this ideology and its competitor, Arab 
nationalism.
35 P.J. Vatikiotis The Modem History o f Egypt p.301
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particularly for their own populist base—the fellahin and devout middle classes. Accordingly, 
the nationalists adopted the symbols of Islam principally to avoid offending these groups and 
to endow their regime with the aura of religious legitimacy. At the same time, however, they 
made no concerted attempts to enshrine the shar’ia within the political, legal, social, or 
economic system.36 This kind of compromise can be seen operating in the interwar years in 
Egypt where, although alcohol was banned in accordance with the shar’ia, no serious attempt 
was made to enforce the law and alcohol remained readily available. Although this balancing 
act left regimes open to the charge of hypocrisy and insincerity from Islamists, it also meant 
that politicians could quickly adopt more rigorous Islamic symbols and rhetoric when it 
became politically expedient to do so. The vacillation between Islam and secularism became 
a mark of twentieth-century nationalist politics for many regimes in the Middle East.
2.1.7 Arab Nationalism
Arab nationalists rejected what they saw as a fundamental betrayal by the classic nationalists: 
their capitulation to the artificial borders of the mandate system imposed by Western 
powers. These divisions, they argued, were just another ploy of the imperial West to 
subdue, control and exploit the Arab people, essentially a reiteration of the ‘divide and rule’ 
tactic. The relevant political identifier for the Middle East was their shared Arabic language, 
literature, culture, heritage and history; the Arabs formed a distinct nation that could only 
stand up to the West if they were politically united. Where Arab Nationalists were themselves 
divided was on the issue of what was the exact form of political organization implied by 
Arabism. Some advocated a single Arab state, whilst others envisaged some kind of union of 
Arab states. This lack of political consensus fed popular fears that pan-Arabism was a cover 
for the expansionist aims of the more powerful Middle East actors looking to exert political 
and economic hegemony over the region.38
Like the classic nationalists the Arab nationalists had an ambivalent view of Islam. At one 
end of the spectrum there was the acknowledgement that Islam played a formative role in the 
shaping of Arab culture and was still a relevant social fact in the interwar period; at the other
end some Arab nationalists emphasised the diversity of religious faiths in the Middle East,
36 P.J. Vatikiotis The Modem History o f Egypt pp.302-303
37 A.I. Dawisha Egypt In the Arab World: The Elements c f Foreign Policy p. 129
38 A.I. Dawisha Egypt In the Arab World: The Elements c f Foreign Policy p. 132
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such as Egyptian Copts and Christian Syrians, and that it was a shared Arab, not religious, 
heritage that united them. Generally, Arab nationalists shared the view of the classic 
nationalists that religion, as important as it was in the past, would inevitably diminish in 
significance going into the future.
2.1.8 Islamism
Like the two nationalist ideologies, Islamism covered a broad spectrum of political, and even 
apolitical, positions.39 Just as Arab and classic nationalism shared certain features, Islamism 
also overlapped with these and other ideologies. What distinguished Islamism was the claim 
that Islam should be the central point of reference for the social identity of the people in the 
Middle East. Whilst the Arab and classic nationalists both believed that Islam, on the whole, 
belonged to the past and at the peripheries of their ideologies, the proponents of Islamism 
placed it firmly at the centre and claimed that Islam must be the future for Muslims in the 
Middle East and, eventually, the global umma. If Islam was declining, as many thought, then 
it must be rediscovered, revived, and even reinvented for the twentieth century.40 As 
Islamism gained legitimacy and support its ideologists developed the courage to explicitly 
state that this was not just a social and religious doctrine, but a political, legal and economic 
one 41 It is against the backdrop of political turbulence that has subsequently become known 
as the Egypt’s liberal age that Islamism as an ideology, crystallized principally in the form of 
the Society of Muslim Brothers. Before we examine the formation and symbiotic 
development of the Society and the Islamist ideology, we shall sketch the political scenery of 
the interwar years.
39 Islamism, in the broadest sense, means ‘political Islam.’ There is, however, a problem with the terminology 
surrounding Islamism. The generally, but not universally, accepted usage dictates, quite arbitrarily, that 
‘Islamist’, does not refer to a person who subscribes to Islamism—in the way that a communist is a follower of 
communism—but denotes a violent faction of Islamism. This is unfortunate for several reasons: firstly, it makes 
it difficult to refer to non-violent proponents of Islamism, secondly, there is no particular reason why a follower 
of political Islam, would choose to follow violent or non-violent tactics, and thirdly, because of this distinction 
‘Islamist’ is often used pejoratively, rather than descriptively. As we are concerned with understanding Islamist 
terrorism we shall concentrate in the Islamist ideology. For clarity we shall cleave to this accepted usage but 
remain vigilant not to fell into the traps presented by the cumbersome terminology.
40 Proponents of this view, despite their radical departures from Islamic orthodoxy, would not describe Islamic 
revivalism in tarns of reinvention. We shall explore the reasons for this in due course.
41 The evolution of Islamism, and its many mutations, is the central concern of this thesis and so we shall refrain 
from attempting to provide a full account too soon.
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2.1.9 The 1919 Revolution, Wafd Party and Egypt’s Liberal Age
In Egypt the ideology that prevailed over its competitors was classic nationalism. At the end 
of the First World War there were high expectations that Egypt’s wartime cooperation 
(although essentially coerced) with the British would result in the achievement of the en 
vogue political fashions of the day: self-determination, autonomy and independence. Britain, 
however, would not be moved by mere fashions in political philosophy, recognising the geo­
strategic importance of Egypt and the Suez Canal, and stubbornly failing to acknowledge the 
strength and depth of the anti-British views held by the majority of the Egyptian populace. In 
1918 seven Egyptian notables approached the British high commissioner with the aim of 
attaining full independence.42 The Wafd (delegation) wished to represent the Egyptian people 
at the forthcoming Paris Peace Conference to present the case of Egyptian independence to 
the international community. Cursorily dismissed by the British, they took their call for 
independence directly to the people, touring the country to gamer support, in order to 
demonstrate that they, not the British, represented the will of Egypt. Led by the charismatic 
and popular Sa’d Zaghul, the Wafd Party was formed and would dominate the tumultuous 
Egyptian political scene for the next three decades.
With Zaghul leading the Wafd’s tour of the Egyptian countryside, agitating rural Egyptians 
on the popular anti-British platform, the British authorities moved to put the movement 
down 43 In March 1919 they arrested Zaghul and several of the Wafd leaders and exiled them 
to Malta 44 The physical displacement of the leaders however, only served to further incense 
their followers, resulting in an explosion of demonstrations and violent riots across Egypt and 
in particular in the large towns and cities. British attempts to forcibly quell the violence 
merely fuelled the movement causing it to spiral into a full-blown revolution for 
independence, uniting normally disparate social groups against the protectorate. The High 
Commissioner eventually conceded to the Wafd’s original request to represent Egypt at the 
Paris Peace Conference, but not before over eight hundred Egyptians were killed in the 
course of the revolution.45
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After gaining this initial concession from the British authorities the Wafd was unsuccessful in 
attaining its goal of full independence. It took three more years of haggling and negotiations 
before Britain finally, and unilaterally, abolished the protectorate, declared Egypt an 
independent state, elevated the sultanate to kingship, and stipulated the creation of a 
democratic constitution within a year.46 Treading a familiar path in imperial politics Britain 
was unwilling to entirely relinquish control over Egypt. At the same time as granting formal 
independence Britain imposed the notorious ‘four reserved points’ that immediately 
undermined Egypt’s autonomy and sowed the seeds of political chaos for the interwar period. 
These points were: the maintenance and security of imperial communications; the right to 
defend Egypt against foreign aggression; the right to protect foreign interests and minorities; 
and the retained responsibility for the administration of Sudan.47 The political upshot of the 
reserved points was the stationing of British troops in Egypt, particularly in bases near vital 
interests, such as the Suez Canal, and ensured the continuation of British interference in 
Egyptian politics.
Egypt’s experience of constitutional democracy was to be a frustrating one. Several factors 
conspired to impede the formation of genuine democratic institutions, and thus social reform 
was stunted and inconsistent. We have already noted the four reserved points that made a 
mockery of the idea of independence, and the political landscape remained orientated towards 
the shaking off of the British imperial yoke. As tensions in Europe heightened in the long 
build up to the Second World War, Egypt remained, as ever, of geo-strategic importance, and 
Britain continued to interfere in her affairs—usually through the conduit of the monarchy— 
when their interests were threatened. The 1923 constitution also contributed to the political 
instability; it was framed to constrain the power of the populist Wafd by granting the 
monarch the prerogative to dissolve parliament, dismiss ministers, remove and instate prime 
ministers, and veto legislation.48 These extensive privileges were used freely by King Fu’ad 
and his son Faruk, whenever it suited their interests, or occasionally when pressured by the 
British.49 Furthermore, the sheer dominance of the Wafd thwarted the development of a 
functioning liberal democratic system. Although the Wafd were usually staunch defenders of 
the constitution, they were not internally democratic, and tended to act to promote the
46 M.W. Daly “The British Occupation” p.250
47 Selma Botman “The liberal age, 1923-1952” p.285
48 A two-thirds majority in parliament was required to override a palace veto.
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parochial interests of the land-owning elites who dominated the decision-making upper 
echelons of the party.
The tensions, mutual distrust and ever-shifting alliances between the palace, the Wafd and 
Britain resulted in the stagnation of democratic institutions, and chronic political and social 
instability throughout the liberal period. The typical political merry-go-round of this period is 
described by Selma Botman:
... a free election was held, the Wafd would be guaranteed a sweeping victory, 
but a conflict with the British or the palace led inevitably to the Wafd’s 
resignation or dismissal, the dissolution of parliament, and the suspension or 
modification of the constitution. The Wafd would remain in opposition until a 
disagreement between the palace and a minority party, or a decision by the 
British, caused the Wafd’s return to office.50
One consequence of this political tumult, combined with a lively and, for the most part, free 
press, was that it proved to be a social Petri dish where experiments in civic society 
flourished. So long as they avoided overt interference in politics, groups and societies could 
operate quite freely. Non-interference was not just an imperative imposed from above, the 
disorder and corruption of the parliamentary system meant that many groups avoided politics 
as a matter of principle, and indeed a deep distrust of parliamentary democracy was 
inculcated during this time. It is to the inception of the most influential of these societies that 
we now turn.
2.2 Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949)
The founder of the Society of Muslim Brothers was Hasan al-Banna. Bom in Mahmudiyah, a 
provincial town in north-west Egypt, he received a traditional Islamic education and learnt 
watch-repair from his deeply religious father, a local imam and amateur scholar. In his early 
years al-Banna displayed his religious fervour and flair for leadership and organization by 
joining and then leading the Society for Moral Behaviour, a local youth organization that 
encouraged Islamic practice and moral behaviour amongst its members and fellow 
townspeople.51 At the age of thirteen, al-Banna helped found another organization: the 
Hasafiyya Society of Charity. As well as inculcating correct moral behaviour, this society
50 Selma Botman “The liberal age, 1923-1952” p.290
51 David Commins “Hasan al-Banna” p. 129
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also aimed to keep in check the Christian missionary work in the town. During this period al- 
Banna had become increasingly involved in the Hasafiyya Sufi spiritual order that 
emphasised members’ personal devotion and the inculcation of a direct and mystical union 
with Allah.
Just as al-Banna was finishing school, the 1919 anti-British riots were erupting across 
Egypt.52 As he participated in these demonstrations, al-Banna witnessed the humiliating 
occupation of his town by British forces, which he would later resentfully recall in his 
memoirs as the beginnings of his ardently anti-Western views.53 During this time of upheaval 
al-Banna enrolled in a teacher training school near his town, before transferring to the higher 
education college, Dar al-Ulum, in the capital. It was al-Banna’s experience of 1920s Cairo, 
through ‘the eyes of a religious villager,’ that fashioned his views of the destructive effects of 
European politics and culture on Muslims and Islam.54 He had already witnessed the brute 
force of occupation during the 1919 uprising, but cosmopolitan Cairo convinced him that the 
subtle, non-violent pressures of imperialism had just as pernicious an effect on the Muslim 
mind and soul. The contrast between the conservative traditionalism of villagers, who, even if 
their practice of Islam was not perfect, would never fundamentally question its tenets, with 
the casual atheism and hedonism of cosmopolitan city life shocked al-Banna.55 During this 
period al-Banna began to see that the more serious threat of the West to Islam was the 
insidious way that it could silently destroy Islam from the inside, without recourse to obvious 
external coercion. Nobody had forced the young men of Cairo to drink alcohol, or the women 
to discard their traditional Islamic clothing; they did it of their own accord, and it was this 
passivity that caused al-Banna to despair.
Whilst studying, al-Banna wrestled with a difficult decision: whether to pursue the spiritual 
enlightenment of his Sufi order, or to attain a practical education and enter into a life of 
professional teaching.56 Eventually, at the end of his studies, he wrote an essay comparing the 
roles of Sufi sheikhs and school teachers. In it he expressed his admiration for the devotion, 
spiritualism and ascetic life of the former, but criticised their passive withdrawal from
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society. Al-Banna deduced from his experience of Cairo that modem Muslim societies had 
become deeply corrupt and rendered apathetic in the face of a dominant Western culture. He 
wrote: ‘...my people ... under the impact of western civilization... materialist philosophy, and 
franji [foreign] traditions, have departed from the goals of their faith.’57 In view of this dire 
situation, al-Banna viewed his role in life not just within the narrow confines of a school 
teacher, but as an educator in its broadest sense, to awaken within Muslims the true meaning 
of Islam. In a sense instead of choosing between the spirituality of Sufism and practicality of 
teaching, al-Banna would combine the two roles through the vehicle of the Muslim 
Brotherhood.
Al-Banna’s final decision to eschew the life of Sufi spiritualism in favour of the role of 
educator stemmed from his ideas about apathy and action. The greatest danger for Muslims 
was the spiritual malaise caused by Islam’s encounter with Western materialism, and the 
resulting apathy and inaction. Perhaps the central theme that runs through the Islamist 
ideology that would develop over the following decade is the intuition sensed by al-Banna 
and others that above all else action, often expressed as jihad, was urgently needed. The form 
that this action should take was—and continues to be—open to a wide spectrum of 
interpretation but the need and urgency of the imperative is always present in the Islamist 
ideology. The corresponding position to this idea was the belief that the ‘Mosque alone did 
not suffice.’58 Before leaving Cairo for his first teaching post in Ismailia al-Banna acted on 
these convictions. In what can be retrospectively seen as the embryo of the Muslim 
Brotherhood al-Banna organised a group of al-Azhar students and trained them in ‘preaching 
and guidance.’59 Crucially, he instructed them not to just preach in the traditional centres of 
Islam, the mosques, but also in coffee houses and other public places. They were to take al- 
Banna’ s message directly to the people, thus bypassing the sluggish and conservative 
hierarchy of ulema (religious leaders). Once al-Banna moved to Ismailia he was to do the 
same and out of this the Society of Muslim Brothers was bom.
2.2.1 Formation of the Society of Muslim Brothers
57 Hasan al-Banna cited in Richard Mitchell The Society o f the Muslim Brothers p.6
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Al-Banna’s experience of Ismailia served to reinforce his awareness of the British occupation 
and the resultant cultural, economic and political domination of the foreigners. Located in the 
heart of the Suez Canal Zone a large section of the joint British and French Suez Canal 
Company was based in the town and was the main source of employment. The British also 
had a sizeable military base on the outskirts and thus there was a large and dominant foreign 
presence. Furthermore, al-Banna complained of the monopolistic control of the local utilities 
by foreign companies and the very obvious disparities, in wealth, stature and living standards 
between the indigenous Egyptians and the Westerners.60 All of this served to reinforce al- 
Banna’s ideas of the corrosive and pervasive effects of imperialism on Egyptians and Islam, 
as well as providing a receptive audience that would readily identify with them.
The importance that al-Banna attached to the power of education dictated the shape of the 
Society in its formative years. Soon after moving to Ismailia al-Banna began teaching Arabic 
at a local primary school. He also started an adult learning class for the children’s parents in 
the evening and despite the demands of his position as the leader of the Brotherhood he did 
not retire from his teaching position until 1946. Al-Banna was not, however, content with this 
form of passive teaching. He viewed the role of the educator as active; he would not merely 
offer instruction to those that came to him—in common with his students in Cairo—he 
decided that he would have to go to the people. To this end al-Banna began to lecture at the 
mosques, local dignitaries’ houses and coffee shops in and around the Ismailia area.61 The 
themes of his preaching were those that he had developed in Cairo and throughout his life: 
the subjugation of Egyptians to foreign forces and the urgent necessity for a wholesale return 
to an authentic Islam.
As al-Banna gained 4 reputation and a small following in Ismailia it became clear that to 
expand his project some form of organizational structure would need to be implemented and 
it was to fulfil this need that the Society was created.62 The actual historical founding of the 
Society is unclear and was later disputed by disgruntled former members; however, al- 
Banna’s version of events, recounted in his memoirs, remains an important apocryphal 
account of the Society’s establishment. The founding myth encapsulates and dramatises some 
of the themes of the nascent ideology. According to al-Banna’s memoirs, in early 1928, six
60 David Commins “Hasan al-Banna” p. 132
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workers employed by the British labour force approached him detailing their, and by 
implication, Egyptian society’s problems. After listening to him preaching they replied:
We have heard and we have become aware and we have been affected. We know 
not the practical way to reach the glory of Islam and to serve the welfare of 
Muslims. We are weary of this life of humiliation and restriction. Lo, we see that 
the Arabs and the Muslims have no status and no dignity. They are not more 
than mere hirelings belonging to the foreigners. We possess nothing but this 
blood ... and these souls ... and these few coins ... We are unable to perceive the 
road to action as you perceive it, or to know the path to the service of the 
fatherland, the religion, and the nation [umma] as you know it. All that we desire 
now is to present you with all we possess, to be acquitted by God of the 
responsibility, and for you to be responsible before Him for us and for what we 
must do. If a group contracts with God sincerely that it live for His religion and 
die in His service, seeking only His satisfaction, then its worthiness will assure 
its success however small its numbers or weak its means.63
Moved by this appeal al-Banna duly accepted their request and took upon himself the burden 
of leadership. The group and al-Banna then swore an oath to God ‘to be soldiers for the call 
of Islam,’ before al-Banna pronounced the group’s name: al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Society of 
Muslim Brothers).64
2.2.2 Early Development of the Society
Al-Banna’s faith in the reforming power of education was reflected in the early development 
of the Society. As we have already noted al-Banna’s conception of education was quite broad 
and segued into his belief in practical action. He expressed the overarching goal of the 
Society within revivalist and educational terms: ‘to raise a new generation of Muslims who 
will understand Islam correctly.’65 He wanted the Brotherhood, and other Islamic societies, to 
fill the gap left between the theological learning of al-Azhar and the spiritualism of Sufism. 
This chasm could only be crossed by practical action, or, to describe it another way, the 
application of Islam to all aspects of life. This meant turning from a theoretical orientation 
towards Islam to a practical, active attitude. Al-Banna did not want to overthrow the existing 
orders of Islam, but to complete them:
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I f ... the scientific power [or scholarship] of al-Azhar had been combined with 
the spiritual power of the Sufi orders and the practical power of the Islamic 
societies, then a unique and exceptional nation [umma] would have come into 
existence. This nation would have been a guide, not guided, a leader, not led.66
In keeping with the idea of grassroots social reform and education one of the initial charitable 
actions of the formative branch was the building of a mosque and two Islamic primary 
schools—one for boys and one for girls.67 The group also bought a house to use as its 
headquarters and raised money to fund these projects including, ironically, five hundred 
Egyptian pounds from the Suez Canal Company. For the first four years the Society 
expanded into several branches around Ismailia as al-Banna toured the countryside and 
preached the message of the Brotherhood. Branches were founded along the same lines as in 
Ismailia; a meeting place was created and then some form of charitable project undertaken, 
usually with an educational purpose. Although the branches had some autonomy, al-Banna 
was keen to exert a centralized control over the growing Society.68 One way in which this 
was achieved was by obligating new members to swear a bay’a (oath of allegiance) to al- 
Banna, a practice instituted from the very beginning of the Society.69
During the early stage of development the Society maintained an apolitical stance.70 Al- 
Banna had no wish to become embroiled with national or local politics, and was careful not 
to offend traditional religious practice of the villages into which the Society expanded.71 He 
was equally careful to avoid clashes with local and national politicians and bureaucrats, and 
so would temper the group’s anti-British rhetoric and its critique of Wafdist nationalism in its 
publications. Finally, al-Banna, recognising the tripartite form of Egyptian politics, would not 
publicly declare or withhold support for the palace. Instead of involving itself with dangerous 
disputations, the Brotherhood’s objective for its early stage was to grow and develop a dense 
network of members throughout Egypt. This was to be achieved by improving the Islamic
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education and practice of its members who were to internalise the Muslim Brotherhood ideals 
and act as cadres for an Islamic revival of Egyptian society.
2.2.3 Return to Cairo and the Conferences
After four years in Ismailia al-Banna returned to Cairo. Until this point the Brotherhood had 
grown around Ismailia and the Suez Canal Zone. With the move to the capital and the 
opening of the first Cairo branch—which subsequently became the group’s headquarters— 
the Brotherhood transformed from a local to a national movement. With this shift in their 
geographical spread came a gradual change of emphasis in the Brother’s goals. Whilst it is 
beyond the scope of this study to describe in detail the Society’s history, it is worth 
recounting the stages through which it progressed. Several large annual conferences were 
held following the move to Cairo and by tracking the issues discussed and the agendas set, 
we can chart the changes in the Brotherhood’s aims, and the means by which these were to be 
achieved, as well as the evolving self-image of the Society. Although the conferences offer an 
idealized and self-constructed history they are useful for our purpose of understanding their 
intellectual and ideological progression.
2.2.4 First Stage: Education
Hasan al-Banna understood that the Brothers would have to pass through three broad stages 
to achieve their ultimate goal of a total reformation of Muslim societies and their 
reorientation towards a true Islam. As we have seen the first stage was largely influenced by 
al-Banna’s faith in pedagogy and the belief that an Islamic revival at the level of the 
individual would result in a spiritual and intellectual awakening. Utilizing a classic Marxist 
model of ideology as a smokescreen al-Banna claimed that the dire situation of Egyptian 
Muslims was potentially known by the people; however the seductive apathy induced by 
Western materialist influences had rendered them insensible to recognising their predicament. 
The Brotherhood, as originally conceived by al-Banna would undertake da’wa (call to Islam) 
to wake up Egyptian society from its slumber by training a cadre of dedicated activists. They 
would spread throughout the country, and eventually the rest of the umma, bypassing the
traditional nodes of Islam and speak directly to the people.72 This was described in the first 
and second conference as the initial stage of ‘propaganda, communication, and 
information.’73
In addition to the quasi-traditional model of da ’wa al-Banna was keen to embrace modem 
tools of communication in order to transform the society into a mass movement and 
disseminate its message.74 Although antagonistic toward Western materialism he was 
pragmatic when it came to adopting its technologies for the Society’s ends; an attitude 
evinced by their use of the tools of mass communication.75 Soon after moving to Cairo the 
Society created a small company in order to purchase a printing press. This served the 
purpose of publishing the Brotherhood journals, magazines and newspapers. It was also used 
to distribute the ‘messages’ written by al-Banna that formed the basis of the group’s ideology 
and kept members informed of the Society’s official views. The Brotherhood press was thus 
an important instrument of propaganda and publicity to attract further support, as well as a 
communicative tool to maintain central control over the Brothers and maintain intra-group 
morale.
2.2.5 Second Stage: Organization
The third, fourth and fifth conferences, held between 1935 and 1939, were themed around the 
second stage of development: ‘formation, selection, and preparation.’76 Throughout this 
period the Brotherhood grew rapidly and had branches in all major Egyptian urban centres 
and throughout the countryside. By 1938 Richard Mitchell estimates that there were 300 
active branches; by 1949 this had risen to approximately 2000.77 The estimated number of 
active members, between 300,000 and 600,000 out of a population of twenty million meant 
that the Brotherhood was the largest organized movement in the Egypt.78 Its members
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represented virtually the entire spectrum of the Muslim population: the poor fellah, the 
middle-class effendi, bazaar merchants, army personnel, members of the legal and medical 
professions, students in Al-Azhar and the lay universities, and crucially, in the civil service. 
The question that exercised the Society during this period was, therefore, how to organize and 
utilize this base of potential power. Essentially this problem was one of organization and 
specialization, and the Brotherhood experimented with several structures to consolidate the 
membership.
Since the founding of the Society al-Banna took a holistic approach to the problems that he 
saw facing Egypt. Initially for the individual, followed later at a societal level, an Islamic 
revival did not just mean a spiritual awakening, an intellectual reorientation and an ethical 
transformation, but also a physical renaissance. Al-Banna did not view these as discrete 
components, but a set of interlinking characteristics that needed to be developed 
symbiotically to ensure the rejuvenation of Muslims, the umma and Islam itself. When the 
first few branches were founded physical training meant occasional outdoor expeditions by 
members as well as general exhortations to care for one’s health and hygiene. These were 
intended to not only improve physical fitness but also encourage intergroup bonding, internal 
loyalty and mutual trust within the Brotherhood. In the course of the second stage these 
informal activities became regularised into a programme of exercise and outdoor pursuits 
resulting in the formation of the Rovers and the Battalions.
The Rovers were similar to the British Scouting movement and became a way to recruit 
young Egyptians into the Society. They were also a way by which the Brothers 
institutionalized their power into a physical force; on occasion the Rovers were called upon to 
provide ‘security’ for important gatherings and meetings. Shortly after the official formation 
of the Rovers, another subsection of the Brothers—the Battalions—were created. The 
formation of the Battalions, however, preceded any clear idea of what exact purpose they 
would serve, and this lack of direction led to their stagnation. Initially each Battalion was 
composed of forty selected Brothers who were to meet once a week for an intense night-vigil, 
prayers and meditation. Al-Banna would personally come to these meetings to deliver a 
lecture and lead the prayers.79 However, over the course of a year the attendance waned and
79 Richard Mitchell The Society o f the Muslim Brothers p. 196
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not all the meetings took place, almost certainly due to a lack of clarity amongst the members 
and leadership of their function.
2.2.6 Third Stage: Action
Marking the tenth anniversary of the Society’s foundation the fifth conference was 
symbolically devoted to the third and final stage: ‘execution ... the active stage out of which 
the fruits of the mission of the Muslim Brotherhood will appear.’80 After the first two stages 
of growth and preparation the zenith of the Brotherhood would be action, an idea 
encapsulated by al-Banna’s climatic conference speech:
At the time that there will be ready, Oh ye Muslim Brothers, three hundred 
battalions, each one equipped spiritually with faith and belief, intellectually with 
science and learning, and physically with training and athletics, at that time you 
can demand of me to plunge with you through the turbulent oceans and to rend 
the skies with you and to conquer with you every obstinate tyrant. God willing, I 
will doit.*1
Beyond the stirring rhetoric, however, the exact form that this action would take was always 
unclear; the internal politics of Egypt by this point was entirely dominated by the Second 
World War, and the Brotherhood’s scope for action was curtailed by the declaration of 
martial law under the terms of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty. Al-Banna’s deep distrust of 
the political system and fear of committing to a premature battle meant that the time for 
action was always set in an indeterminable future.
Despite this reticence we can identify three tentative developments in the period following 
the fifth conference, their purpose being to at least demonstrate that the Brothers were on the 
path to the final, ‘active’ stage. The first was an official declaration, in reality an 
acknowledgement, that the Brotherhood was a political organization. Despite his distrust of 
the machinations of the political system Islam was, for al-Banna, both ‘religion and state.’82 
As we shall soon examine in detail, the internal logic of the Brotherhood’s ideology dictated 
that the Society was necessarily a deeply political organization. This same logic also meant
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that whilst defining the Brotherhood as a ‘political organization’ this was understood in a 
more holistic sense than a mere ‘political party.’ In 1943 al-Banna explained this distinction 
in a letter widely distributed to members:
My Brothers: you are not a benevolent society, nor a political party, nor a local 
organization having limited purpose. ... When asked what it is for which you 
call, reply that it is Islam ... the religion that contains within it government, and 
has one ... of its obligations freedom. If you are told that you are political, 
answer that Islam admits no such distinction.83
This quote demonstrates al-Banna’s continuing suspicion, and distaste, for the political 
system; a Brother will only admit to involvement in politics as a negative response to an 
accusation from his imagined interlocutor. This reluctant position informed the second 
response to the fifth conference: al-Banna’s aborted attempt in 1942 to stand for parliament in 
Ismailia district. Up to this point it had been consistent to be both a member of a nationalist 
political party, for example the Wafd, and a Muslim Brother, however the decision to directly 
enter into parliamentary politics threatened this relationship. In the end, al-Banna’s distrust of 
party politics prevailed. Shortly after announcing his candidature he was approached by the 
leader of the Wafd, Nahhas Pasha, and asked to withdraw from the elections. Al-Banna did so 
in return for greater freedom for the Society—whose activities had been curtailed since the 
outbreak of the war—and a commitment for the Wafd to restrict alcohol sales and
•  84prostitution.
The third course of action undertaken by the Society as a result of the fifth conference was 
their most direct in the pre-war period and the closest to the theme of ‘execution.’ Clashes 
between Arabs, Zionists and the British in Palestine had resulted in the Arab strike of 1936- 
39. Al-Banna took this opportunity to agitate for the Palestinian cause, supporting the strike 
and raising funds to be sent to Palestine. This cause easily fell within the Brothers’ 
ideological remit, involving their archetypal imperial foe, the British, Zionists—who were 
seen as an extension of Western imperial forces—and Arab Muslims. The latter were of 
concern as the Brothers made no ideological distinction between Egyptian and non-Egyptian 
Muslims, and by this point several branches of the Brotherhood had been created in
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surrounding Arab states.85 Although these were distinct, autonomous organizations, only 
borrowing the name, ideology and structure of the Egyptian Society, they demonstrated the 
theoretical transnational pan-Islamism of the Brothers.
2.2.7 Breakaway Groups
Despite the new strategies adopted after the fifth conference some of the younger Brothers 
were left frustrated. The disappointing flirtation with the political system and the limited 
response to the situation in Palestine was insufficient to convince them that the final 
fulfilment of the Brotherhood’s mission was imminent. In late 1939 a small but significant 
number of members broke away to form a rebel group—the Society of Our Master 
Mohammed’s Youth. For this group the mission of the Muslim Brotherhood was both simple, 
and had been betrayed by a hesitant leadership that had become enmeshed in the political 
system they rhetorically rejected. The original goal of the Brotherhood, as understood by this 
group, was the total Islamic reformation of Egyptian society, which they interpreted as a 
‘moral salvation.’86 Where the Brotherhood and its offshoot differed most markedly however, 
was the means by which this end should be achieved. Whilst al-Banna warned against ‘hasty’ 
and ‘unprepared’ action, the young members of the new society did not hold these 
reservations. If fellow Egyptians did not reform when they heard the call to Islam then it was 
their duty to use ‘force of hand.’87 The breakaway group did not manage to attract enough 
support to threaten the Brothers but it did set a pattern for future Islamist movements. The 
stagnation of the Brotherhood in terms of tangible actions inevitably led to the alienation of 
some of its members. Similarly with later movements, the imperative to visible action, in 
order to maintain the internal momentum of the group, often outweighs the utility of those 
acts; put another way, the continued demonstration of the ability to pursue means becomes 
more important than the achievement of goals. Like the proverbial shark the ideological 
movement must keep moving to ensure its survival—the theory can only be sustained by the 
perception of continual practice.
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The fifth conference also provided a platform for the leadership to reflect on the previous
wave of structural reformation and its failures, and to devise and implement new reforms.
The failure of the Battalion system—although a disappointment for al-Banna—did force an
important rethink of the best way to organize the Society. The second reorganization began in
the early 1940s and in 1943 the most important organizational unit of the Brotherhood was
created: the ‘Family’ system. Families of Brothers were limited to five members, and were
• • 88primarily a means of providing a tightly knit structure of self-reinforcing indoctrination.
The Family would meet weekly at a member’s home for prayers and discussions on Islamic
topics. The small size of each cell meant that the actions of each Brother was under close
scrutiny by his Family members and so effectively coerced each member into greater 
devotion to the Brotherhood. It also allowed Families a degree of autonomy in their actions 
without fear of infiltration by outside forces, and in theory if one cell was disrupted the rest 
would not fail.89 Al-Banna, having not abandoned the alluring rhetoric of Battalions, also 
devised a system that could be scaled up in numbers. In theory, four ‘Families’ would form a 
‘Clan,’ five ‘Clans’ in a ‘Group’ and finally a ‘Battalion’ would be composed of five Groups; 
leading to a total of five hundred Brothers.90
The last organizational form that was created by the Society was the shadowy and notorious 
‘Secret Apparatus.’91 Known internally as the ‘Special Section’ it came into being around 
1942. Information about the Apparatus is patchy due to its clandestine nature and subsequent 
government propaganda spread to discredit the Society and exaggerate its activities. It seems 
that al-Banna’s intention was that the Apparatus would undertake covert and illegal 
operations against the government to facilitate the ‘revolution’ and the founding of an Islamic 
state. In reality these grandiose ambitions were scaled back so that the Apparatus became a 
defensive unit against a hostile government attempting to isolate and dismantle the 
increasingly popular Society.
As with the Battalions the Apparatus’ success was limited because of the lack of clarity with 
which its objectives were formulated. The absence of a concrete guiding strategy meant that 
the group’s actions were sporadic and lacked internal coherence. This, combined with their
88 Richard Mitchell The Society c f the Muslim Brothers pp.206-207
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implicit autonomy, resulted in a series of attacks that belied the true power of the 
Brotherhood—the attempt on the life of Nahhas Pasha—the Egyptian Prime Minister for 
most of the War—followed by the assassination of the wartime minister of finance Amin 
‘Uthman Pasha in 1946.92
2.2.8 The Decline of the Society of Muslim Brothers
As the confidence of the Secret Apparatus grew so did the scale, scope and audacity of their 
violence directed against British and Egyptian targets. The guiding principle behind this 
growing violence was the equation, in the minds of many Egyptians, of British imperialism 
and Zionism with the unpopular post-War Sa’dist government. Judges, politicians, policemen 
and other officials accused of collaborating with Britain were attacked, as were theatres and 
cinemas in Cairo that symbolized Western cultural imperialism.93 Jewish businesses, homes 
and other ‘foreign’ interests were also bombed as the Palestinian war escalated.94 With this 
surge in violence, the members of the Apparatus and other Brothers acted with an 
unprecedented level of autonomy. The internal momentum that had gathered with the rapid 
growth of the Brotherhood and the inexorable evolution of its ideology—from propaganda, to 
preparation and finally action—had overtaken the leadership who ceased to be able to control 
their constituents. Despite al-Banna’s efforts to restrain the membership and urge restraint, 
the Society was now on a direct collision course with the entrenched political powers of 
Egypt: the Wafd, the Sa’dist government, the Palace and Britain.
Concurrent with this period was the creation of the state of Israel and the simultaneous war of 
independence as Egypt, Iraq, Transjordan, Lebanon and Syria rejected the UN ruling of 
partition and declared war on the new state.95 We have already noted the Brothers’ 
involvement in supporting resistance to Zionism by participating in the Arab strike at the end 
of the 1930s, but with the partition decision in 1947 al-Banna felt confident enough to openly 
declare jihad and mobilize a Battalion to fight in Palestine. A year later the Battalion was sent 
to the border a few weeks prior to the official commencement of war. Although the details of 
the Society’s involvement in the conflict are sketchy it seems that the Battalion did not play a
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major role in hostilities, but employed guerrilla tactics and hit-and-run attacks on Zionist 
settlements. As the fighting recommenced after the breakdown of a truce in October 1948 
events reached a climax in Egypt; the Society had grown too powerful and the challenge to 
Egyptian sovereignty was too obvious for the government to ignore. In the following month, 
believing that a full-scale revolution was imminent, the Society of Muslim Brothers was 
declared illegal, its fighters in Palestine were rounded up into camps to be deported to Cairo, 
the Society’s assets were seized and the process of their dismantlement commenced.
In retrospect the organizational changes and new strategic directions taken after the fifth 
conference marked the apogee of the Brotherhood’s power and the beginning of its decline. 
The Family system and the Secret Apparatus were both designed to allow the Society to 
continue to operate autonomously and covertly when the leadership and its centralized 
institutions were repressed and eventually destroyed. Al-Banna’s short-lived attempt to enter 
mainstream parliamentary politics foundered on his personal lack of commitment to the 
political process, the popular power of the Wafd, the ruthlessness of the Sa’adist regime and 
the Palace, and ultimately British control over domestic politics and internal security. 
Furthermore, the Society increasingly faced serious centrifugal pressures from developing 
schisms between Brothers over the direction the Society should be taking and the means by 
which they should be pursued. The most visible of these was the secession of the militant 
Mohammed’s Youth but there were also disputes amongst the leadership during this period.
The final precipitating event that led to the intensive persecution of the Society and its 
members was the assassination of the Prime Minister Mahmud al-Nuqrashi in late December 
1948—who a few months previously had announced the decree for the dissolution of the 
Brotherhood—by a young student member of the Society. At al-Nuqrashi’s funeral the chant 
of ‘death to Hasan al-Banna’ was heard and in February of the following year this call was 
answered. As he stepped into a taxi al-Banna was shot and died shortly after in hospital. The 
charismatic personal authority of al-Banna that had managed to just hold the Society together 
until his assassination—widely believed to have been carried out by the secret police with 
government sanction—was obliterated.96
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Although several factors conspired in the decline of the Society the most critical came from 
the tripartite political establishment.97 Throughout the Second World War and during the 
post-war period successive governments attempted to control the powerful Brotherhood 
either by co-option or suppression. At the heart of the problem lay the paradox that the 
Society had become too strong for the nationalists and the British to ignore, but too weak to 
stand up to these dominant forces. Tactical alliances between the nationalist Wafd and the 
Islamist Brothers were inherently unstable as they undermined the Society’s ideology and 
discredited the commitment of the leadership to the Islamist project. The alternative however, 
was worse; despite their attempts to decentralize, the Society was still heavily reliant on their 
printing presses to disseminate propaganda and communicate with its members. The loss of 
their leader, who had barely managed to hold the Society together, compounded these 
problems. When the Society was declared illegal in 1948 and its property seized, the 
organization of the Brothers at a national level rapidly disintegrated.
The events of the years following the Society’s initial dismantlement to the 1952 revolution 
are too complex to recount in full here but a brief account will suffice for our purposes. In the 
political and social turbulence of the pre-revolutionary years the Society, under the new 
leadership of a former judge, Hasan Isma‘il al-Hudaybi, the Brothers found themselves 
buffeted from illegality to legality and back again whilst being variously co-opted or 
suppressed by the stream of governments during this period. Lacking al-Banna’s personal 
authority or legitimacy, al-Hudaybi found it even more difficult to hold the socially and 
ideologically divided Society together. Many Brothers were arrested and interned in desert 
prisons where they were able to maintain informal organizational structures but were 
prevented from communicating with the wider membership. In the years that followed 
escalating violence in Egypt and the breakdown of law culminated in the 1952 revolution led 
by Anwar al-Sadat. Although the revolutionary conspiracy involved several groups it is clear 
that Secret Apparatus in particular, and the Muslim Brothers in general, were important 
protagonists.
In 1952 a group of army officers led by Muhammad Naguib and Gamal Abdul Nasser 
overthrew King Farouk and established control in a coup d ’etat?* Initially the Muslim
97 For a thorough account of the Society’s convoluted decline see Richard Mitchell The Society o f the Muslim 
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Brotherhood was used to gamer popular support for the revolutionary council and undermine 
the prospects of an Islamist counterrevolution. This relationship of convenience quickly fell 
apart due to the radical divergence of the ideologies of the republican officers and the 
Islamist Brothers. Two years later the Society was once again outlawed and shortly after, 
following a familiar pattern, an unsuccessful assassination attempt was made as Nasser held a 
nationalist rally. The fate of the Brotherhood as an illegal organization had now been sealed. 
The response from Nasser was swift, in December 1954 six Brothers were hanged, thousands 
were imprisoned and ‘the organization had been efficiently crushed.’99
2.3 The Historical-Ideological Context of the Muslim Brotherhood
As discussed in the previous chapter there are two interconnected principle components to 
any ideology: the descriptive element—how the ideology constructs the world—and the 
prescriptive element that imagines how the world ought to be. As we saw in the previous 
section due to the historical circumstances of the Muslim Brotherhood as a large organization 
in a hostile political environment and al-Banna’s risk-aversion the scope for action was 
tempered by fears of government reprisals. This in part explains why the ideology developed 
lopsided, with the descriptive critique of the world more fully developed than the utopian 
vision for a new world. It is therefore appropriate that we should devote more space to 
explicating and understanding how the Brothers viewed the world, and the key theological 
and ideological ideas that were employed, and less space on their plan for action on how to 
change the world. When examining the ideology it is important to remind ourselves that 
ideology is neither a by-product of the movement nor do the organizational form and actions 
of the movement merely flow from the ideology. Instead these two elements are intertwined 
and interdependent and therefore it will be necessary to refer back to the history of the 
Society in order to understand the ideology and vice versa.
Having examined the origins, rise and fall of the Muslim Brotherhood in its historical 
economic, social and political context we must now turn to an in-depth examination of the 
intellectual context in which the ideology was formed and shaped. The formation of the 
Society represents the first Islamist mass movement and the framework of the modem 
Islamist ideology. The intellectual origins of the Islamist ideology however stretch much
99 Richard Mitchell The Society o f the Muslim Brothers p. 151
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further back than the Muslim Brotherhood. We will therefore explore these historical and 
intellectual roots in order to better understand the evolution of the modem Islamist ideology. 
The intellectuals we will examine were reacting against two broad historical currents. The 
first was the predominance of a conservative Sunni Islam that preferred political and social 
stability to a rigorously enforced Islamic theology. The second theme was the sense of crisis 
created by the onset of dominant foreign forces. The failure of the mainstream conservative 
ulema to react to the challenges posed by these encounters formed the basis of the alternative 
radical response.
With the ascendency of European imperial powers, marked by their economic dominance, 
superior war and civil technologies, and eventual political, diplomatic and bureaucratic 
control over Ottoman internal and foreign affairs, Muslim thinkers and political activists have 
had to confront the question of the apparent superiority of the Christian West over Islam and 
modernity over tradition.100 How had the infidels (non-believers) managed to subdue and 
dominate the divinely ordained community of Muslims? One popular response to this 
existential crisis was that the revelations of the Prophet Mohammed remained valid, but that 
Muslims in general, and political leaders in particular, had abandoned the ‘true’ path of 
Islam, either entirely or by following a corrupt version of Islam tainted and ruined by the 
accumulation of man-made bida ’ (innovations). By embracing Western codes of morality and 
replacing the divine shar’ia with secular, man-made laws, and by adopting foreign political 
institutions and alien economic practices, Muslims had conspired with the West in their 
downfall. In short Islam was not to blame for the decline of the Muslim umma, and only a 
return to Islam could ensure the survival and rejuvenation of the umma. This line of reasoning 
was given expression and popularised by four important thinkers—ibn Taymiyya, 
Muhammad al-Wahhab, Sayyid al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh—all of whom had an 
important intellectual influence on the formation of al-Banna’s and the Brotherhood’s 
ideology. Before turning to these thinkers we will first briefly examine the mainstream 
conservative Sunni establishment that was the background source of their frustrations.
2.3.1 Conservative Sunni Islam
100 See Karen Armstrong Islam: A Short History pp. 121-133
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In accordance with classical Sunni tradition the prevailing theological interpretation of 
tawhid (the unity of Allah) in 1930’s Egypt was limited to an essentially apolitical one, 
governing one’s personal moral behaviour and religious practice in the context of the family 
and community. The direct domain of Islam was restricted to the level of the individual and 
the community and effectively excluded—in all but a superficial sense—from the state. The 
unity of Allah was to be reflected by individual Muslims in their spiritual, personal and 
communal life by acting in accordance with Islamic edicts and through traditional forms of 
worship such as prayer and fasting. Political leaders were expected to show public 
observation of Islam and, at least outwardly, to rule in accordance to its edicts, but were not 
expected to actively impose Islamic practice on the populace or to rigorously implement and 
uphold shar ’ia.m  This was an essentially conservative and pragmatic attitude with a 
historical pedigree that Albert Bergesen called ‘the classic Sunni fear of revolt and 
disorder.’102 As long as traditional Islamic observance and practice could continue, 
channelled through, and controlled by the traditional ulema without overt state interference, 
then the ulema would not directly challenge the ruler’s legitimacy or authority.103 Allah’s 
sovereignty governed individual Muslim’s religious practice, their moral conduct, and the life 
of the Muslim community; it was only notionally extended to the ruler’s governance.
The modus vivendi between religious and political authority had traditionally been decided 
upon the question of whether the insincere or ‘bad’ Muslim could legitimately govern an 
Islamic society. The mainstream of Sunni jurisprudence taught that the preservation of the 
social order was of higher priority than the religious sincerity of the ruler. ‘No matter how 
“bad” of a Muslim a ruler was or how insincere,’ Natana DeLong-Bas observes, ‘classical 
scholars believed that he should remain in power so as to avoid the social chaos and 
disruption that were bound to occur with his removal.’104 The conservative position of the 
ulema can be understood as a reaction to the historical experience of Sunni Islam to the 
seventh-century Islamic sect, the Kharijites.
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The Kharijites were the third sect, alongside the Sunnis and Shiites created out of the dispute 
over the successor of the third, assassinated caliph Uthman.105 The Kharijites formed a 
distinctive sect because they believed that any pious and capable Muslim could be the leader 
of the community, unlike the Shiites who claimed caliph lineage belonged exclusively to 
‘Ali’s descendents. In contrast to the Sunnis, the Kharijites asserted that a caliph who did not 
act in accordance with the Qur’an and following the example of the prophet Mohammad, was 
guilty of sedition and must be forcibly removed from power. This belief was put into action 
when ‘Ali was assassinated by a Kharijite in 661. Related to the Kharijites’ position towards 
impious rulers was their literalist and strict interpretation of the Qur’an, and the belief that 
any Muslim caught deviating from their understanding of the shar’ia was guilty of kafir 
(unbelief) and should thus be put to death. For the Kharijites the Qur’anic instruction to 
‘command good and prohibit evil’ was to be actively pursued to its logical and often deadly 
conclusion.
Unsurprisingly, the Kharijites’ philosophy was seen by ‘Ali and later ulema as an alarming 
threat to social order and political stability resulting in ‘Ali sending a contingent of troops to 
put down the rebellious sect before their beliefs could be disseminated further. Although ‘Ali 
succeeded in quashing the rebels as a military force, some of the Kharijites escaped, and, 
more significantly so did their ideas.106 The Kharijites’ radical doctrine served as a cautionary 
tale to the Sunni ulema that saw the dangers of an unmediated Qur’an being interpreted 
literally by disgruntled groups. The ulema establishment also internalized the necessary trade­
off between political and social stability, and the desirability of pious rulers; generally, the 
ulema preferred the conservative pragmatism of turning a blind-eye to the latter in the hope 
of maintaining their privileged position and social stability.
The uneasy mutual stance of non-interference between a quietist, conservative Sunni Islamic 
establishment and political leaders who offered the veneer of an Islamic state was not always
105 Initially, the Kharijites, along with the Shiites supported the rule of the last of the rashidun (rightly-guided 
caliphs) Caliph ‘Ali. In the course of the ensuing civil war between supporters o f‘Ali, and the rival claimant for 
the caliphate—Uthman’s cousin, Muawiyah—at the brink of defeat Muawyah’s soldiers held aloft Qur’ans to 
signify that Allah, not force, should settle the dispute. A section of ‘Ali’s forces agreed with this sentiment 
forcing ‘Ali to send an arbitrator as a representative. When the two sides met, the arbitrations went badly; the 
terms of the meeting had not been settled in advance, and when the initial contingent o f‘Ali’s soldiers 
discovered that it was ‘Ali’s legitimacy as a caliph under discussion, they rebelled under the slogan ‘Allah’s rule 
alone.’ This group formed the Kharijites, they objected both to Muawyah’s claim to the caliphate, which they 
believed belonged to ‘Ali, but also to ‘Ali’s decision to subject his caliphate to arbitration, which they believed 
only Allah had the right to do.
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universally accepted. There has been a long history of Islamic thinkers and religious leaders 
who have rebelled against this conservative compromise particularly in times of major 
political and social crises. To understand al-Banna’s radical rejection of this truce we must 
briefly examine the history of radical Muslim thinkers who have previously rebelled against 
the self-imposed constraints of conservative Islam. This will allow us to trace the ideological 
lineage that al-Banna drew upon to create the philosophy of the Muslim Brotherhood.
2.3.2 Taqi ad-Din Ahmad ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328)
The medieval scholar, Ibn Taymiyya serves as a frequently referenced, intellectual and 
inspirational figurehead for the modem Islamist movement. Ibn Taymiyya lived in Damascus 
during the aftermath of the Mongol invasion that ended the Abbasid Caliphate (750-1258).107 
The Mongols brought to an end what was retrospectively considered to be the golden age of 
Islamic civilization and put in place Mongol leaders.108 Although the new rulers formally 
converted to Islam, they continued to follow their own customary practices and law, the 
Yassa code. Ibn Taymiyya refused to accept the traditional conservative view that however 
‘bad’ or insincere a Muslim the leader may be, social order is preferable to the chaos that 
would ensue if the leader was deposed. He believed that the legitimate Islamic leader has two 
tasks: governance by shar’ia and the defence of Muslim lands.109 The failure to achieve 
either of these would mean that the ruler should not be considered a Muslim and his 
constituents have the right, or even the duty, to depose of them. Ibn Taymiyya composed the 
infamous Mardin fatwa (religious or legal ruling) justifying jihad for the overthrow of unjust 
leaders or those who superficially professed allegiance to Islam whilst governing against 
Islamic injunctions.
Although Ibn Taymiyya prudently did not explicitly say so, this was clearly directed against 
the Mongol rulers. Ibn Taymiyya claimed that the ‘bad’ ruler was one who governed contrary 
to shar’ia and introduced bida’ that diverged from the Qur’an and the Sunna. Public 
implementation of foreign practices would lead the Muslim populace astray from Islam.110 In 
essence Ibn Taymiyya re-politicised Islam by legitimising the forceful overthrow of
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authorities who transgressed the political implementation of Islamic law, or those that had 
illegally superseded the ‘true’ Islamic rulers. The Mongol rulers had clearly committed both 
these offences by first conquering the Abbas id caliphate and then by introducing the Yassa 
code at the expense of Islamic law. The metaphor of Mongol rulers, who feign the outward 
motions of Islamic belief for political capital, but ignore its teachings and introduce ‘foreign’ 
laws, persists today amongst Islamists seeking the violent removal of their own ‘illegitimate’ 
or ‘un-Islamic’ governments.
2.3.3 Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792)
The 18th century reformer Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab argued that the degeneracy of 
Islamic civilization was due to the privatization of the concept of tawhid.111 He claimed that 
the neglect of the principle of tawhid had led to spiritual and social degeneration. This was 
partly symbolised, and partly caused by, the worship of extraneous idols, saints, angels and 
other intercessors that did not form part of Sunni orthodoxy.112 In particular he singled out 
Sufism as a grotesque distortion of Islam as it deliberately incorporated and conjoined local 
traditions and forms of worship with Islam; al-Wahhab claimed that Sufis worshiped more 
than one God and were therefore guilty of apostasy and deserving of death.113 Furthermore, 
al-Wahhab denounced any forms of Islamic practice or knowledge not based solely on the 
original and holy sources of the Qur’an, the Surma and hadith.114 By corrupting the pristine 
message of Islam, with innovations and additions, the Muslim community had also been 
corrupted, weakening and fracturing the umma and creating factionalism. Al-Wahhab made 
the link between the decay of the divine message and the decay of society with the decline of 
the umma. Only the divine text, the practices and saying of the Prophet, and the correct 
interpretations based on these texts, could be used as the basis of the Islamic state.
Ibn Taymiyya had justified jihad in order to resist rulers who were very obviously governing 
contrary to shar’ia. In effect Ibn Taymiyya used tawhid as a negative or reactive standard 
justifying the removal of leaders clearly failing in their duty to implement the shar’ia. Al- 
Wahhab went further than Ibn Taymiyya by claiming that all aspects of political life should
111 The concept of tawhid is discussed in more detail below.
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be conducted not only in accordance with Islam, but solely by its standard. For al-Wahhab 
Islam was the exclusive criterion of legitimacy; any addition to, or manipulation of shar’ia 
was illegitimate bida\ To rectify this Allah had to be recognized both ‘as the creator and 
sustainer [sic] of all life and as the ultimate sovereign and lawgiver.’115 Recognising that 
Allah cannot rule directly, al-Wahhab specified that political leadership should not be based 
on worldly values such as wealth, birth or stature but on knowledge of the Qur’an and the 
hadith. This meant the restoration of Islam from the private domain to the centre of public 
and political life and eventually formed the ideological basis of the modem Wahhabism.116
Wahhabism is one movement within the broader Salafist ideology, although the two terms are 
often (incorrectly) used interchangeably. Salafism, taking its name from ‘salaf meaning ‘the 
righteous ancestors,’ is a puritanical creed that aims to make a purified Islam the sole focus of 
public and private life. The focus of Salafism is to purge Islam of all hida ’ that have corroded 
and corrupted the religion since the time of the Mohammed and the first three generations of 
Muslims. Since it cannot be known exactly how Islam was practiced during its nascent 
period, and that the application of a 7th century socio-political system to the modem world is 
open to a multitude of divergent interpretations, the Salafi ideology reflects more of an 
idealised position than a concrete movement. The Salafi impulse ranges from the reactive, 
utopian idea of returning to a pristine Islam by discarding all the implements of modernity, to 
the renewal, resurgence and relocation of Islam to the centre of human life in the modern era. 
This explains how very different types of movements from the ultra-conservative Wahhabi, 
through the politically radical Muslim Brotherhood, to the violent extremism of al-Qaeda, can 
all be located under the Salafist ideological umbrella.
2.3.4 Sayyid Jamal-al-din al-Afghani (1838-1897)
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Sayyid al-Afghani advocated a very different type of Islamic revival to al-Wahhab. Faced 
with the question of the survival of Islam in a world increasingly dominated by Europe and 
their imperialist forces, al-Afghani spearheaded the educated urban response. Bom and 
educated in Iran, al-Afghani then relocated to Egypt in 1871 where he attracted a small circle 
of followers to his ideas and message of reform. Al-Afghani shared the tribal response of al- 
Wahhab—the solution to the problems of the umma lay in a return to Islam—but for the 
urbane milieu this did not entail a wholesale rejection of modernity. Al-Afghani’s followers, 
some of whom had been educated in European universities, wanted to retain and incorporate 
the exciting scientific and technological advancements but at the same time reject 
imperialism and reverse the decline of Islam. Instead of trying to reject modernity al-Afghani 
wanted to embrace it and modernise Islam. The problem he faced was how to reconcile a 
rejection of Western cultural values but selectively retain scientific elements and frame the 
entire project as a return to Islam.117
Al-Afghani managed to partially ameliorate these contradictions by promoting an agenda of 
jihad that focused attention on taking action and thus distracted from any potential 
ideological discrepancies. The political activism that al-Afghani promoted was based around 
a call for Islamic solidarity and resistance to imperialism. His charismatic personality meant 
that he attracted a popular following, prompting one commentator to note that al-Afghani’s 
life ‘touched and deeply affected the whole Islamic world in the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century.’118 After coming to the attention of officials in Egypt he was expelled to India in 
1879 but five years later he emigrated to Paris where he published an Arabic journal al- 
Urwah al-Wuthqa—The Indissoluble Bond.119 This publication established al-Afghani’s 
message of political solidarity based on the shared bonds of Islam, and the common enemy of 
the West. This represented the first major, modem ideal of pan-Islamism. The journal also 
signified the intention of al-Afghani and his followers to embrace modern technology and 
techniques of mass communication to disseminate their message and gamer support for their 
pan-Islamic cause.
The articles published in al-Afghani’s journal formed the basis of his views and proved 
important for the formation of al-Banna’s worldview. Al-Afghani believed that the political
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ascendency of Europe and the corresponding decline of the Ottoman Empire and other 
Islamic lands did not demonstrate the superiority of the West. In agreement with al-Wahhab 
al-Banna thought that Islam had fallen into a state of moral decay and decadence due to the 
infiltration of foreign ideas and cultural practices. Islam had been neglected by Muslims and 
abused by their leaders; the umma had lost faith in the power of their religion and had, in the 
face of European dominance, grown apathetic and subdued. After al-Afghani’s stay in India 
and observing the failure of the Indian Mutiny, he became convinced that imperialist forces 
threatened the Middle East, and only Islamic solidarity could resist Western hegemony. Al- 
Afghani was clearly motivated by the themes of solidarity and action, and was primarily 
interested in Islam as a political force in the world rather than an object of personal religious 
belief, a fact reflected in al-Afghani’s failure to marry. This lack of concern with the 
anachronistic, theological details of Islam allowed al-Afghani to envisage a rejuvenated Islam 
that transcended partisan divisions of race, language and denomination; an Islam that 
embraced modem technologies, and acted as a bulwark against the European cultural, 
political and economic power.
2.3.5 Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849-1905)
If al-Afghani sketched the crude outlines of a political pan-Islamism, then his pupil, 
Muhammad ‘Abduh was left with the arduous task of filling in the ideological and 
theological details. ‘Abduh agreed with al-Afghani that Islam’s biggest challenge came from 
Europe, but that this also represented a unique opportunity to unite the umma in a way that 
had been impossible since the time of the rashidun (rightly-guided caliphs). However, 
‘Abduh did not view Islam as a mere tool to ferment a collective identity, instead he 
emphasised the theology of Islam as the key to an Islamic revival. Similarly ‘Abduh agreed 
with al-Wahhab that centuries of accumulated traditions and alien practices had reified Islam 
and turned it from a dynamic, living and all-encompassing way of life into a staid and 
paralysed set of irrelevant anachronisms that left the umma vulnerable to outside forces. 
Unlike al-Wahhab’s turn away from the modem towards a stripped back, ascetic Islam, 
‘Abduh argued that Islam should embrace modernity. Muslims should not have to choose 
between Islam and the modem world because the two need not be mutually exclusive.120
120 Roy Jackson Fifty Key Figures in Islam p. 174
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‘Abduh’s response to the challenge of modernity was a mixture of pragmatism and idealism. 
The spectre of European domination could only be resisted by a new approach to modernity. 
Religions, argued ‘Abduh, needs a state within which to survive, and for the state to be 
durable and strong, requires wealth. This can only be generated by ‘the people and the 
people’s wealth is not possible without the spread of these sciences amongst them so that 
they may know the ways for acquiring wealth.’121 ‘Abduh’s claim, that Muslim states, and 
their populace, needed to embrace modem science and economic systems was not merely a 
practical survival strategy, it also formed the core of ‘Abduh’s theological stance. ‘Abduh 
wanted to show that Islam and modernity were not antithetical, or merely compatible, but 
were, in fact complementary.122 This meant going further than the secular approach of 
separating religion from other forms of knowledge in the expectation that they need not 
impinge on one another, and demonstrating that in Islam reason and revelation are two sides 
of the same coin.
In ‘Abduh’s most famous work Risalat al-Tawhid (The Theology of Unity), he reconnected 
science and Islam using two techniques.123 Firstly, he showed how the Qur’an, as a divine 
and therefore perfect text, anticipated modem scientific discoveries, but that these needed to 
be reinterpreted within a modem context.124 Secondly, ‘Abduh wanted to resurrect and 
transform the concept of ijtihad, a term originally used to describe the process of forming 
legal judgements by mujtahid (learned scholars of the shar’ia) based on independent 
reasoning or interpretation of legal sources. ‘Abduh reinterpreted ijtihad as a general form of 
independent human reasoning or thinking enjoined by Islam on Muslims.125 This meant that 
all Muslims had the right to make reasoned judgements, using their rational faculties gifted 
by Allah, about all matters where the Qur’an or the hadith had not specifically mentioned.
By taking a traditional Islamic concept and relocating it within a modem context with a new 
political emphasis ‘Abduh was participating in a tradition of Muslim reformers that lent 
historical weight to essentially new and radical ideas. It seems that ‘Abduh’s aim in opening 
up the gates of reason was to find a way to reappropriate scientific research as an activity not
121 Muhammad ‘Abduh cited in Elma Harder “Muhammad ‘Abduh”
122 John L. Esposito The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? pp.57-58
123 Roy Jackson Fifty Key Figures in Islam p. 174
124 For example, ‘Abduh argued that jinns (genies) in the Qur’an should be understood in an age of modem 
medicine as microbes. Further investigation of the Qur’an and the hadith would reveal more links of this kind 
which for now are beyond human understanding.
125 Roy Jackson Fifty Key Figures in Islam (London: Routledge, 2006) p. 175
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just compatible with, but essential to correct Islamic practice. This circumscribed and narrow 
end could not, however, be contained by the possibilities inherent in the new meaning that 
‘Abduh endowed on ijtihad. By opening the gates of reasoning, one also creates the 
possibility of reinterpreting the divine texts, and as any Muslim can participate in 
interpretation and reasoning, the spectrum of possible ways in which to understand the 
Qur’an is radically expanded. Furthermore, apart from the qualifier of ‘rational’ judgement, 
‘Abduh did not limit who could take place in this project, and so did not provide a definitive 
way of telling which interpretations were authoritative. At a stroke it seemed that any literate 
Muslim could make pronouncements on the meaning of the Qur’an and the hadith, and there 
was no obvious method of deciding which of the interpretations was correct, or indeed who 
was qualified to authenticate or invalidate them. The lasting legacy of ‘Abduh’s work was to 
undermine the authority that had traditionally resided within the confines of the ulema and 
decentralize and democratize the divine texts.
The two poles of this spectrum of interpretation are the liberal and radical positions. Using 
the principle of ijtihad liberal or modernist Islam broadly claims, for example, that the Qur’an 
and hadith call for democratic institutions, religious tolerance, human rights and equal rights 
for women. Conversely, radical Islamist groups use the same principle of ijtihad to variously 
demonstrate that Islam stands for a form of social justice that necessitates a violent jihad that 
defeats the purported enemies of Islam and facilitates the unimpeded spread of da’wa around 
the world. These two irreconcilable views are, nevertheless, connected by the shared 
principle of ijtihad and thus exclude the possibility of finding an objective viewpoint from 
which one group could criticise the other. Although both sides accuse their opponents of 
wilful misinterpretation based on taking passages of the Qur’an or hadith out of context and 
manipulating them for their own nefarious ends, neither are willing to surrender the principle 
of ijtihad; rational understanding of Islam is allowed, so long as the correct interpretation is 
employed. ‘Abduh had intended to open the gates of reasoning, but in doing so he opened the 
floodgates of heterodox interpretation.
2.4 The Ideology of Hasan al-Banna and the Muslim Brotherhood
Like his four intellectual predecessors Hasan al-Banna was reacting to the onset of foreign 
forces that created series of crises for traditional Egyptian life. In the previous section we
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examined the accelerated modernising and westernising agenda forced top-down by 
Mohammed Ali, Isma’il Pasha and the French and British colonial regimes.126 We saw how 
the eager embrace of modernity created political, economic and social crises and sparked 
several violent revolts and revolutions culminating in the burning of Cairo in 1952 and the 
Nasser coup d ’etat. In the face of this tumult al-Banna saw the failure of the traditional 
centres of authority in Islam capitulate and fail to act. Years of ossified conservative Islamic 
orthodoxy had lost touch with the original utopian promise of the early Islamic community. 
Traditional forms of Egyptian life bound up with traditional Islamic practice faced the 
wrenching onslaught of modernity imposed by foreign forces and unaccountable political 
leaders with no protection provided by the Islamic establishment. By trying to reconcile the 
painful and destructive dualisms created by the unequal encounter of modernity with tradition 
al-Banna, following the path laid out by his predecessors, forged a response far removed from 
Sunni orthodoxy: the modem Islamist ideology. We must now examine these themes further 
and critically examine the details of the ideology.
When diagnosing the problems of Muslims in 1920’s Egypt al-Banna employed a mode of 
language and a style of argumentation that still carry currency with modem Islamists. He 
lamented that:
[a] wave of dissolution which undermined all firm beliefs was engulfing Egypt 
in the name of intellectual emancipation. This trend attacked the morals, deeds 
and virtues under the pretext of personal freedom. Nothing could stand against 
this powerful and tyrannical stream of disbelief and permissiveness that was 
sweeping our country... I saw the social life of the beloved Egyptian people, 
oscillating between her dear and precious Islam which she had inherited, 
defended, lived with during fourteen centuries, and this severe Western invasion 
which was armed and equipped with all destructive influences of money, wealth, 
prestige, ostentation, power and means of propaganda.127
The dichotomy of the siren of decrepit and hollow Western values, and authentic but 
neglected Islamic values is a recurring theme of the nascent Islamist ideology.128 In addition 
to the spiritual malaise created by the encounter with Westernism and modernism al-Banna 
also regretted the more tangible political, economic and military dominance of Western
126 Shahram Akbarzadeh and Fethi Mansouri “Contextualising Neo-Islamism” p.3
127 Hasan al-Banna cited in Brynjar Lia The Society ofMuslim Brothers In Egypt: The Rise o f an Islamic Mass 
Movement 1928-1942 p.28
128 Bernard Lewis The Crisis O f Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror pp. 101-102
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colonial powers. The Muslim Brotherhood remained virulently anti-British throughout its 
existence although the leadership tried to reign in overt expressions of anti-imperialism in 
order to prevent it falling foul of the Political Police.129 This anti-Western theme was partly 
founded upon the belief that young Muslims had become unduly fascinated by the West, in 
particular its cultural exports, resulting in a widespread inferiority complex, and the 
devaluation of the indigenous culture and religion. Al-Banna believed that the encroaching 
Westernization of the Islamic world had to be combated by reinvigorating Egyptian youth 
with a robust and renascent Islamic identity. Ironically, despite this multifaceted rejection of 
the West, al-Banna remained open to the adoption of Western techniques of modern 
propaganda and educational techniques to further the Brotherhood’s goals.
2.4.1 Sense of Disgrace and Crises
Central to the propaganda employed by the Brotherhood was the theme of humiliation and 
disgrace suffered by Muslims under the dominance of the West. The emaciated modem 
Muslim society was contrasted with a constructed ideal of glorious Islamic civilizations of 
the past, in particular with the early expansionist era of the rashidun following Mohammed. 
This humiliation found its most concrete expressions in the regions of Egypt most clearly 
under British economic control and political influence. The Suez Canal Zone was a 
particularly obvious example of British imperialism, and it was here, in the town of 
Isma’iliyya that al-Banna began his professional career and founded the first branch of the 
Muslim Brotherhood. The symbols and symptoms of imperialism that al-Banna found in 
Isma’iliyya shaped the fiercely anti-colonial strain in the Brotherhood’s ideology. Here the 
British army camps clearly displayed the military dominance of the British occupation, but 
equally repugnant to al-Banna was the economic dominance of the Suez Canal Company. 
This sense of weakness and humiliation was compounded with ‘complete foreign domination 
of the public utilities ... the conspicuously luxurious homes of the foreigners overlooking the 
‘miserable’ homes of their workers ... [and] even the street signs ... were written in 
[English].’130
Brynjar Lia The Society o f Muslim Brothers In Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement 1928-1942
110
p.81
30 Richard Mitchell The Society o f the Muslim Brothers p.7
Al-Banna saw the years following the First World War as a disastrous period for the Egyptian 
and worldwide umma. The global upheavals in and around the Muslim world resulted in the 
destruction of the imagined spiritual and political unity of the early Muslim community. The 
insidious seed of doubt, expressed as atheism, materialism or secularism, planted after the 
First World War had created ‘orientations of apostasy and nihilism.’131 Several critical events 
contributed to this dissolution of faith and unity of the umma. The 1919 Egyptian revolution 
against the British had resulted in fierce political infighting between the two main parties— 
the popularist Wafd and the modernising Liberals—and the unpopular compromise that 
allowed the continued presence of British forces in Egypt. On the global stage Mustafa 
Kemal Ataturk inaugurated a secularist revolution in Turkey and disbanded the Caliphate— 
the last potent symbol of Islamic unity. Al-Banna believed that Egyptian intellectuals, spurred 
by Ataturk’s revolution, planned to subvert orthodox Islam under the banner of an 
‘intellectual and social emancipation’ of Egypt.132 Al-Banna gathered these currents together, 
along with reformists in the Egyptian universities; ‘secularist ... literary and social salons;’ 
and the modernist media, to create a compelling picture of a wholesale attack on Islam and 
traditional cultural values, hierarchies and practices.133
These events and trends were interpreted by al-Banna as undermining the unity and integrity 
of Islam. For al-Banna and his followers the theme of unity was of critical importance and 
was the standard to be applied to a range of social, political, religious and cultural problems. 
In keeping with the ideal of unity all of these issues were combined into a singular, but 
multifaceted ideological complex; and, as we shall see, the solution would have to be unitary 
in form too.134 Anything which enjoined unity was to be encouraged, whilst anything that 
threatened disunity or heterogeneity of any kind, was to be fiercely resisted. Two theological 
concepts were appropriated by the Muslim Brotherhood to express these themes: tawhid and 
fitna.
2.4.2 Tawhid
131 Hasan al-Banna cited in Richard Mitchell The Society o f the Muslim Brothers p.6
132 Richard Mitchell The Society o f the Muslim Brothers p.7
133 Richard Mitchell The Society o f the Muslim Brothers p.7
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Tawhid literally translates as ‘making one’ and refers specifically to the oneness or unity of 
Allah. The ritual corollary of tawhid is the shahada; the Islamic declaration of faith: ‘There is 
no God but Allah. Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah.’ The declaration of the shahada 
forms one of the five pillars of Islam and its most fundamental and central creed. 
Accordingly, the sincere recital of the shahada is the formal and sufficient condition of 
converting to Islam or the reaffirmation of one’s membership to the umma. Tawhid testifies 
to the singularity and uniqueness of Allah and thus the unity, universality and totality of His 
sovereignty as revealed by the prophet Mohammed. Islam, translated as ‘submission,’ refers 
to the duty of mankind to submit to Allah’s will upon hearing His message.
Al-Banna combined the tradition of resistance of Ibn Taymiyya, the salafist theology of al- 
Wahhab, the activism of al-Afghani and the technological modernism of ‘Abduh, to forge the 
new ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood.135 Al-Banna added to this mix his impulse towards 
education-oriented grassroots social reform, his organizational skills and his personal 
charisma and leadership qualities. This was not an attempt to regress to an archaic Islam—as 
the pejorative ‘fundamentalism’ suggests—but a thoroughly ‘modern, innovative, and 
modernizing’ movement.136 Al-Banna extended the logic and imperative of tawhid so that it 
did not operate solely at the personal level but also at the cultural, political, legal and 
economic level of society and the state. The aim was not only to orientate these areas towards 
a unified Islamic whole, but also to effect a fundamental shift and achieve a totalised Islamic 
existence; reflecting both the oneness of Allah and His absolute sovereignty.
2.4.3 Fitna
The issue of disunity was extremely important to al-Banna and his followers. The word fitna 
was appropriated to describe the evil of disunity and the related harms associated with it. The 
closest literal translation of fitna is ‘trial’ or ‘temptation,’ from which follows the negative 
connotations o f ‘treachery, persecution, seduction, enchantment, or disorder.’137 The context 
of the definition originates from a hadith reporting that the greatest fitna for men is the 
sedition caused by the illicit temptation of women. Within a socio-political context fitna 
refers to periods of strife within the Muslim community. The first civil war within Islam
135 See Olivier Roy Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah pp.232-234
136 Karen Armstrong The Battle For God: Fundamentalism in Judaism, Christianity and Islam p.369
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caused by the assassination of Caliph Uthman and fought over control of the caliphate, is 
called the first fitna and describes the breakdown of the unity of the early Muslim umma and 
the political and social chaos that ensued.138 Importantly, this event heralded the first major 
schism within the Muslim community, resulting in the umma turning in on itself and halting 
its outward expansion.139 Fitna therefore has multiple meanings within several contexts 
including disunity, division, schism, chaos, agitation and rebellion. Whatever the particular 
meaning in a certain context fitna always has strong negative connotations.
For the Muslim Brothers, fitna represented the antithesis of tawhid and thus established an 
important dualistic moral continuum. Anything that promoted tawhid necessarily came at the 
expense offitna and was, therefore, a good thing, and the converse—the promotion offitna at 
the cost of tawhid—was an evil to be resisted. The Brothers’ preoccupation with fitna rested 
on two, interrelated grounds. The first was the Islamic injunction for Muslims to live in 
loving ‘brotherhood’ with their brethren. This theological imperative explains the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s name and the centrality of unity in their ideology. The second, connected 
explanation was based in political pragmatism; divided the umma as a political force was 
weak and unable to resist the parasitic forces of the West.
This mutually exclusive principle, with its two poles of tawhid and fitna, was applied within a 
variety of disparate fields including politics, economics, religion and cultural expression. The 
application of a bipolar critical scale has the useful property of unifying and making sense of 
a host of different issues within a singular framework. A result of this simplified approach 
was that the message and philosophy of the Brothers was coherent, easy to disseminate and 
could be understood and applied by their members.140 We shall identify four key domains 
where, for the Brothers, Western dualities wrought havoc on the ideal of Islamic unity: 
politics, economics, society and the law. Whilst doing so it should be borne in mind that all of 
these fields were regarded as part of a single problem by the Brothers and so were not 
understood separately, but blended into a coherent whole. Furthermore, these dualisms were 
interdependent and fed into one another, the culmination of which would mean the decay and 
demise of Islam and traditional Egyptian life.
138 Karen Armstrong Islam: A Short History pp.28-29
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2.4.4 Politics
One interesting consequence of the tawhid-fltna principle is the Brothers’ early eschewal of 
politics, or more precisely, political partisanship. Al-Banna viewed the evils of imperialism 
through the prism of fitna. Accordingly, the principal method by which imperialist forces 
dominated Egypt was to divide the people into various artificial groups (Egyptians and 
foreigners, the urban rich and poor, state bureaucrats and ordinary workers, landowners and 
tenant farmers) with competing interests and turn these groups against one another. This 
tactic operated through two complementary channels: firstly, the direct interference and 
machinations of the foreign imperialists; and secondly, the internal forces that, consciously or 
otherwise, served the interests of the imperialists, or treated them with indifference, resulting 
in ‘a dead pacifism, lowly humiliation, and acceptance of the status quo,’141 These were 
respectively labelled by the Brothers as ‘external’ and ‘internal’ or ‘domestic’ imperialism.
According to al-Banna the most insidious forms of domestic imperialism was perpetuated by 
Egyptian political parties. The Brothers held a comprehensive list of grievances against 
parties and their leaders. Political parties only operated to serve the interests of their 
members, particularly their leaders, as they were ‘led by men, not ideas.’142 This meant that 
parties dominated and ruled the people rather than acting as their servants. Furthermore, they 
had no genuine programmes of social or political reform, and just used these as guises to gain 
control of the state. Personal prestige rather than social ideals guided the leaders, who were 
willing to employ any tactic in the pursuit of power. Adopting familiar communist rhetoric 
the Brothers asserted that the system of political parties supported the capitalist system, the 
‘political instrument by means of which the capitalist exploited the workers,’ and 
appropriated the legal and bureaucratic instruments of the state for their own ends.143
The visceral hatred of political parties lies at the heart of the Brothers’ stance on imperialism. 
Domestic imperialism did not only support and sustain external imperialism; it also mirrored 
and reproduced its ideas. Thus the fact that Egyptian political parties, set within a 
constitutional parliamentary system, resembled foreign forms of political organization and 
ideology was reason enough for the Brothers to reject it. This was understood by al-Banna as
141 Mohammed al-Ghazali cited in Richard Mitchell The Society o f the Muslim Brothers p.218
142 Richard Mitchell The Society o f the Muslim Brothers p.218
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114
a form of cultural imperialism, whereby Western ideas, concepts and modes of organization 
were uncritically reproduced in Egypt resulting in the moral decay of Egyptian society and 
maintained the grip of the imperial power on its host. The ideology of the West was hollow 
and decrepit, thus the allegation that ideas or values were ‘Western’ was sufficient for the 
Brotherhood to reject them. This antagonism to anything ‘Western’ served as a reference 
point for the Brothers’ attitude to a range of political and economic questions, and partly 
explains their hostile stance against capitalism and materialism.
The political parties and their leaders were particularly susceptible to Western cultural and 
economic hegemony. They blindly adopted Western modes of thought, organization, values 
and ideology and then sought to project this Western facsimile onto Egyptian society. They 
were, the Brothers charged, incompetent Muslims, in effect they had been schooled in 
Western thought so thoroughly that they had lost sight of their Egyptian and Islamic heritage, 
‘they forgot their glory, their history and their past.’144 The Brothers’ concern was that if the 
Egyptian political process was normalized to resemble British parliamentary democracy then 
the corrupt Western values adopted by the political leaders would leach irreversibly into their 
constituents thus making imperial control a fa it accompli. By implementing a Western legal, 
economic and political structure the fabric of Islam would be destroyed. One Brother 
summed up this process with the complaint that Egypt had accepted ‘independence, a 
constitution, and a parliamentary system before we expelled England from Egypt.’145
2.4.5 Economy
Variously labelled by the Brothers as materialism, greed, economic tyranny, and exploitation; 
the Brotherhood took a dim view of a capitalist economy. Their critique of capitalism can be 
broken into three parts: 1) the corrupt and inequitable Egyptian capitalist economy; 2) 
imperial control of the economy and the leaching of resources and wealth; 3) philosophical 
objections to the corrupting influence of materialism. The first two categories borrowed 
heavily from socialist rhetoric derived from the active Egyptian communist party formed 
three years before the Muslims Brothers. The third category was cast within theological 
terminology and was mainly used as a potent tool to disparage and castigate the soiled
144 Mohammed al-Ghazali cited in Richard Mitchell The Society of the Muslim Brothers p.219
145 Anonymous Muslim Brotherhood member cited in Richard Mitchell The Society o f the Muslim Brothers
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Western ‘soul.’ At the same time as heavily borrowing socialist language and argument 
structure, the Brothers also wanted to separate themselves from the ‘atheist’ communists. 
This required the Brothers to tread a narrow and sometimes contradictory path; they utilized 
the familiar ideology of the left in order to attract potential supports from the communist 
camp, particularly from the student population, but at the same time castigated the atheism of 
the communist party and their links with the Soviet Union.
2.4.6 Domestic Capitalism
The Brothers’ complaints against Egyptian economic system centred around the polarisation 
of wealth and the inequitable dualisms of land-holder and tenant farmer, factory owners and 
labourers, the rich and the poor. One set of problems diagnosed by the Brothers concerned 
the ownership of land and the exploitation by landlords of their tenants. Although abolished 
in law, the Brothers claimed that Egypt was stuck in a feudal economic system, where the 
landless masses were exploited by the few landlords and kept in a permanent state of 
deprivation and humiliation. This created three major harms: 1) poverty and its related ills of 
poor health, miserable living conditions and quality of life; 2) usurpation of the sovereignty 
of Allah by making the few landlords the masters of the poor; and 3) the division of society 
(fitna) into mutually exclusive groups that uneasily coexist within an exploitative 
relationship.
The first ill-effect of capitalism diagnosed by al-Banna was the poverty caused by low-paid 
jobs, urbanization and unemployment. Egypt in the 1920s was undergoing a post-war 
demographic boom resulting in an exodus from the countryside of young people, who, having 
received a minimal education, had expectations of a better life but were unable to find 
employment to attain it.146 This led to an unruly expansion of the fringes of Egyptian cities 
resulting in an urban sprawl of poor quality, squalid housing and an underdeveloped utilities 
infrastructure. So disgusted were the Brothers with the living conditions of the poor that the 
streets ‘deserve nothing better than destruction by dynamite,’ so that they may be rebuilt 
anew.147 The image of families subsisting in hovels surrounded by raw sewage was the 
operative illustration of the effects of capitalism on Egypt.
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Al-Banna was not exclusively interested in the immediate effects of poverty and poor 
sanitation on health and well-being; he was also concerned with its consequences on 
education, and the social and moral health of the community. He believed that poor education 
and poverty co-existed in a mutually reinforcing relationship. Related to the problems of 
poverty and education, the Brothers claimed that the social and moral fabric of Egyptian 
society was being tom apart by the poverty caused by capitalism. The lack of wage-paying 
jobs meant that the sons were unable to afford their own house, and therefore, living with 
their families, were unable to marry. The sexual mores of traditional Egyptian society meant 
that a generation of sexually frustrated young males were being led astray by the easy 
Western temptations of alcohol, dance halls, gambling, pornography, adultery and pre-marital 
sex. Humans forced to live in base conditions will tend towards base behaviour; or, as Qutb 
later wrote ‘[poverty] corrupts the character and the conscience.’148
The descent into immoral, haraam (forbidden) forms of behaviour conspired to create a 
generational gap between sons and fathers—the young and old—leading to the estrangement 
of families and the collapse of traditional social structures and hierarchies. Furthermore, the 
materialist sirens of the West left the young devoid of dignity and aspiration, unable to find 
work they stagnated in poverty and thus completed the cycle of dependency and inertia. The 
Brothers’ critique of poverty with its economic immobilisation of a generation and 
devastating impact on Islamic values and traditional social structures is a good demonstration 
of the Brothers’ ability to weave a single, unified narrative from an array of disparate 
problems. However, unlike other social and religious groups who also surveyed Egyptian 
society and produced a similar diagnosis, the Brothers framed the narrative within their 
unique Islamist ideology, thereby distinguishing themselves from potential competitors.
The second evil of capitalism concerned not just the direct, material consequences of poverty, 
but the usurpation of the absolute sovereignty of Allah by making the capitalists the masters 
of the poor. This is replicated throughout the economic system with land-owners maintaining 
an exploitative feudal relationship with their tenants. Instead of investing in social projects to 
benefit the people and the country, capitalists invested in schemes that serve their personal 
interests and perpetuated the economic status quo. The fundamental equality promised by the 
shahada—the equal submission of all before one God, and no-one but God—is broken by the
148 Sayyid Qutb cited in Richard Mitchell The Society of the Muslim Brothers p.221
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material subjugation of the poor to the rich. The domination of one group by another 
extended to the political realm where the Brothers clearly saw that economic power was 
readily translated into political power leading to the charge that the government taxed the 
poor but represented the rich. This multiplied the sins of capitalism and further entrenched 
the competing groups in their respective system.
2.4.7 Economic Imperialism
For the Brothers the economic relationship between the imperialists and Egypt was like that 
of a parasite and its host. The imperialists consisted of both the foreign elements and those 
who had assumed Egyptian nationality; they had ‘taken for their own and for their native 
country’s interests the best of the natural resources of the country.’149 They had gained a 
monopolistic control of the utilities, industry and commerce and ‘continue to view the 
Egyptian citizen, the Egyptian worker, and the Egyptian rulers without esteem and without 
justice.’150 Not only were the imperialists leaching resources from their host but they treated 
the Egyptians as slaves, subjugated to the master’s will. This humiliating position of 
servitude was accepted by the majority of Egyptians as the imperialist domination had broken 
their dignity and foreign ideas had corrupted their souls; the imperialist’s sovereignty and 
superiority, and Egyptian servitude had been internalised. As will be expected the emphasis 
of the Brothers’ critique rested on the idea that the Muslims had been forced to accept the 
sovereignty of other men, the imperialists, and so had ignored the sovereignty of Allah. The 
corruption of the ideal of tawhid was the essence of the problem, with all of the associated 
consequences—such as poverty—being mere symptoms.
2.4.8 Society: Culture and Family Life
A further objection raised by the Brothers against materialism was related to its corrupting 
effect on the Muslim soul. This issue is intimately connected with the second problematic 
concerning the Brothers, culture and family life, and demonstrates the interconnectedness of 
their worldview. As we have already examined the Brothers argued that one outcome of 
capitalism was the destabilisation of traditional family structures due to high unemployment 
and the economic and social inertia of Egyptian youth. In addition to this direct consequence,
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the Brothers claimed that materialism had a debasing effect on young Egyptians. The concept 
of materialism was intimately connected with the West and was often rhetorically connected 
with the ‘greed’ of Western imperialism. The professed higher virtue of Islamic spirituality 
was contrasted with the voracious appetite of the West for base pleasures such as sexual 
gratification, gambling, and inebriation. The West had become thoroughly contaminated by 
materialism: ‘The Western world, during [recent] centuries, has been materialist in tissue and 
fibre ... resulting in a deadening of human sentiments and sympathies, and in the extinction of 
godly endeavours and spiritual values.’151 The essential difference between Western 
materialism and Islam was that the former was only concerned with temporarily satisfying 
the insatiable base desires of man, whilst the latter served only God.
Connected with the Brothers’ construction of Western materialism was the idea of cultural 
imperialism. This was the process whereby the imperialists surreptitiously implanted 
materialist impulses within Egyptians, thus corrupting their souls and ensuring the continuing 
dominion of the West over the East. In line with the rest of al-Banna’s worldview, the 
apathetic and impressionable youth were susceptible targets of this form of imperialist 
control. The Brothers accepted that the materialist trappings of the West were not simply 
forced upon Egyptians, but also leeched across and were actively sought out by young 
Muslims. This occurred due to the proximity and availability of Western temptations, for 
example dance-halls and cinemas in the cities and the legalisation of the consumption and 
selling of alcohol, and was compounded by the addictive and cyclical nature of these 
activities. Furthermore Egyptian youth were lulled into a degenerate moral state by the 
collapse of traditional social structures, their inadequate Islamic education, high 
unemployment and so provided a willing receptacle for Western temptations to take hold.
The guiding metaphor employed to describe this process was that of the foreign temptress 
seducing her unwitting victims, with her beguiling appearance, but riddled with contagious 
and ultimately deadly disease. This image provided both the structure of the Brothers’ 
concern with a variety of Western cultural practices, such as cinema, provocative clothing, 
lewd dancing and ‘suggestive’ music, and with a provocative seam of language with which 
these things could be described, labelled and condemned. Additionally, the Brothers’ tactic of 
sectioning off inauthentic Western practices from authentic Islamic ones, allowed them to
151 “Al-Dawa” cited in Richard Mitchell The Society o f the Muslim Brothers p.226
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construct an easily identifiable barrier between themselves and the Western or Westernized 
‘other,’ around which they could rally. By having a group which could be readily identified, 
at least rhetorically, as the enemy, the Brothers cemented the internal cohesion and loyalty of 
their own, included membership. This had the additional benefit of promoting the internal 
unity of the group, important for any organization, but vital for reinforcing the Brotherhood’s 
ideological position.
Apart from the culture of entertainment, indulgence in base pleasures and mass media, the 
Brothers were also deeply concerned about new roles for women that displaced them from 
their traditional role as wife and mother. The moral corruption of woman was of special 
concern for al-Banna as they were pivotal for the health of the traditional family structure and 
for the moral education of their children.152 However, al-Banna’s concern with the role of 
Islamic women was not entirely reactionary. Concerned with the correct Islamic education of 
all young Muslims, one of the Muslim Brotherhood’s first major undertakings was to form an 
Islamic school for girls in 1933. The ‘Institute for the Mothers of the Believers’ retroactively 
constituted the first branch of the Muslim Sisters in 1944. Despite al-Banna’s efforts the 
Muslim Sisters did not expand to the same degree as the Brothers, attracting, at its peak only 
5000 members.153 In part, this was due to resistance from the Brotherhood members, who 
were suspicious of anything that resembled the displacement of women from their traditional 
roles.154
The degeneration of moral standards caused by exposure to Western culture not only led to 
kufr (disbelief) and the abandonment of ‘true’ Islam but also created an ethical and cultural 
dualism for young Muslims.155 Al-Banna was not solely interested in immoral behaviour but 
also the apathy generated by the multiple dualisms of modem life. Young Muslims that were 
caught between two sets of ethical values, and simultaneously attracted and repulsed by two 
cultural paradigms, would oscillate between these worlds and be rendered insensible by the 
confusion. The first stage to solving this dilemma, according to al-Banna, is to clearly 
identify the true boundaries of these worlds and then purge Islam of any Western impurities.
152 The Brothers’ attitude towards women, however, was progressive in some respects particularly when 
compared with the official rulings of al-Azhar. For instance, the Brothers eventually accepted that contraception 
could be used in certain circumstances, reflecting their pragmatic response to the issue of overpopulation.
153 Richard Mitchell The Society o f the Muslim Brothers p. 175
154 Perhaps the more pertinent reason for the Sisters’ stunted growth was that its potential constituents did not 
believe that the social program of the Brothers was compatible with their own goals of emancipation.
155 Bernard Lewis The Crisis O f Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror p. 103
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Only by resolving these dualisms into a unitary truth of Islam, could the inertia and servitude 
of Muslims to the West be overcome.
2.4.9 Education
The institutionalized conservatism of al-Azhar University symbolised, and reinforced, the 
problems for Islam in 1920s Egypt. Founded in 975 AD al-Azhar is the centre for Sunni 
scholarship in the Arab world and the second oldest surviving university in the world.156 With 
this heritage it is not surprising, therefore, that al-Azhar remains bastion of conservative 
theology, but al-Banna was not just railing against the university’s theology, he was critical 
of their lack of application of Islam outside of a privatised devotional framework. He 
believed that the university’s rectors were essentially quietist, passive and even complicit— 
they supported the ruling powers regardless of who they were or how they ruled, in an 
implicit exchange for non-interference with the running of the university. Al-Azhar would 
issue fatwas supporting the regime and its policies when necessary, and in return would be 
assured of state funding and allowed to govern its internal affairs. With the Muslim world 
disintegrating around them, al-Banna dryly remarked ‘the ulama’ saw and observed and 
heard and did nothing.’157
The central problem for al-Banna with al-Azhar was that over the centuries it had ossified 
Islam into a static, ancient set of impenetrable dogmas—‘dry, dead [and] ritualistic’—that 
had lost relevance for the needs of ordinary Muslims.158 Al-Banna held the opposite view, 
Islam is, or should be a dynamic, organic religion governing all aspects of life at all levels of 
the individual, society and the state. It should be open and understandable to all, not just a 
sheltered and distant community of scholars. Al-Azhar and the Muslim world are 
symbiotically linked and when al-Azhar ‘went to sleep’ the umma followed.159 In short Islam, 
according to al-Banna, should be a living, inclusive, all-encompassing way of life, not a 
privatised, exclusive faith. Al-Azhar ought to play a positive role encouraging the 
Brotherhood’s vision, rather than reactively supporting the political and social status quo. Not 
only had al-Azhar failed Islam as a historical project, but crucially it had abandoned and
156 Sayed Farid Alatas “From Jami’ah to University: Multiculturalism and Christian-Muslim Dialogue”
157 Hasan al-Banna cited in Richard Mitchell The Society o f the Muslim Brothers p.212
158 Richard Mitchell The Society o f the Muslim Brothers p.213
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become irrelevant to the living Muslim community. According to the Muslim Brothers al- 
Azhar, as the bastion of Islamic learning, had two major roles to play, and it had failed in 
both. Firstly, al-Azhar should be the ‘leading voice of Muslims in the world ... and a 
spokesman for a living and dynamic Islam.’160 Secondly, Al-Azhar should defend against 
encroachments on Islam from alien ideas and ideals. Al-Azhar had achieved this second task 
by withdrawing ever further into an anachronistic Islam, whilst living Islam, as the 
Brotherhood construed it, had been invaded, eroded and colonised by foreign values. By 
failing to involve itself in the wider Muslim community al-Azhar had relinquished its moral 
and intellectual authority in Egypt and the umma.
Despite the Brothers’ contempt for it, al-Banna was careful not to publically ostracize the 
university; its students were important targets for Muslim Brotherhood membership, and al- 
Banna did not want to alienate them or the rest of institutionalized Islam. For the ordinary 
Muslim al-Azhar as an institution still held great symbolic value and encapsulated a long, 
proud Islamic history and tradition. The Brothers, therefore critiqued the ‘type’ of Islam that 
al-Azhar had come to embody; a submissive, moribund Islam incapable of defending itself 
from foreign ideologies. Al-Azhar was partly the cause, but also partly the symptom and 
outcome of an impotent Islam.
Furthermore, al-Banna could not see how change could be affected by the traditional centres 
of Islam. The imperialists had a critical interest in maintaining the status quo of a weakened, 
privatised Islam. To complete the circle the ulema, many of whom were major landowners, 
were likely to lose out in the event of major political upheaval, and the rectors at al-Azhar 
were happy to receive funding and a degree of autonomy, in exchange for political 
acquiescence. In this servile state Islam could not be used as a tool of resistance or rebellion, 
nor would it be an effective rallying cry around which politically diverse Muslim groups 
could unite and upset the balance of power. In fact a corrupt and enfeebled Islam served to 
divide Muslims who, unable to see Islam as an all-encompassing unity, split up into religious 
subsets, and concentrated on their differences rendering them incapable of uniting against 
their common enemy—the imperialists and Western materialism.
160 Richard Mitchell The Society o f the Muslim Brothers p.212
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2.4.10 Law
It is not surprising that one of al-Banna’s key aims was the removal of Western, secular law 
from Egypt and its replacement with divine shar ’ia. There were good, theological grounds 
for this position, but in the context of early twentieth century Egypt there were other, more 
immediate concerns. As with politics, education, cultural life and economics, al-Banna was 
acutely aware of the dualisms of the Egyptian legal system. To understand how these 
dualisms arose in Egypt we must briefly examine the history of the legal system in the 
Ottoman Empire and Egypt.
The Capitulations were a set of commercial treaties entered into by the Ottoman sultans with 
European states. The Ottoman sultans entered into these agreements from a position of 
military superiority over Europe and they were intended to facilitate commercial trade. The 
first treaty was with France in 1536 permitting ‘French merchants to trade freely in Ottoman 
ports, to be exempt from Ottoman taxes and to import and export goods at low tariff rates.’161 
A further series of similar treaties eventually tilted economic power in Europe’s favour and 
facilitated the penetration of European goods and capital into the Ottoman Empire. These 
economic agreements also had political significance as they granted foreign merchants 
immunity from Ottoman law and placed them under the jurisdiction of the relevant European 
consul. As the balance of economic and political power shifted away from the Ottoman 
Empire, European consuls frequently and brazenly exploited the legal powers granted in the 
Capitulations causing humiliation for the Ottoman sovereign. By the nineteenth century the 
Capitulations symbolized the weakness and impotence of the Ottomans and the economic and 
political dominance of the Europeans, a dominance that they were willing to exploit openly 
regardless of the destabilising effect on the Ottoman Empire.
One consequence of the increasing number of foreigners conducting business in Egypt was 
that the legal system needed to be adapted to cope with disputes arising between them and the 
locals. The Capitulations had provided legal protection for foreign traders from the 
indigenous legal system and traditionally any dispute between Egyptians and foreigners 
would be heard by the relevant European consul, which would normally result in the 
exoneration of the foreigner no matter how egregious their offence. As the number of cases
161 William L. Cleveland A History o f the Modem Middle East p.50
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increased it became clear that this confusing and biased legal system needed to be 
standardized. Under the European-orientated reforms of Isma’il in 1876 the Mixed Courts 
were established to address this problem. They were to preside over cases involving civil and 
commercial disputes where foreigners were involved. The courts were governed by French 
civil law and were staffed by judges who served for life, thus lending the courts a degree of 
political autonomy. Once the Mixed Courts were established it was not long before the 
Egyptian legal system was further reformed, standardized and centralized. The National 
Courts, based closely on the Mixed Courts were created in 1884. The National Courts 
jurisdiction covered all Egyptians in matters of civil and commercial law and was based on 
the French legal code. Furthermore, although Egyptians could serve as judges, Europeans 
tended to be preferred for the most important positions.162
The creation of the Mixed and National Courts centralized and standardized the Egyptian 
legal system, but it was also dominated by European judges and was based on European law. 
The shar’ia courts had their jurisdiction severely curtailed and only dealt with personal and 
family matters, such as divorce, and so restricted the legal responsibilities and power of the 
ulema. Cleveland notes that at the same time as shar’ia was marginalized to essentially 
private matters and the ulema’s authority limited, opportunities arose for Egyptians schooled 
in French law; ‘[t]hus was Egyptian society set in conflict with itself.’163 Clearly, any Muslim 
society that lived under any non-Islamic law would fail the standard of God’s absolute 
sovereignty by living according to a man-made, and therefore profane law, thus the exclusive
implementation of shar’ia was a critical goal. The achievement of this goal was, however,
necessary but not sufficient. The totality of the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology was distinctly 
utopian in orientation due to this absolute goal of unity and this would eventually lead to the 
splintering of the group into political realists willing to compromise on the concept of tawhid 
and those that could not.
2.4.11 Secularism
Closely connected with the Brothers’ views of the legal system was their critique of 
secularism. The culmination of the tawhid-fitna principle was the absolute rejection of the 
principle of secularism. The division of religious and political authority was the antithesis of
162 William L. Cleveland A History o f the Modem Middle East p. 97
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the ideal of tawhid and the embodiment offitna.m  For al-Banna secularism was not just one 
more corrupt Western ideal, but the false idol that the West was enthralled to. Secularism did 
not merely threaten the cohesiveness of Egyptian society; it held within it the seed of the 
destruction of Islam. In his fundamental and total rejection of secularism al-Banna was 
following a well-worn ideological path by the Pakistani journalist and political theorist 
Mawlana Mawdudi.165 Writing in the late 1920s Mawdudi argued against the circumscribed 
‘Muslim State,’ a state for Muslims, analogous to the ‘Jewish state’ of the Balfour 
Declaration.166 For Mawdudi anything short of an Islamic state would concede unacceptable 
ground to the nationalists by placing manmade laws and politics above the divine law and the 
sovereignty of Allah. In contrast to the Brotherhood’s grassroots action and early avoidance 
of politics, Mawdudi proposed ‘Islamization from above,’ where ‘sovereignty would be 
exercised in the name of Allah’ in accordance with shar’ia. ‘Politics,’ declared Mawdudi, 
‘was “an integral, inseparable part of the Islamic faith, and ... [in the] Islamic state ... Muslim 
political action seeks to build ... a panacea for all their problems.’” 167 Clearly, any form of 
secularism was absolutely incompatible with Mawdudi’s vision of an Islamic state.
The early Islamist’s rejection of secularism may appear as a regressive and dogmatic 
principle. It is important to note, however, that the reverse is also true; from the perspective 
of Mawdudi, al-Banna and the Muslim Brotherhood, secularism stood as a Western idol that 
they refused to worship, and vowed to destroy. Rather than regarding secularism as a political 
philosophy it was seen as an assertion of a blasphemous faith in manmade law and politics. 
These were not two positions that could be reconciled through negotiation, compromise and 
rational argument. Karen Armstrong dramatically observes: ‘fundamentalism exists in a 
symbiotic relationship with an aggressive liberalism or secularism, and, under attack, 
invariably becomes more extreme, bitter, and excessive.’168 Armstrong then goes on to claim 
‘[the] doctrine of God’s sovereignty ... threw down a gauntlet to the modem world because it 
contradicted every one of its sacred truths.’169 The word ‘sacred’ illustrates the symmetry of 
the two positions and thus the impossibility of conciliation. This symmetry was not 
something inherent in the two philosophies—the philosophical basis of secularism and
164 Bernard Lewis The Political Language o f Islam p.3
165 Bom in India in 1903 Mawlana Mawdudi formed the Jamaat-e-Islami (Party of Islam) that played an 
important role in the partition of India and die founding of Pakistan.
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Islamism are quite different in form and content—but reflects the appearance of the other 
from their respective positions. The Islamists firmly believed that sovereignty was Allah’s 
alone, and humans had no right to create their own laws or the shape their destiny. This was a 
clear rejection of the foundations of secularism and its declaration of human freedom and 
autonomy. Mawdudi exemplifies this stance and the gulf between Islamism and secularism 
when he writes:
It is neither for us to decide the aim and purpose of our existence or to prescribe 
the limits in [sic] our worldly authority nor is anyone else entitled to make these 
decisions for us. This right [is] vest[ed] only in God Who has created us 
endowed us with mental and physical faculties, and provided all material 
provisions for our use. This principle of the Oneness of God altogether negates 
the concept of the legal and political sovereignty of human begins, individually 
or collectively. Nothing can claim sovereignty, be it a human being, a family, a 
class or group of people, or even the human race in the world as a whole. God 
alone is the Sovereign and His Commandments are the Law of Islam.170
In order to understand the Brothers’ vitriolic rejection of secularism we must recall the unity 
of al-Banna’s ideology and its theme of unification both in its critique and its solution 
exemplified in the motif of tawhid. For al-Banna the problems facing Egyptian society and 
the wider umma could not be viewed separately, and certainly could not be tackled one at a 
time. The idea of secularism was not understood merely as a political doctrine of the 
separation of Church and State, but as an all-corrupting philosophy that threatened to tear the 
umma apart and destroy Islam. The dualisms of the West—with the duality of secularism at 
its centre—were poisonous for Muslims.
Perhaps, more than any other feature of the Islamist ideology, this chasm of understanding 
between the principle of tawhid and secularism, explains the radical divergence and persistent 
hostility between Islamists and secular governments. Furthermore, this also helps explain the 
apparent gulf of understanding between Western observers, either lay or academic, and the 
Islamists. Within a secularist worldview the Islamist ideology and its deep foundations in the 
principle of tawhid seems strange to the Western social scientist leading to the temptation to 
grope for alternative motivations lying behind the religious ‘facade.’ John Vo 11 comments 
that ‘religious religious belief... [is explained] as a secondary phenomenon related to “real” 
motivations involving material gain, class interest, or other non-religious aspects of human
170 Mawlana Mawdudi The Islamic Way o f Life
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experience.’171 For the Islamists to be properly understood it is necessary to take the religious 
kernel of their ideology seriously and not to superimpose a secularist framework operating 
behind the Islamist rhetoric.
2.4.12 The Muslim Brotherhood’s Ideological Solution
So far we have examined how al-Banna constructed the Islamist ideology based on a critique 
of modernity and the failure of orthodox Islamic authorities to respond. As discussed in the 
first chapter ideologies do more than just provide an explanation of the world to its adherents, 
and their place within it, but also to provide a vision of a new future. For the Muslim Brothers 
the division of labour was very much imbalanced in favour of the critique rather than the 
positive vision or solution. This was a result of the ideology’s embodiment in a real 
movement that had to ensure its survival in a turbulent social and political situation 
dominated by far more powerful forces. The imbalance was reinforced by al-Banna’s natural 
fear of premature action. As we have seen with the Brotherhood conferences talk of action 
was mostly rhetoric, and when it did finally tip over into violence the Society was too weak 
to survive the government’s repression. This would be a recurring problem for Islamist 
movements who found themselves in the position of being too weak to seize power but too 
strong to be tolerated. This may also be one of the reasons why Islamist movements have 
tended to resort to a mode of action—terrorism—and a covert organisational structure that 
can withstand state repression. Despite these difficulties the Islamist ideology at this stage did 
have something to say about a solution to the problems it describes, and we shall briefly 
examine this now.
The final goal of al-Banna’s project remained necessarily vague and was described in a 
broad, utopian language.172 The aims of the Brotherhood were presented as a unique solution 
to the problems of Egyptian society and the cures prescribed by the Brothers were closely 
related to the ills they had diagnosed. As we have seen al-Banna believed that Egyptian 
society had been corrupted, ‘under the impact of western civilization ... materialist 
philosophy, and franji [foreign] traditions.’173 These alien influences had thoroughly 
corrupted every area of life, including Egyptian society’s culture, economy, politics, personal
171 John Voll "Foreword” in Richard Mitchell The Society o f the Muslim Brothers xii
172 Youssef M. Choueiri Islamic Fundamentalism p.43
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conduct, religious practice, and the legal system. In contrast to other nationalist reformers of 
the day, Al-Banna held that the core cause of these multiple corruptions was the corruption of 
the nation’s, and in particular the youth’s, Islamic faith. The only way to repair these deep 
problems would be a total Islamic reformation of Muslim individuals, society and the nation.
The specifics of what exactly a total Islamic reformation would entail were both contentious 
and vague. This resulted in a superficial consensus consisting of rhetorical slogans: “the 
Qur’an is our constitution,” and a cluster of abstract principles. These basic principles 
encapsulated a de facto definition of Islam for the Muslim Brotherhood. They were ‘the 
insistence on (1) Islam as a total system, complete unto itself, and the final arbiter of life in 
all its categories; (2) an Islam formulated from and based on its two primary sources, the 
revelation in the Qur’an and the wisdom of the Prophet in the Sunna; and (3) an Islam 
applicable to all times and to all places.’174 These basic principles demonstrate the importance 
to al-Banna of Islam representing a total, perfect and timeless panacea to the endemic 
problems he diagnosed in Egyptian society. The second principle reflects the specific 
influence of the salafi movement on al-Banna and the Brotherhood as it emphasizes a return 
to the pristine, unsullied version of Islam based around the Qur’an and the Sunna.
The incompleteness of al-Banna’s vision of the end-product of an Islamic revival was 
compounded by the ideological battles fought over how this could be achieved. In the early 
years of the Brotherhood al-Banna believed that the process of reform flowed from the 
individual through to society and the state. For genuine reform to be realized individual 
Muslims must first discard their ‘doubt and perplexity,’ and embrace the truth and practice of 
the Brothers version of a genuine Islamic life.175 Al-Banna was a primary school teacher 
throughout his leadership of the Brotherhood and firmly believed in the role of education in 
the moral and religious reform of the individual and in particular the necessity of re-educating 
the Egyptian youth. The reform of young people was paramount as they were the most 
vulnerable to the competing ideological influences of Western materialism, nationalism and 
communism. Mitchell describes al-Banna’s ‘mission in life as the reversal of these trends; he 
would become ‘a counsellor and a teacher,’ giving himself, by day to the children and by
174 Richard Mitchell The Society o f the Muslim Brothers p. 14
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night to their parents, to the task of teaching ‘the objectives of religion and the sources of 
their well-being and happiness in life.’176
A consequence of this view was the importance attached to the concept of jihad by the 
Brothers. The incorporation of jihad into the Islamist lexicon has a history that is closely 
intertwined with the evolution of the Islamist ideology. For the Society of Muslim Brothers 
jihad was primarily utilized as a general exhortation to action, reflecting its literal translation: 
struggle or effort. In response to the apathetic lethargy diagnosed by al-Banna, the Muslim 
Brotherhood prescribed a spiritual, political and physical awakening for Egyptian Muslims. 
All self-initiated activities aimed at furthering the goals of the Muslim Brotherhood were 
collected under the banner of jihad. The abstract imperative of jihad however, can be further 
broken down into three overlapping categories of more specific activism.
The first of these categories of jihad was the anti-colonial struggle to rid Egypt of British 
influence. This was not, however, a straightforward task. Al-Banna recognised that in order 
for the Muslim Brothers to survive they must accomplish a modus vivendi with the Egyptian 
authorities during a period when Islamic organizations were banned if suspected of engaging 
in politics. For a long period al-Banna thought that this accommodationist stance could be a 
permanent state-of-affairs and was based in the ideological position that it was possible for 
individuals to possess multiple identities and loyalties—for example Islamic and Egyptian- 
nationalist. As the group grew larger and more self-confident, their rhetoric sharpened and 
explicitly anti-British statements were sanctioned by the leadership. For most of their history, 
however, the Muslim Brothers did not engage in political violence, a policy that led to 
frustration and the formation of a radical splinter group, Muhammad’s Youth.177 The schism 
between the predominantly non-violent parent organization and its militant, underground 
offspring mirrors the split between modern ‘moderate’ Islamists and their violent 
counterparts. Just like the modem distinction, the division within the Muslim Brothers was 
not clear-cut; a violent arm, the Secret Apparatus, was formed during the Second World War, 
with the intention of capitalising on the post-war confusion and achieve the group’s anti- 
British objectives. Despite this, the leadership continued to disown the use of violence and 
the coordination and the extent of the Society’s post-war violence remains unclear.
176 Richard Mitchell The Society o f the Muslim Brothers p.6
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The second type of jihad was for the Islamists to seize power in Egypt. This was a far more 
controversial objective than getting rid of the British—a cause that united almost all 
Egyptians of any ideological persuasion. Recognising how dangerous this idea was al-Banna 
sought at first to deny that the Brotherhood was a political organization, and later when this 
became untenable he denied that the Brothers would resort to violence against the Egyptian 
state. This jihad was marked by both its lack of clear, achievable objectives and the 
vagueness of the final goal. Although al-Banna created a military section a clear strategy was 
never formulated.178 The lack of commitment to seizing power through violent means was 
matched by al-Banna’s half-hearted engagement with the political process. Despite al- 
Banna’s reticence the internal logic of the ideology meant that the seizure of domestic power 
was the only realistic way of achieving an Islamic state. As we saw with the historical 
development of the Society the vacillation between the imperative of jihad and pragmatic 
survival eventually caused schisms within the movement and made it vulnerable to the whims 
of the state.179
The least developed and third category of jihad imagined the spreading of the Brotherhood 
across the umma eventually resulting in the reestablishment of the caliphate and the triumph 
of Islam over the Christian West. The Brothers were too weak to develop this idea beyond 
mere utopian dreaming but there are some indications that this type of thinking did exist in 
the movement. New autonomous branches of the Society were created in surrounding Arab 
region demonstrating an attempt to spread beyond Egyptian borders. Furthermore, the one 
significant example of the Battalion system in action was during the 1948 Palestine war. 
Despite this the restraints of the existing movement meant that this radical element of the 
ideology was not developed during al-Banna’s time. It took the destruction of the movement 
and the unleashing of the ideology from pragmatic constraints for it to undergo the next step 
in its evolution. It is to this stage that we now turn.
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3 The Radicalisation of the Islamist Ideology
3.1 Introduction
After Nasser’s 1952 revolution and the proscription of the Muslim Brotherhood both the 
movement and the ideology underwent a period of adaptive evolution. This was a result of 
the altered political reality in which the movement found itself and the injection of new ideas 
from new intellectuals. By critically tracking the evolution of these ideas in their historical 
and intellectual context we aim to understand the form of the Islamist ideology during this 
crucial period.
We begin by surveying the new political, social and material landscape that the Brothers 
found themselves in following the revolution. We will then turn our attention to the most 
important ideologue to emerge during this period—and for subsequent Islamist movements in
ththe late 20 century—Sayyid Qutb. Although involved with the Brothers later in his life, 
Qutb was not a product of the movement and so it will be useful to examine his life in order 
to better understand the new direction that he took with the Islamist ideology. Sayyid Qutb 
marked both a departure and a continuation of the ideological trends of the al-Banna and 
early Muslim Brotherhood period. It will also be instructive to scrutinize the similarities and 
differences between al-Banna and Qutb; and demonstrate how these differences informed the 
evolution of the Islamist ideology in the 1960s and 70s. Qutb introduced several crucial new 
concepts that profoundly shaped the direction of Islamist movements after his death so we 
shall examine the most important of these in detail. Another important element of Qutb’s 
thinking was his dialectical accounts of Western materialism, communism and the three 
monotheistic religions. These sub-narratives are then woven together into the grand 
dialectical narrative of Islam and jahiliyya (ignorance of Islam). We will study these ideas in 
order to understand Qutb and the late modem Islamist ideology with its transcendental 
characteristics.1 We will look at how Qutb thought his theory could be put into practice by 
looking at his treatment of jihad, the Islamic Revolution and the Muslim nation. Finally we 
shall compare Qutb’s notion of action with that of al-Banna.
1 By ‘transcendental’ we refer not to the technical philosophical sense of the word but the idea that the Islamist 
ideology operates beyond mundane reality.
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In the previous chapter we observed how the theory and practice of the movement and the 
Islamist ideology interacted and mutually restrained their development. This was observed 
both in the tension present in al-Banna’s writings and leadership, and in the centrifugal forces 
in the Society that eventually resulted in its bifurcation. The restriction that practice exerted 
over the theory was particularly in evidence in the stunted growth of the utopian element of 
the ideology that found itself incapable of fleshing out its aspirations for the future of the 
Islamist movement for fear of the immediate material and political damage that could result. 
By contrast one interesting feature of the Qutbian period is that theory and practice became 
effectively detached as Qutb was writing largely in isolation from the movement in prison. 
As we shall argue this temporary distancing of the two elements and the elevation of the 
importance of theory over practice largely accounts for the radical and utopian direction the 
ideology took on during this period and for the trajectory of the ideology into the 21st century.
3.1.1 The Muslim Brothers in post-Revolution Egypt
The history of the decline o f the original Muslim Brotherhood reveals some important 
insights into the Islamist ideology. As a proscribed organization the Brotherhood and the 
Islamist ideology underwent a further stage in its evolution. The physical relocation of many 
members into prisons and internment camps in the Sinai desert, and the persecution of other 
Brothers, meant that the Society was transformed from one embedded within Egyptian 
society to one excluded from it. The Society had existed as a living organization, forced to 
deal with the mundane political, social and material realities of everyday Egypt. Its ideology 
was developed by Hasan al-Banna and other key leaders but it was always restrained and 
shaped by the opinions, ideas and activities of the members. Prior to 1954 the ideology of al- 
Banna and other leading Brothers had existed in a dynamic relationship with the actual 
organization. The ideology had shaped the Society and guided its development and eventual 
downfall, but in turn the Society exerted a power over the ideology and fashioned its form. 
This power was primarily one of constraint, we have already examined how al-Banna had to 
restrict the third stage of the ideology—that of action or revolution—because of his 
perception of the limited power of the Brothers, and his own cautious preference for 
preparation over execution.
132
The same tensions between the ideology and the organization, or theory and practice, can be 
observed in the internal rift caused by the Secret Apparatus. Here the political violence 
inherent in the ideology that for pragmatic reasons could not be expressed openly in action 
had to be subverted into an underground movement that was simultaneously part of the 
Society and autonomous. Eventually the contradictions between theory and practice created 
centrifugal forces that tore the Society apart and contributed to its downfall—the mass 
movement could not contain the explosive utopian impulses of the ideology. The tensions 
between the radical, utopian aspirations inherent in the structure of the Islamist ideology 
could not ultimately be contained by al-Banna’s pragmatic conservatism. Neither the 
members of the organization, nor the ideology of the Society, were infinitely flexible as 
demonstrated by the radical breakaway group—the Society of Our Master Mohammed’s 
Youth. In this case the ambitions and frustrations of a section of members could not be 
placated within the scope of the ideology, nor could the movement be stretched to 
accommodate the Brothers’ concerns and so a fundamental break had to occur.
The post-revolution period saw the movement crossing the threshold of legality to illegality 
and the corresponding shift from a modus operandi of principally legal, non-violent methods 
to illegal violent ones. The loss of an authoritative centralized core that could exert a measure 
of control over the actions of the members meant that the more wild impulses—that had 
always been present—could now be expressed. From the Society’s inception in 1928 to 1954 
the spectre of repression and dismantlement of the organization meant that there was always 
the possibility of suffering a great loss, and this restrained their scope of action. Once the 
Society had been destroyed as an organization the potential for destruction had been removed 
and so the disincentive against violent actions was removed.
Nasser’s suppression of the Brothers also resulted in their physical removal from society and 
their concentration in prison camps.2 The distillation of the most dangerous, committed and 
idealistic Brothers had the opposite effect intended by Nasser. These men coalesced into a 
myriad of small, self-contained groups that, in the harsh isolation of prison, were both 
physically and psychologically removed from the complexities of Egyptian society and 
politics.3 A further effect of removal was the diminishing of the feeling of connectedness 
with the outside world; the political prisoners felt they had no stake in society. Removed from
2 Gilles Kepel Jihad: The Trail o f Political Islam p.63
3 John Voll "Foreword” in Richard Mitchell The Society o f the Muslim Brothers x
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the messy complexity of society it was easy for the most committed Brothers to re- 
conceptualize society in black and white, to bifurcate the world into the true believers and the 
kafir (apostates) or, as we shall see, into a true understanding of Islam and jahiliyya.4 The 
tether of the organization that had restricted the development of the ideology was cut free: it 
was now free to evolve in any direction its intellectuals would care to take it. The pragmatism 
that had restrained al-Banna’s construction of the Islamist ideology had no traction here. 
Instead an idealistic, transcendental, revolutionary and utopian philosophy had a receptive 
audience and it was the writings of a fellow prisoner, Sayyid Qutb that quenched this thirst.
3.1.2 Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966)
Sayyid Qutb’s upbringing shared some similarities with Hasan al-Banna. Brought up in 
Mushsa, a small village 200 miles south of Cairo, he experienced the same shift from the 
traditional elementary Qur’anic school, where he learnt the Qur’an by heart, to a secular, 
modem school. He was struck by the contrast in the educational system between tradition and 
backwardness of the Egyptian religious madrassas with the modernity of forward-thinking 
Westem-oriented secular schools and the constant tension between the two camps. His family 
were prominent in the village and so Qutb, as the only surviving son, received an effectively 
private education. Thus by the time that he left for Cairo, Qutb was a highly literate teenager, 
and having experienced the 1919 Wafdist revolution, he was also conscious of Egyptian 
nationalist politics.
After moving to Cairo in the early 1920s he faced the same tensions but in an unfamiliar 
urban setting. ‘Qutb,’ comments one biographer, ‘was the product of two worlds, traditional 
and modem, which eventually merged into one unstable world with two conflicting 
worldviews.’5 Here he enrolled in a teacher training school before transferring to college and 
finally graduating with a BA in education in 1933. During this period Qutb began writing 
poetry and essays, some of which were published in Cairo’s literary journals, and started to 
mix in Cairo’s literary circles. After graduation he worked for the Ministry of Public 
Instruction drafting articles on educational reform. His main preoccupation during the next 
few years was his deepening involvement with Cairo’s literati and he led a life as ‘a man of
4 Gilles Kepel Jihad: The Trail o f Political Islam pp.207-208
5 Adnan Musallam From Secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundations o f Radical Islamism p.28
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letters, a social critic, and a journalist.’6 He also joined the Wafd and became a committed 
activist which informed his essentially secular, liberal-nationalist political outlook.
In the early period of his writing Qutb rebelled against the established Cairo school of poetry, 
escaping outside the confines of traditional Arabic literature to acquaint himself with not only 
Western literature but with the entire gamut of modern knowledge: ‘psychology, 
psychoanalysis,... biology, Darwinism, chemistry, Einstein..., the structure of the universe ... 
as well as modern scientific and philosophical theories.’7 Qutb attempted to transform 
himself into a polymath and increasingly became aware of the tension between the rich but 
ossified heritage of the East and the dynamic but hollow modernism of the West. Although 
Qutb was clearly fascinated with the idea of modernity and the West during this period it was 
not an unambiguous relationship but one of ‘morbid fascination,’ reflected in the restless, 
gloomy introspection of his poetry.8 Eventually the internalized, self-doubting, depressed 
poetry gave way to a growing political awareness and his output switched from poetry to 
literary criticism that also marked a shift from abstract matters of the heart towards topics of 
social justice and nationalist politics. This coincided with the Palestine-Arab revolt from 
1936 to 1939 and the political turbulence in the build-up to the Second World War where 
resentment in the failure of the nationalist Wafdist project to achieve full independence 
resulted in widespread social discontent, publically expressed anti-Westernism and a 
dramatic rise in the popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood.
As Qutb reorientated his writings around these themes he also began to rediscover the Qur’an 
of his childhood. At first he approached it from a literary perspective in an attempt to apply 
the tools of literary criticism to explicate the intricacies and beauty of the text. However, at 
the commencement of war in 1939 Qutb became entirely disillusioned with the liberal 
nationalist ideals that had informed his writings for the previous decade. In the social 
economic and political upheavals caused by the war in Egypt and the spectacle of destruction 
as the various secular ideologies of the West plunged the world into chaos Qutb began to 
forge an idea of social justice based on the principles of Islam. This project that Qutb would 
pursue to his execution in 1966 was influenced by the ideas of Mawdudi, al-Banna and the
6 Albert J. Bergesen The Sayyid Qutb Reader: Selected Writings on Politics, Religion, and Society p.3
7 Adnan Musallam From Secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundations o f Radical Islamism p. 3 6
8 Adnan Musallam From Secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundations o f Radical Islamism p.3 8
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Muslim Brothers with whom he had forged contacts but did not officially join until the early 
1950s.
Two formative events had a critical influence on Qutb’s ‘emergence as a stem moralist, [and] 
an anti-Western thinker.’9 The first was the nihilistic violence that he observed during the 
Second World War; the second, his state-sponsored trip to America. Qutb viewed the war as 
the climax of the inherent violence contained in Western materialism which he called ‘the 
tribulation of humanity.’10 More specifically he condemned Western suppression of Arab 
nationalist movements, citing in particular the history of French and British colonialism in 
Egypt and Western support for Zionism. Under the hypocritical mask of a civilizing power 
colonialism is nothing but ‘savage barbarism.’11 The war, thus viewed, was caused by 
mounting social, political, economic and moral crises created by the contradictions of 
materialism. These forces culminated in the unmasking of the West and resulted in an 
explosive orgy of violence as Western technologies and expertise in mass production were 
harnessed as instruments of mutual and total destruction.
3.1.3 Qutb in America
The second, more personal event was Qutb’s visit to America from 1948 to 1950. The 
Egyptian Ministry of Education sponsored him to observe and report back on the American 
educational system. Broadly speaking the Second World War and the history of colonialism 
informed Qutb’s ideas of the political violence inherent in Western materialism but it was his 
firsthand experiences during his stay in America from which he developed his views on the 
moral bankruptcy of the West. This period of Qutb’s life, and his reaction to sexual 
promiscuity, consumerism, alcohol consumption, the power of the mass media and capitalism 
has been widely discussed but it is worth noting one particularly interesting experience that 
affected his writings.12 After attending a church service the young male and female 
worshippers were led to an adjoining room where a mixed dance was held. Qutb found this 
mixing of religion, entertainment and sexual fraternising particularly vile by debasing
9 Adnan Musallam From Secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundations o f Radical Islamism p.73
10 Sayyid Qutb cited in Adnan Musallam From Secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundations of 
Radical Islamism p. 84
11 Sayyid Qutb cited in Adnan Musallam From Secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundations of 
Radical Islamism p.84
12 See Adnan Musallam From Secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundations o f Radical Islamism
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religion into a mere adjunct to ‘having a good time.’13 Qutb believed that everything corrupt 
and distasteful he found in America was all part of the same problem and was rooted in the 
secular materialist philosophy. In this way he collected together the vices of sexual openness 
and promiscuity, with popular culture, music and film, racism, and capitalism into a self- 
perpetuating, hedonistic and dystopic vision of modernity:
Humanity today is living in a large brothel! One has only to glance at its press, 
films, fashion shows, beauty contests, ballrooms, wine bars, and broadcasting 
stations! Or observe its mad lust for naked flesh, provocative postures, and sick, 
suggestive statements in literature, the arts and the mass media! And add to all 
this, the system of usury which fuels man’s voracity for money and engenders vile 
methods for its accumulation and investment, in addition to fraud, trickery, and 
blackmail dressed up in the garb of the law.14
Qutb believed that people in the West, under the influence of a hegemonic materialism, had 
become estranged from themselves—by living in contradiction with human nature; other 
humans—through moral and social decay; and God—through secularisation and neglect of 
religious practice. In a letter he wrote to Mawlana Mawdudi he complained ‘[hjere is 
alienation, the real alienation, the alienation of the spirit and the body, here in that huge 
workshop which they call the New World.’15 The alienation that Qutb diagnosed in modern 
Western societies is in part a reflection of Qutb’s own deeply felt personal experience of 
alienation as an Arab in mid-century America. In one revealing passage in Milestones Qutb 
expresses the loneliness, spiritual and moral aloofness of a ‘Believer’ in the midst of a 
materialist society:
The society may be drowned in lusts, steeped in low passions, rolling in filth and 
dirt, thinking that it has enjoyment and freedom from chains and restrictions. ...
The Believer from his height looks at the people drowning in dirt and mud. He 
may be the only one; yet he is not dejected nor grieved, nor does his heart desire 
that he take off his neat and immaculate garments and join the crowd.16
3.1.4 Return to Egypt
13 Sayyid Qutb cited in Adnan Musallam From Secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundations of 
Radical Islamism p. 116
14 Sayyid Qutb cited in Karen Armstrong The Battle For God: Fundamentalism in Judaism, Christianity and 
Islam p.240
15 Adnan Musallam From Secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundations o f Radical Islamism p.l 18
16 Sayyid Qutb Milestones pp. 145-146
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In 1949, during Qutb’s stay in America, Hasan al-Banna was assassinated in Egypt. Although 
he did not know al-Banna well Qutb was angered by the sense of glee that he detected in the 
reporting of his death in the American press. What had previously been disgust and contempt 
towards American culture was now also coloured by enmity. It seemed to him that the idea of 
a popular Islamist movement threatened the West which explained the barely veiled delight 
with which the news of the decapitation and suppression of the Brothers was greeted. Before 
leaving Qutb published a book, Social Justice in Islam that explicated his newly developing 
Islamist orientation. In the dedication he praised the ‘youngsters whom I see ... coming to 
restore this religion anew as it began fighting in the cause of Allah by killing and getting 
killed.’17 Although he later denied it, many Brothers back in Egypt assumed that he was 
implicitly referring to them; in any case the dedication opened the way for an emerging 
closeness between the Society and Qutb upon his return.
In the years following the Second World War the moment of calm in the wake of the violence 
subsided, replaced by the tense struggle for power between Western liberal democracies and 
the communist bloc. This new paradigm of international relations framed Qutb’s ideological 
response. In several papers and short books published between 1950 and 1952 Qutb argued 
that the Muslim world should not align itself with one bloc or the other for political or 
economic gain, nor follow a policy of neutral non-alignment, but instead should actively 
embrace Islam as a superior political system and ideology to the corrupt man-made systems 
of communism and capitalism. At this point there was an element of realpolitik in Qutb’s 
thinking; he identified the potential strength of a Muslim political bloc that he claimed would 
stretch from the Atlantic to the Pacific and encompass 300 million Muslims.
To make sense of the transformations in Qutb’s ideas we can roughly divide his intellectual 
life into three periods. The first was his career in the education ministry and his alternative 
existence as a literary critic. During this time Qutb had an essentially modem, secular and 
nationalist outlook and engaged in a literary rebellion against the conservative establishment. 
The second period saw his poetry output being replaced by essays on themes of social justice, 
during this time he also rediscovered the Qur’an, first as a literary text and later as the key to 
answering all the social, political and economic problems of the Muslim world. During this 
time he also developed a fiercely anti-Western attitude through his experience of Egypt in the
17 Sayyid Qutb cited in Adnan Musallam From Secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundations of 
Radical Islamism p. 122
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War and then from his personal observations on his stay in America.18 The third period, to 
which we now turn, saw Qutb witnessing the failure of pan-Islamism to materialise as a 
political reality and the restrained pragmatism of his writings of the early 1950s gave way to 
a radical utopianism.
3.1.5 Qutb and the Muslim Brotherhood
During the third period Qutb was drawn into the orbit of the Muslim Brothers (or, from an 
alternative perspective the Brotherhood was drawn towards Qutb). Initially Qutb began to 
have his articles published in the Society’s journals, and then later, after being impressed with 
the guerrilla campaign fought by the Brothers against the British in the Suez Canal crises, he 
joined as a member in 1951. Soon after the ideologies of Qutb and the Brothers began to 
align and Qutb became the ‘leading ideologue’ of the Society and the head of the 
‘Propagation of the Message Section’ in 1953.19
The fate of the Qutb and the Brothers from 1952 onwards was tied in with that of the Free 
Officers revolution of July that year. Both the Society and Qutb personally were close to the 
Free Officers and the Brothers regarded the coup as ‘our revolution.’20 After the coup the 
Revolutionary Control Council (RCC) rescinded the laws that proscribed the Brothers as an 
illegitimate organisation. The initial solidarity and gestures of political cooperation between 
the RCC and the Society however, descended into mutual antagonism as it emerged that the 
Brothers’ vision of a government based entirely run on the principles of Islam did not 
coincide with the RCC’s long-term nationalist vision for the country. As tension between the 
groups grew Qutb was forced to choose sides. In 1952, frustrated by his failure to secure 
promotion to Minister of Education he submitted his letter of resignation. The simmering 
hostility broke out into the open in 1954 during a student rally that turned violent resulting in 
clashes between the young student Brothers and pro-government supporters. The RCC seized 
on this incident as the pretext to designate the Society as a political party and declared it 
illegal under a revolutionary law.
18 Shahram Akbarzadeh and Fethi Mansouri “Contextualising Neo-Islamism” p.9
19 Adnan Musallam From Secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundations o f Radical Islamism pp. 130- 
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20 Adnan Musallam From Secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundations o f Radical Islamism p. 137
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In the meantime the power struggle climaxed between President Mohammed Naguib, who 
wished to return the country from a military dictatorship to a constitutional parliamentary 
system encompassing the Wafd and the Brothers, and Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, who 
wanted the armed forces to remain at the centre of power. Nasser eventually gained the upper 
hand ensuring that reconciliation between the state and the Brothers would be impossible. 
The final act arrived during a public address by Nasser held on October 26th, 1954. Captured 
and immortalised in a radio recording Nasser’s speech was interrupted by a volley of bullets 
in an assassination attempt by a Muslim Brotherhood secret apparatus cell. Moments after the 
shots were fired Nasser delivered an improvised rebuttal:
... I am Gamal ‘ Abd al-Nasser ... I redeem you with my blood. I shall live for you 
and die working for you. ... So let them kill me now. ... I have planted in this 
nation freedom, dignity and self-respect. For the sake of Egypt and for the sake of 
the freedom of Egypt I shall live; and I shall die for the sake of Egypt.21
The vitriolic rhetoric was swiftly followed by the crushing of the Society as a political 
organization. Al-Banna’s successor al-Hudaybi was imprisoned and several of the other 
leaders were found guilty of a leading a conspiracy for the overthrow of the RCC and were 
executed. Many other ordinary members were arrested and imprisoned including Qutb. He 
would spend the next ten years incarcerated and tortured in Egypt’s prisons. It is in this 
setting of persecution and isolation that Qutb produced his most radical texts.
3.2 Qutb’s Worldview
To grasp Qutb’s philosophy we need to examine how he understood the contemporary world 
and its history. In his writings Qutb described a novel worldview that interpreted history as a 
battle between jahiliyya and Islam. Clearly influenced by Marx’s historic materialism, Qutb 
describes history as a dialectic between the forces of ignorance—jahiliyya—and the 
immutable truth of Islam. Instead of the relations of production as the base that determines 
consciousness, social and political structures, and ideology, Qutb places truth and falsehood 
as the real foundation upon which the superstructure rests. Both Qutbian and Marxist 
ideology are teleological and utopian: Marx identified the communist means of production as 
the final economic base, upon which a classless, stateless and non-ideological society would
21 Gammal Abdel Nasser cited in Adnan Musallam From Secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundations 
of Radical Islamism p. 144
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be supported, whilst Qutb stated that only when Islam reigns supreme would a truly just 
society be created, one where there would be ‘no strife on earth and all submission be made 
to God alone.’22
3.2.1 Jahiliyya
The concept of jahiliyya is central to Qutb’s philosophy. Traditionally it pejoratively 
described the state of Arabian tribes prior to the revelation of Islam. During this period the 
tribes lived in a state of ignorance and so existed in a primitive state of quasi-anarchy and 
constant internecine war and blood feuds. Their ignorance was several fold: firstly, they did 
not recognise a singular God, instead worshiping a multitude of idols. Secondly, their 
ignorance of the monotheistic revealed truth meant that there was widespread moral 
ignorance most dramatically displayed in the practice of infanticide. Finally, there was 
political ignorance that resulted in never-ending warring between the tribes and an economic 
system that relied on the belligerent and reciprocal practice of raiding caravans. In short their 
ignorance of God led to ignorance of how to organize society which resulted in an unjust, 
immoral, chaotic and weak society marked by strife, war and human misery and suffering.23
Qutb mined the rich concept of jahiliyya to understand and critique the modem world. He 
was not merely using the term to label modem societies as ignorant, unjust and chaotic, but 
was pursuing a more fundamental line of critique. In his most famous work Milestones Qutb 
developed at length the argument that all societies—including Muslim ones—were 
essentially tyrannical at their heart. This was despite efforts made by political leaders to a 
lesser or greater extent to veil the tyranny with various ideological cloaks.24 Qutb claimed 
that the ubiquitous origin of all of tyranny is the exertion of control of one group of people 
over another, and in turn all forms of human authority are essentially tyrannical. Qutb 
identified these power relations running through all societies at every level, from within the 
family through to international relations. As all individuals and groups have their own desires 
that conflict, or are mutually exclusive with the interests of others, every exertion of power
22 Sayyid Qutb In The Shade o f the Qur’an
23 There are striking similarities between this mythological pre-Islamic state of jahiliyya and Hobbes’ pre­
political state of nature. In the Leviathan the state of nature is escaped by the creation of a social contract that 
cedes all legitimate violence to a political sovereign, in Qutb’s Islamist ideology jahiliyya is overcome through 
the recognition of the absolute sovereignty of God over all mankind. Only then will political, economic and 
social justice and stability prevail in the world.
24 Gilles Kepel Jihad: The Trail o f Political Islam pp.373-374
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will simultaneously involve a subjugation of at least one party. Following this principle Qutb 
grouped together the diverse ideologies of, amongst others, nationalism, communism, 
democracy, colonialism, theocracy, slavery, racism, fascism and capitalism as examples of 
the illegitimate exercise of power by man over man and thus tyrannical systems. As we 
discussed in the first chapter like many fervent ideologists Qutb condemned all other systems 
of thought as ideological whilst maintaining Islamism to be non-ideological. Only by 
stepping outside of the domain of humans and their partisan interests—by discarding 
ideology—can a society not based on force and free from suppression be achieved and this 
means returning all authority to God alone. Qutb expresses this argument eloquently:
Jahiliyya ... is deviation from the worship of One God and the way of life 
prescribed by God. ... [It] is evil and corrupt. ... Its roots are human desires ... 
which are used in the interests of some persons or some classes or some nations or 
some races, which interests prevail over the demand for justice, truth and 
goodness. But the pure law of God cuts through these roots and provides a system 
of laws which has no human interference, and is not influenced by human 
ignorance or human desire or for the interests of a particular group of people.25
Qutb shared the same Gramscian view as al-Banna that the forces of Westernization and 
imperialism worked most effectively and insidiously when their values and norms were 
internalized by the host society at the political, communal and individual level. By acting 
from within the foreign values and ideologies are first mixed with the indigenous, authentic 
culture and political practice. They are then subsumed by local traditions before finally being 
autonomously replicated and reproduced by the host society. Eventually the foreign 
Weltanschauung is entirely normalized and passively accepted as the only way of organizing 
society. Both al-Banna and Qutb saw this process as an unfolding tragedy that strangled the 
Arab and Muslim world—one that could only be reversed by an Islamic revival. Al-Banna 
called the process domestic or internal imperialism, whilst Qutb labelled it jahiliyya.
The different words are not mere semantics but demonstrate the diverging philosophies of the 
two thinkers. Whilst al-Banna was ambivalent to the issue of wholesale political reform and 
organization, merely stating the need for the government to rule in accordance with the 
principles of Islam, Qutb went much further. Instead of pursuing a ‘compatibility’ model he 
argued that the roots of jahiliyya were deeply entrenched in society at all levels, and that
25 Sayyid Qutb Milestones pp. 129-132
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jahiliyya and Islam were absolutely and irreconcilably opposed. Qutb was also much more 
explicit in attacking Islamic institutions and traditions than his predecessor. Although al- 
Banna was critical of al-Azhar, accusing it of passively accepting imperialism, he did not 
launch a wholesale attack on Islamic traditions. This was at least in part due to his sensitivity 
of the beliefs and practices of his followers and potential constituents, as well as his own 
deeply held Sufi beliefs. In contrast to al-Banna’s conservatism Qutb had no such restrictions 
and therefore in his most radical writings was able to openly criticise the accumulated 
traditions of Islamic history, accusing them of being terminally infected with franji (foreign) 
ideas and therefore constituted jahiliyya: ‘Our whole environment, peoples’ beliefs and ideas, 
habits and art, rules and laws—is jahiliyya, even to the extent that what we consider to be 
Islamic culture, Islamic sources, Islamic philosophy, and Islamic thought are also constructs 
ofjahiliyya,’26
Qutb used the category of jahiliyya to describe individual’s cognitive state as well as social 
organization. A jahili psychological state is one that is infected by a commingling of man- 
made concepts with Islamic ones which Qutb refers to as ‘pollution.’ The first stage towards 
an Islamic revolution, as dictated in Milestones, is to expunge these foreign concepts from 
one’s mind, to ‘change ourselves so that we may later change the society.’27 Again there is 
subtle shift from al-Banna’s ideology to that of Qutb. Whilst al-Banna talked of resolving the 
dualisms of modernity and tradition into the single category of Islam, Qutb’s rhetoric aims at 
obliterating all jahili ideas and practices. The pragmatic concerns of al-Banna as the head of a 
real organization meant that some form of political compromise in the Brotherhood’s 
ideology was necessary to keep it on the right side of legality. Facing no such restraints 
whilst writing in prison Qutb advocated nothing less than a total transformation. ‘Our 
foremost objective,’ Qutb states in a typically vitriolic passage, ‘is to change ... the jahili 
system at its very roots—this system which is fundamentally at variance with Islam and 
which, with the help of force and oppression is keeping us from living the sort of life which is 
demanded by our Creator.’
3.2.3 Dialectical account of Judaism, Christianity and Islam
26 Sayyid Qutb Milestones p.20
27 Sayyid Qutb Milestones p.21
28 Sayyid Qutb Milestones p.21
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A significant part of Qutb’s thinking is his dialectical and teleological account of Islam. By 
examining this frequently neglected part of Qutb’s philosophy we will be better placed to 
understand why he thought a fundamental clash between Islam and the West was both 
inevitable and necessary; and also why Qutb steered the Islamist ideology towards a 
transcendent and utopian mode of thinking. This represented an important departure from al- 
Banna who held a static historical view of an Islam that had become ossified in the face of 
Western colonialism. The thesis that Qutb eventually draws from his dialectical account is 
one of Islam and jahiliyya embraced in an existential struggle. Although Qutb does not 
explicitly say so this provided an intellectual and moral justification for the terrorism the 
Islamist movement would later employ.
Qutb subscribed to a crude dialectical understanding of the origins and teleology of Islam. In 
his essay Religion and society in Christianity and Islam Qutb presents Judaism as a religion 
of Law and codes. Judaism however was corrupted by the Jewish claims to their privileged 
relationship with God as ‘the chosen people,’ and by turning the religion into ‘a system of 
rigid and lifeless ritual, an empty and unspiritual sham.’29 The Prophet Jesus arrived as a 
corrective to the staid, excessive legalism of Judaism to ‘preach spiritual purity, mercy, 
kindness, tolerance ... and to moderate certain restrictions imposed on the Children of 
Israel.’30 Judaism, which Qutb accused of only being concerned with the outer motions of 
religiosity, the ‘external acts’ of faith, was balanced by the Christian concern for the 
believer’s inner-disposition, their moral sensitivity, aestheticism and spirituality. However as 
early Christianity developed in the political incubation of the Roman Empire it had no need, 
or ability, to extend its influence on wider society or the state and so it focussed exclusively 
on personal ‘moral and spiritual purification.’31 Eventually this turned Christianity into an 
otherworldly religion concerned only with the personal relationship between the individual 
and his God; the salvation of souls in the afterlife, but not society in this world. The political 
governance of society was left to worldly profane powers—embodied in the State—whilst 
Christians absolved themselves of any ills that afflicted others. The rigid exclusivist legalism 
of Judaism, the thesis, had thus been excessively corrected by the antithesis: the inwardly- 
oriented otherworldliness and excessive spirituality of Christianity.
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In the distinction that early Christians made between personal religious devotion and profane 
everyday life Qutb discerned the roots of modem secularism and communism. When 
Christianity spread to Europe with the Roman Empire and encountered barbarian societies the 
new adherents would retreat to the sanctified interior of the Church to confess their sins and 
seek spiritual purity and then return to the profane world to continue their life according to 
local law, customs or the sword. The bifurcation of an inner spiritual world and an outer 
mundane existence was symbolically replicated by the inner, peaceful sanctuary of Church 
where refuge could be sought from the outer, violent world of man. ‘Hence,’ Qutb claimed, 
‘arose that division between religion and the world in the life of Europe.... Religion there has 
remained in isolation from the business and customs of life from the day of its entry to the 
present day.’32
Contradicting the separation of domains of power, however, was the institution of the Church 
that like all manmade, jahili creations eventually sought to exert its influence, control and 
suppress others for its gain. Churchmen soon discovered that they could increase their earthly 
power and exploit their monopoly over the spiritual realm by acting as exclusive 
intermediaries between God and man. Due to the disparity in literacy between the class of 
priests and peasants, and their exclusive right to conduct ritual, they exerted absolute control 
over the word of God. In doing so they perverted it keeping the populace in awe of their 
power by threatening the eternal damnation of hell, or promising justice in the afterlife in 
compensation for the injustice of the world. Thus their power increased until they rivalled 
that of the worldly monarchs. Eventually both parties realised that the earthly and spiritual 
powers shared a material and political interest in keeping the masses subdued in order to 
maintain the status quo and so alliances were forged between the two powerful groups. 
Caught between ‘temporal... tyrants and religious despots’ the violent secularism of Europe 
meant that people were controlled by the two powers, earthly and divine, threatening 
punishment in this life and the next, over the body and soul of men.33 A reaction against this 
tension was inevitable and so the Marxist account of religion gained traction, and this, 
according to Qutb, explains communism’s state atheism.34
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Resolving the dialectic of excessive codification and legalisation of Judaism and the spiritual, 
other-worldliness of Christianity, is the third and final iteration of God’s revelation to man— 
the synthesis—Islam. Bom into a power vacuum, Islam did not have to bow to the political 
might of empire, or withdraw from the world into aesthetic purity. It concerned itself both 
with inner spirituality and the practical life of the individual, society and governance. 
Combining elements of Mosaic Law with the Christian ideals of love, forgiveness and 
spirituality, Islam, at least in its first expression on earth, did not neglect any area of life, nor 
promote one aspect at the expense of others. Unlike Judaism it did not lay claim to a ‘chosen 
people’ but was given to all o f mankind, and the nascent Muslim community fully understood 
their task to spread the message of the final, complete and comprehensive religion to all of 
humanity. Qutb powerfully proclaims:
So Islam chose to unite earth and heaven in a single system, present both in the 
heart of the individual and the actuality of society, recognizing no separation of 
practical exertion from religious impulse. Essentially Islam never infringes that 
unity....
... The center of its being and the field of its action is human life in its entirety, 
spiritual and material, religious and worldly. Such a religion cannot continue to 
exist in isolation from society, nor can its adherents be true Muslims unless they 
practice their faith in their social, legal, and economic relationships. And a society 
cannot be Islamic if it expels the civil and religious laws of Islam from its codes 
and customs, so that nothing of Islam is left except rites and ceremonials.35
The core purpose of Islam, according to this view, is to heal the ‘hideous schizophrenia’ of 
secular modem life that tears states, societies, families and individuals apart by spawning a 
multitude of irreconcilable and contradictory dualisms.
3.2.4 Islam
The foil to the Hobbesian chaos of jahiliyya is Islam. Islam is not merely the opposite of 
jahiliyya—Islamic truth to jahili falsehood, order to chaos, peace to war, happiness to misery, 
justice to injustice—but also represents the only possible and permanent solution to the state 
of jahiliyya.36 Following in the footsteps of al-Banna, Qutb identified God’s singularity
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{tawhid) and His absolute sovereignty (<al-hakimiya) as the fundamental core of Islam.37 
Unlike his predecessor Qutb followed these principles to their logical and radical conclusion. 
Al-Banna accepted forms of human authority so long as they did not contradict Islam. By 
contrast Qutb took the principle of God’s absolute authority to mean that no form of man- 
made control or authority was legitimate. Any exertion of power of man over man is a 
usurpation of God’s sovereignty and elevates man to the position of God, thus adding 
partners to God and betraying the monotheistic principle.
Throughout Milestones, which may be aptly described as the Islamist manifesto, the idea of 
Islam is described as a ‘revolutionary concept and a way of life, which seeks to change the 
prevalent social order and remould it according to its own vision.’38 Qutb in his most radical 
and utopian mode is far less concerned with outlining the shape of the post -jahili world. He 
concentrates on a negative form of critique of the West, Communism and modernity in 
general, and announces a call to action. ‘The word ‘Muslim” he claims, ‘becomes the name 
of an international revolutionary party that Islam seeks to form in order to put its 
revolutionary programme into effect. Jihad signifies that revolutionary struggle involving the 
utmost use of resources that the Islamic party mobilizes in the service of its cause.’39 When 
he comes to providing a positive account of what would come after the revolution he resorts 
to the abstract and utopian language of justice, peace, harmony, and unity.
3.2.5 Islam versus Jahiliyya
For Qutb exactly what the concrete realisation of Islam would look like is either unimportant 
or will be easily discovered once jahili institutions and ideas have been destroyed. In any case 
what is of crucial importance is that historically the forces of Islam and jahiliyya are 
implacably opposed and are in a state of permanent war. There are two distinct points that 
Qutb makes clear about the relationship between Islam and jahiliyya. The first is that they are 
entirely different and that Islam is truthful and good, whilst jahiliyya is falsehood and evil. 
Qutb writes ‘it was practically demonstrated that it was impossible to achieve coexistence 
between two diametrically opposed ways of life with such deep-rooted and fundamental 
differences that affect every detail of concepts, beliefs, moral values, social behaviour, as
37 Gilles Kepel Jihad: The Trail o f Political Islam p.372
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well as social, economic and political structures.’40 The essential difference that creates this 
opposition is that one system is based on submission ‘to other human beings and false deities’ 
and the other is ‘based entirely on submission of all mankind to God alone.’41 Qutb’s second 
point is that as a result of these critical differences there arises an implacable mutual hostility 
between the two systems that manifests itself ‘at every step and in every aspect of life.’42 
Neither system can tolerate the existence of the other and, although the conflict takes on 
different forms according to different historical circumstances and temporary truces, the 
battle will not cease until one side eliminates the other.
Although obscured behind a multitude of other temporary and superficial conflicts and 
alliances the existential battle between Islam and jahili forces is the real and permanent 
driving force behind the history of mankind. Qutb illustrates this grand narrative by pointing 
to several historical periods of open hostility between Islam and jahiliyya where the masks of 
economic, political and racial interests have been removed to reveal the genuine root of 
conflict. In Milestones and In the Shade o f the Quran Qutb focuses on three periods where 
jahili forces have attempted to suppress or even destroy Islam, but he also makes it clear that 
a more detailed reading of history will reveal that many other world events have been driven 
by this fundamental clash.
The first period that Qutb discusses is the formation of the nascent Muslim community and 
the persecution that Mohammed and his followers faced first from Arabian tribes in Mecca 
and then the duplicity and treachery of the Jews in Medina. In both cases the jahili system 
sensed a threat to its political and economic power base from the weak power of Islam and 
attempted to extinguish it at source. The second period he identified was the Christian 
crusades against the holy land. For Qutb and many other Islamists the Crusades are a 
paradigm for Western and Christian religious oppression of the East and a framework for 
understanding modern international relations43 Qutb specifically dismisses revisionist 
accounts of the Crusades that identify internal political problems in Europe as their 
motivating cause. He insists that they remain a clear example of jahiliyya attempting to 
violently destroy Islam through the use of organized military forces. The final era is the one
40 Sayyid Qutb In The Shade o f the Qur'an
41 Sayyid Qutb In The Shade o f the Qur’an
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of European colonialism and imperialism in the East that Qutb recreates in his dualistic cast 
of jahiliyya suppressing Islam albeit hidden behind the masks of economic, political and 
cultural hegemony.
3.2.6 Jihad
One crucial element of Qutb’s historical narrative is that although he concentrates on the 
periods where jahiliyya has attempted to suppress Islam he emphatically denies that the clash 
is a one-way conflict. Islam, claims Qutb, especially in its formative period expanded rapidly 
through both da *wa and jihad, making inroads against the domain of jahiliyya. As we have 
already seen Qutb argues that the domain of Islam is the entire planet and its constituents all 
of humanity and therefore it is incumbent on true Muslims to spread Islam until the forces of 
jahiliyya have been entirely defeated. Qutb insists that Islam is not merely a religion—a 
matter of individual personal belief or faith—as understood by the secular West but is a 
living principle and a ‘way of life.’44 Religion which is merely a matter of personal belief 
cannot be spread by force as violence cannot alter conscience. The secular critique of 
religious warfare does not, therefore, apply to Islam, because applying the secularist concept 
of religion to Islam is a category error. As Islam is not simply, or even principally, a matter of 
belief but is in fact a system whereby all sovereignty is returned to God, it is not a 
contradiction for the system to be forcibly spread. ‘In an Islamic system,’ Qutb states ‘it is 
possible that different groups live under it even though they may choose not to adopt Islamic 
beliefs. They will, however, abide by its laws based on the central principle of submission to 
God alone.’45
It is from this basis that Qutb argues against liberal or modernist Muslims who claim that 
jihad should be understood as defensive warfare. Qutb pejoratively labels Muslim scholars as 
‘defeatists’ and ‘apologists’ who have meekly succumbed to Western ‘orientalist’ 
propaganda.46 The ‘orientalists’ cynically castigate ‘Islam as a violent movement which 
imposed its belief upon people by the sword,’ and in a negative reaction Muslim scholars 
respond by claiming that Islam is a religion of peace and that jihad must be understood as
44 Sayyid Qutb In The Shade o f the Qur’an
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defensive warfare.47 In this way the secularists succeed in imposing the secular concept of 
religion onto Muslims, not through the use of force, but by outmanoeuvring Muslims scholars 
into negatively internalizing and then disseminating jahili ideas to the wider Muslim 
community. The victory is complete as the Muslim researchers believe that they have 
correctly understood Islam for themselves and so their claims assume an aura of authenticity. 
‘These research scholars, with their defeated mentality, have adopted the Western concept of 
‘religion,’ which is merely a name for ‘belief in the heart, having no relation to the practical 
affairs of life, and therefore they conceive of religious war as a war to impose belief on 
peoples’ hearts.’48
The fundamental error made by moderate Muslim authorities and scholars was to relativise 
Islam in the secular mould as simply one religion amongst many that should co-exist with 
other systems of belief under a religiously neutral state. Qutb, like al-Banna, entirely rejects 
this proposition but goes much further than his predecessor who had cautiously advocated a 
limited use of force or jihad  to achieve the establishment of an Islamic state in Egypt and 
other Muslim countries. By contrast Qutb advocates worldwide da’wa and jihad regardless of 
national boundaries, which he considers illegitimate, until all sovereignty is returned to God 
and all jahili institutions have been eradicated. Employing a tenuous logic Qutb claims that 
people would not be forced to accept Islam but merely live in a system where they would be 
free to choose their faith. Qutb uses the concept of ‘freedom’ here to mean the radical 
equality of individuals under God’s absolute sovereignty. Only once this has been achieved 
will people be truly free from the servitude of others to choose or reject Islam.49
3.2.7 After the Islamic Revolution
Qutb claims it is in the interest of jahiliyya to obscure the battle between it and Islam. If the 
real conflict remains hidden then mankind will remain in a state of chaos, confusion and 
ignorance. Thus jahili intellectuals, politicians and the media (including Muslims) will 
attempt to demonstrate that Islam is not in fact in competition with the Western ideologies of 
secularism or liberal democracies, and that ‘moderate’ Islam—a phrase Qutb detests—is 
compatible with these institutions. Correctly understood Islam is a state when no power is
47 Sayyid Qutb Milestones p.76
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exerted by man and God is made the sole sovereign of the earth. Islam, in stark contrast with 
the secular jahili tradition, is understood as being much more than a mere religion. Qutb 
insists that Islam must announce itself as pure system, unabashed and unashamed of its 
fundamental differences from jahiliyya. It should not ‘rationalize’ its principles to appease 
jahili society by presenting itself as ‘Islamic democracy’ or ‘Islamic socialism;’ nor should it 
pretend that only small changes need to be made to the prevailing ‘economic or political or 
legal systems.’50
3.2.8 Muslim Nation
Rhetorically Qutb is more comfortable with the language of revolution than pragmatic 
politics. One of Qutb’s principal dilemmas when discussing the post-revolutionary world is 
his explicit commitment to rejecting all jahili concepts, especially the political ones. The self- 
imposed conceptual restrictions have a concomitant effect on the available language. This 
tension is betrayed in an examination of the concept of a ‘nation.’ Qutb contrasts the jahili 
concept of a nation with the potential Muslim concept. He defines the former as being a 
‘homogenous group of people which assumes distinction from other groups on account of its 
shared belief in some foundational values.’51 From within an Islamic paradigm, the 
corresponding concept is defined as a community that makes the Islamic ‘faith the sole basis 
for the relationship between the individuals of [the] group.’52 Carefully avoiding endorsing 
the language of nationalism Qutb describes ‘this great Islamic society ... [where] peoples of 
all nations and all races ... were united, and with mutual cooperation, harmony and unity they 
took part in the construction of the Islamic community and Islamic culture. This marvellous 
civilization was not an ‘Arabic civilization’, even for a single day; it was purely an ‘Islamic 
civilization’. It was never a ‘nationality’ but always a ‘community of belief.’53
Qutb’s re-imagination of the idea of a ‘nation’ serves a purpose beyond the rousing rhetoric. 
By removing the borders that traditionally define a nation—delineating one group of people 
from another—Qutb’s Muslim nation, or umma, potentially encompasses the entire world.54 
Qutb then claims that the traditional nation can utilize collective violence against another
50 Sayyid Qutb Milestones p. 134
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nation on two counts: in legitimate self-defence against foreign belligerence; and illegitimate 
aggression for some form of material gain in advancement of its particular interests. The 
Muslim umma when correctly conceived as a community of belief with no racial, linguistic or 
geographical boundaries must engage in legitimate collective defensive warfare when under 
attack.55 However, in contrast with the jahili nation it possesses no partisan interests and its 
potential constituents are limitless, therefore it may legitimately engage in offensive warfare, 
not for material advantage, but to bring potential members into its folds.56 The umma would 
not subjugate the conquered populace but merely free them from the political, material and 
conceptual restraints that had previously prevented them from making an entirely free choice 
to follow Islam.
Beyond the radical and utopian polemic imagining in detail what a world would look like 
where no forms of human power are exerted is an evidently difficult and paradoxical task and 
thus one that Qutb carefully avoided. The distinct lack of a thick description of what an 
Islamic state and society would look like or what form its political and economic system 
would take is addressed by Qutb in Milestones in two ways. Firstly, Qutb often refers back to 
the early period of the four rightly guided caliphs as an archetypal golden period where all 
aspects of private, social and political life were governed easily by the single standard of 
Islam. During this period it would only take ‘a few words from the lips of the Prophet’ for 
illegitimate practices such as drinking or gambling to be abolished.57 As people would be 
living in harmony with Islam there would be no resistance to social reform. Qutb contrasts 
this to modem secular governments who ‘have to rely on legislation, administrative 
institutions, police and military power, propaganda and the press, and yet they can at most 
control what is done publicly, and society remains full of illegal and forbidden things.’58
Secondly, when discussing the content of the shar ’ia and the codes that would govern a true 
Islamic society he makes the argument that at no point in history have a people settled upon 
norms, laws and systems prior to forming a nation, but that these are formed and moulded 
symbiotically with the development of the society. Similarly, Milestones anticipates the 
internalizing of the true meaning of Islam by individuals, who would then, having rejected
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and destroyed jahili ideas and institutions, would create an Islamic society that would 
gradually create the institutions in sole accordance with the principles of Islam—an idea 
closely related to the ‘spontaneous order’ imagined by some anarchistic philosophies.
Qutb claims that this would be unproblematic due to the perfection of Islam, which when 
understood correctly, is entirely in accordance with human nature and so would easily resolve 
the multitude of contradictions and defects of jahili society. Qutb conceived of Islam as ‘a 
revolutionary concept and way of life,’ all aspects of social life and collective activities, such 
as science and the arts will flourish under Islam and questions of social justice would be 
resolved.59 Clearly, Qutb rejects a narrow conception of shar’ia as mere legislation or 
religious law with the limited jurisdiction of personal and familial conduct; a view he 
attributes to Muslim apologists under the influence of a Western secularist ideology. Qutb 
writes ‘by ‘the shari’ah of God’ is meant everything legislated by God for ordering man’s 
life; it includes the principles of belief, principles of administration and justice, principles of 
morality and human relationships, and principles of knowledge.’60 Finally all macro-level 
problems such as resource distribution, political competition and warfare would dissipate in 
an entirely Islamic world. Displaying his most utopian leanings and paraphrasing the Qur’an 
he asserts Islam’s ‘... ultimate aim being that there should be no strife on earth and all 
submission be made to God alone.’61
As vague as Qutb is about what the post-revolutionary world would look like he is even more 
evasive when describing how the revolution would be brought about. Although this 
vagueness fits in with the rest of Qutb’s abstract theory we can also assume that as the text of 
Milestones had to pass through the prison censors the author could not be too explicit about 
revolutionary tactics. The title ‘Milestones’ is sometimes translated as ‘Signposts’ and 
signifies that the text is to be used as manifesto and guide for Islamic revolutionaries. The 
Milestones are significant points for to help orientate the revolutionary vanguard on the road 
towards a revival of Islam and the deposal of jahili institutions and ideas. ‘It is necessary,’ 
writes Qutb in the introduction, ‘that this vanguard should know the landmarks and the 
milestones of the road toward this goal so that they may recognize the starting place, the
59 Sayyid Qutb In The Shade o f the Qur’an
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nature, the responsibilities and the ultimate purpose of this long journey.’62 The ‘vanguard’— 
which bears more than a passing resemblance to Leninism—is to be formed from a small 
group of people who have internalized the true meaning of Islam and its implacable 
opposition to jahiliyya, using Qutb’s theoretical writings as a guide.63 This group, in imitation 
of the Prophet Mohammed and the nascent Muslim community, would form a true 
community of Believers that spiritually and physically withdraw and isolate themselves from 
the jahili society.64
From this initial point Qutb enters into a more abstract mode of prescription, simply 
instructing that this group use ‘the methods of preaching and persuasion for reforming ideas 
and beliefs; and it uses physical power and Jihad for abolishing the organizations and 
authorities of the Jahili system,’ adding that ‘[tjhese two principles [of preaching and jihad] 
are equally important.’65 Qutb does not fill in the details of the tactics to be used by the 
vanguard nor delineate the legitimate acts of physical power nor describes its potential 
targets. Instead he insists that Islam is not ‘merely a theoretical, philosophical and passive’ 
system of belief but a ‘positive, practical and dynamic’ movement, that must utilize every 
‘appropriate means’ and ‘necessary methods’ to achieve its goal of ‘the universal... freedom 
of man on the earth from every authority except that of God.’66
Qutb clearly advocates both preaching and violence for the attainment of Islam’s goals, but 
importantly does not specify nor delimit the types of violence to be used. This is important as 
Qutb is often accused of providing the justification of terrorist violence for the advancement 
of his pan-Islamic ideals. Although he implicitly advocates violence, and does not 
specifically exclude the targeting of noncombatants, the targets that he does mention are the 
‘material obstacles’ o f ‘political powers.’67 This includes all governments and the institutions 
upon which their powers ultimately rest such as the armed forces and the police. Qutb also 
issues a general call for the destruction of all other jahili institutions which presumably 
includes legal and economic systems. We may therefore conclude that although Qutb does
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not specifically advocate violence directed against civilians, the scope of his offensive jihad 
would inevitably mean that noncombatants would be targeted.
3.2.9 The Evolution of the Islamist ideology from al-Banna to Qutb
There are three important distinct, but interlinked differences between Qutb and al-Banna’s 
proposed methods for achieving their Islamic objectives. Firstly, al-Banna created the first 
Islamist, grassroots, mass-movement that existed within the existing political system with the 
aim of creating an Islamic state from below. The momentum for the movement and the 
source of its power were to be based on a wave of populism that would eventually overwhelm 
the inertia of the state. Qutb by contrast, advocated the creation of an exclusivist vanguard 
movement that would deliberately withdraw from the irredeemably corrupt jahili society and 
work from without to effect an Islamic revolution. The distinction of working within (and 
sometimes with) the state, society and its laws, to existing without and against these 
institutions and structures is perhaps the most significant shift between the thinking of Qutb 
and his predecessor.
The second difference is that al-Banna sought to avoid or at least postpone the use of openly 
violent action in the attainment of the Brotherhood’s goals. This was not an entirely 
ideological decision as al-Banna created and supported the Secret Apparatus but he was 
clearly adverse to the chaos of revolution. However the main reason that al-Banna attempted 
to limit the potential violence of the Brotherhood was for the pragmatic rationale that the 
institutional structure of the organization would be destroyed by the more powerful Egyptian 
state if the Brothers committed themselves to an insurrection. Qutb did advocate an offensive 
jihad—including the use of force—alongside da’wa for the achievement of his utopian goals. 
However for several reasons Qutb’s attitude towards violence and the important details of the 
tactics to employ and the targets to be aimed at—are deeply ambiguous. We can attribute this 
at least in part to the prison censors and to the shortening of his life and thus his literary 
output, but we can also detect a hesitancy in Qutb to commit the Islamist movement to open 
violence—perhaps due to fear of failure, or even the horror of bloodshed—that resulted in the 
author staying within the theoretical, abstract and utopian mode of language despite his 
claims that Milestones, and more generally Islam, is a practical guide for action.68
68 Qutb writes at the beginning of Milestones that there would be further parts to be written.
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The third ideological shift from al-Banna to Qutb is their respective scope of action for their 
movements. The Muslim Brothers despite their internationalist rhetoric and token armed 
intervention in Palestine were based physically and ideologically in Egypt. This was not just 
a practical geographical constraint but an acknowledgement by al-Banna of the existence of 
the nation-state of Egypt as a legitimate actor on the international stage, and a tacit 
acceptance of its internal legal and political structures. Al-Banna’s brand of Islamism 
begrudgingly sits within a quasi-nationalist framework a fact reflected in his willingness to 
accept that one could simultaneously possess a Muslim and Egyptian identity and that loyalty 
to Islam was compatible with loyalty to the state. Although the Society of Muslim Brothers 
was exported to adjacent Arab countries they were autonomous organizations affiliated with 
the Egyptian Society but not subordinate to it. The idea of the global umma and the 
resurrection of the caliphate were certainly present in al-Banna’s thinking but did not occupy 
a central position.69 Qutb explicitly rejects this territorial position of multiple Islamist 
movements existing within the international system of nation-states.70 We can attribute this in 
part to the new bipolar international order that promoted the importance of ideologically- 
orientated superpower blocs above nation-states. Within this framework Qutb advocated the 
formation of an Islamic bloc that would be able to compete on the world stage and offer an 
ideological alternative to the moribund liberal-democratic and Communist political 
philosophies. However this realpolitik manoeuvre was supplanted in Qutb’s later radical and 
utopian thinking where he established the ideological principle that Islam is a system for all 
of humanity and the entire planet and thus should not be constrained within the manmade and 
illegitimate borders of the historical ‘Muslim’ nations.71
3.3 Abdessalam Faraj
The latent violence that had been suppressed by the Brothers and was given an ideological 
justification by Qutb had yet to be fully expressed by an Islamist group. It will be useful to 
briefly describe a movement that fulfils the archetypal characteristics of the rejectionist end 
of the ideological spectrum. Several movements sprang up in Egypt after Qutb’s execution 
who attempted to live out his ideals. They would normally be formed around a charismatic
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leader who would gather a small following by preaching to students on the university 
campuses or in the slums around the big cities. One of these groups, simply called ‘Jihad’ 
was created in the late 1970s by a young electrical engineer Abdessalam Faraj. Quoting 
extensively from Ibn Taymiyya, Faraj wrote a pamphlet titled Al Farida al Ghaiba (The 
Hidden Imperative or The Missing Obligation) the title referring to the forgotten duty of 
jihad. Faraj was particularly concerned with the failure of the ulema, who were supposed to 
be representatives of the Muslim community, to recognise their obligation to depose of the 
ruler who fails to implement the tenets of Islam.72 The impotence of the ulema, reasoned 
Faraj, utilizing the arguments of Ibn Taymiyya, meant that the obligation fell on ordinary 
Muslims.
In contemporary Egypt President Anwar Sadat was equated with the Mongol invaders in the 
13th century who adopted the outer garb of Islam but continued to rule according to their 
traditional Yassa code.73 Faraj called Sadat an ‘apostate of Islam fed at the tables of 
imperialism and Zionism.’74 The specific and unforgivable transgression that vexed Faraj, 
and many other Egyptians, was Sadat’s Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty signed in 1979. Shortly 
after the release of the pamphlet in 1981 Sadat was assassinated during a military parade by a 
Lieutenant Khalid Islambouli and three other soldiers. During his trial it was disclosed that 
Islambouli was a member of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, an Islamist movement with close ties to 
Faraj’s group.75 It seems that Faraj had expected a spontaneous uprising to occur after the 
toppling of the leader, but apart from a small insurrection in Asyut in Upper Egypt which was 
swiftly put down by the army, this failed to materialize.
Their political naivety points to a something more fundamental than a mere lack of 
judgement by the Faraj’s group. It shows that at the rejectionist end of the Islamist spectrum 
there was a deep unwillingness to engage with, and be sullied by, mundane jahili politics. 
This is further demonstrated by the critique that Faraj levelled at the Muslim Brotherhood in 
his pamphlet. He accused the Society of misunderstanding the fundamentally corrupt nature 
of the jahili state, and by attempting to gain power by engaging with the state they too had 
been irredeemably corrupted. Furthermore by working within the legal and political
72 Gilles Kepel Jihad: The Trail o f Political Islam p.86
73 Abdessalam Faraj The Absent Obligation p.23
74 Abdessalam Faraj cited in Gilles Kepel Jihad: The Trail o f Political Islam p.86
75 Jason Burke Al-Qaeda: The True Story o f Radical Islam p. 152
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structures of the state they inadvertently endowed the state with Islamic legitimacy; rather 
than undermining the system they strengthened it.76 The logic of withdrawal and rejection 
had led Jihad into a political cul-de-sac and demonstrated the gulf between the two polarities. 
Their refusal to engage in politics had spectacularly misfired. Not only did they fail to 
capitalise on the successful assassination of a head of state, but in the following months 
hundreds of Islamists were arrested and imprisoned—including Ayman al-Zawahiri, who 
would later become the head of Egyptian Islamic Jihad and a leader of al-Qaeda—and the 
cause of violent Islamist activity in Egypt disappeared for several years.77 The Muslim 
Brotherhood, for fear of once again being dragged into illegality, had to publically condemn 
and distance itself from the assassination and so the gap was further widened between the 
jihadists and the moderate Islamists.
3.4 Conclusions
From al-Banna and the Muslim Brothers to Qutb and the radical Islamists of the 1960s we 
can trace the evolutionary changes in the Islamist ideology away from legal, non-violent, 
social and political action from within the existing Egyptian system to illegal, violent action 
from without. The characteristics of the movement also evolved during this period. The 
Muslim Brotherhood, a grassroots mass-movement working openly within the implicitly 
accepted framework of the nation-state were supplanted by a more ephemeral movement 
consisting of a dedicated vanguard existing separately from society and outside political and 
legal systems, concealing their potentially violent activities. In theory these groups could 
operate anywhere in the world although in reality their geographical dispersion was 
constrained from the 1950s to the end of the 1970s to Egypt and occasionally the surrounding 
Arab states. We have identified the driving force behind these ideological developments as 
the growth in power of the Brotherhood and the subsequent repression by the state. As the 
movement was declared illegal and its members were persecuted and driven underground into 
Egyptian prisons the ideology simultaneously mutated into a more subversive form 
withdrawn from its social base.
This new ideology found its voice in Qutb’s prison writings and the fate of the author became 
a powerful metaphor and symbol for the subsequent Islamist movement. One of the most
76 Gilles Kepel Jihad: The Trail o f Political Islam pp.86-87
77 Walter Lacquer No End To War: Terrorism In The Twenty First Century p.37
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famous images of Qutb frames the intellectual in a smart suit directing an interrogative gaze 
away from the camera from behind prison bars. With his execution by the Egyptian state in 
1966 he was transformed from an intellectual into a martyr and would eventually be lauded 
as ‘the godfather ideologue of Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and al-Qaeda ... whose 
revolutionary writings have become a manifesto for Islamists and global jihadists 
everywhere.’78 As well as elevating the status of Qutb into an iconic figure and increasing the 
demand and dissemination of his writings his hanging also prematurely ended his output. Had 
he been able to continue writing then it might have been necessary for him to clarify his 
position on the use of violence in the Islamist movement. Whatever the case Nasser’s crude 
attempt to silence Qutb had the opposite effect and the cast of the globalised Islamist 
ideology was set.
Although we have identified the evolution of the Islamist ideology from al-Banna to Qutb it 
would be more accurate to describe a divergence between two polarised strands that had 
uneasily coexisted within the Muslim Brotherhood. The contradictions between the legal and 
peaceful method of capturing political power that al-Banna favoured, and the violent impulse 
that was embodied in the Secret Apparatus, were never resolved and eventually led to the 
Brotherhood’s downfall. The difference between these two strands amounted to more than 
just a disagreement over acceptable and efficient means; they also represent diverging views 
over what the goals of the Islamist movement ought to consist. Partisans of the first strand 
commonly labelled ‘reform,’ ‘liberal,’ or, usually, ‘moderate’ Islam, operate within the 
political system by adapting the core of the Islamist ideology to present it as broadly 
compatible with the existing legal and political structures. Their basic, reconciliatory premise 
is that Islam can potentially exist in harmony with secular political and legal institutions. 
They also emphasize the social justice, heritage and ethical values of Islam that they claim 
ought to take a central place in the life of the state, society and the individual. In practice this 
translates as a demand for a constitution that officially recognises Islam as the religion of the 
state and its people, and the implementation of some form of shar’ia so that at a minimum the 
secular legal code does not obviously contradict religious law. Due to their reconciliatory 
rhetoric towards the existing political order this strand of Islamism often found itself co-opted 
by the state in order to isolate or draw support away from the other polarity: the Islamists.
78 Adnan Musallam From Secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundations o f Radical Islamism pp. 171- 
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The second strand, which is commonly labelled ‘Islamist’ or ‘radical Islam’, exists at the 
other end of the spectrum. Here no concessions are made to the core ideological principle 
established by Mawdudi, al-Banna and Qutb, namely that God’s sovereignty is complete, 
absolute and supreme and so cannot be legitimately contravened by man. Any system that 
does not recognise God’s absolute sovereignty is labelled jahiliyya and there can be no 
comprise between this and Islam; there can be no hybrid system. It is this position that allows 
us to describe this strand of the Islamist ideology as ‘radical.’ The result of this ideological 
intransigence is that at the Islamist end of the spectrum there can be no rapprochement 
between the movement and the state. The group must exist outside of the political system, 
usually on the wrong side of legality and often employing violent tactics. If they do enter into 
the political process it will be on the platform of transforming or destroying the existing 
system once power has been achieved. As with the first strand of Islamism, and in common 
with other radical and utopian political philosophies, the Islamists are necessarily vague 
about what sort of system would be implemented after the revolution. This is partly due to the 
Islamist ideology defining itself in opposition to the existing order; thus once the old order is 
eliminated, the Islamists are faced with an existential identity crises. As we have seen with 
Qutb the ideology does not necessarily lead to any concrete positive political and social 
vision beyond the most abstract notions of a just society ordered according to Islamic 
principles under the absolute sovereignty of God. The further that groups pursue the logic of 
this end of the spectrum, the further they are cast adrift from the political and social reality of 
the world, eventually leading to the symbolic and transcendental violence of groups such as 
al-Qaeda.79
By reflecting on the specific changes in the Islamist ideology of this period we can make 
some observations about ideology in general. The Islamist ideology managed to adapt rapidly 
to the changing political, material and social circumstances. In common with other 
comprehensive ideologies the Islamist ideology possesses a core nucleus of fundamental 
ideas around which a number of other, tertiary but connected ideas rotate. The property of a 
permanent core gives the ideology a permanence and allows a disparate set of actual 
movements to be fundamentally linked by a shared truth. Conversely, the flexibility of the 
tertiary related ideas that are relatively replaceable or whose relative importance fluxes across 
time and circumstance allows the ideology and its movements to adapt and evolve to new
79 Mark Juergensmeyer Terror In The Mind o f God: The Global Rise o f Religious Violence p. 125
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political, social and material realities. The properties of a solid core and a fluid periphery 
accounts for the resilience of an ideology to simultaneously avoid becoming an anachronism 
in a changing world and also avoid alteration into something entirely unrecognisable to the 
original vision. This brings us back to one of our points in the first chapter: successful 
ideologies are not dogmatic, static and monolithic but heterogeneous, fluid and organic.
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4 The Globalization of the Islamist Ideology
4.1 Introduction
Why did 9/11 happen? This cannot be definitively answered but we can address the question 
of what 9/11 meant. Specifically what was its meaning from the perspective of its 
perpetrators and organizers and the wider Islamist movement? As we discussed in the first 
chapter a frequently neglected approach to answering this question is to engage in 
interpretive-understanding of the ideology that informed the Islamists’ worldview and 
actions. We have undertaken this task by critically examining the historical evolution of the 
ideology alongside the historical development of the Islamist movement and studied the 
interactions between these two streams. In this final chapter we shall closely examine the 
period from the death o f Qutb in 1966 to the attacks in 2001. We shall see how the radical- 
utopianism of Qutb was transformed into the globalized Islamist movement embodied in al- 
Qaeda. The process of transformation was not unproblematic and the tensions and 
contradictions that had been present from the beginning of the modem Islamist ideology 
continued to manifest themselves in the philosophy of late modem Islamists.
In the 1970s and 80s the diverging paths, observed in the previous chapter, of the moderates 
and the radicals were played out on the world stage. A second split on a separate axis also 
occurred during this period. After the assassination of Anwar Sadat a new fault line began to 
form between the radical Islamists who pursued their agenda at home, in an attempt to 
overthrow the state and seize domestic power, and those who pursued Qutb’s logic of the 
globalized umma and began to act and, crucially, see themselves as actors, on the global 
stage.1 The first group was largely stymied during the 1970s and 1980s as the regimes in 
Egypt and other Arab countries such as Syria and Libya became more authoritarian with the 
real centre of power residing with the military.2 Under these conditions the Islamist militants 
were subdued although were never completely eradicated. Successful terrorist attacks on 
Western tourists in Egypt in the 1980s and 1990s succeeded only in alienating these Islamists 
from large segments of the general population, many of whom depended on the tourist trade 
for their livelihood. They also prompted successive waves of government repressions
1 Rohan Gunaratna Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network o f Terror p. 15
2 Derek Hopwood Syria 1945-1986: Politics and Society p.54
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resulting in thousands of Islamists being incarcerated in Egyptian jails where many faced 
torture.3
The growing frustration and lack of direction at home meant that many Egyptian and Arab 
Islamists were drawn towards the second group that sought to pursue a Qutbian agenda 
abroad. Initially this movement focused on Palestine after the humiliating defeats in 1948 and 
1967 of Arab armies at the hands of Israel. However, the mantle of Palestinian resistance was 
grasped by secular nationalists, pan-Arabists and international left-wing organizations that 
did not allow room for the Islamists to engage in a Palestinian jihad. Finally, in 1979 an 
opening was created by the confluence of several global events that combined to create a 
conflict that could be easily understood within the narrative framework of the international 
Islamists. Their pent-up frustration was effectively channelled into this opening by regimes 
happy to see the back of militants that had troubled them for decades.4 The trajectory of the 
Islamists’ described and defined by al-Banna and Qutb can, in part, explain this latest 
evolution, but three world events provided the geopolitical conditions and the catalyst for the 
globalization of the Islamist ideology.5
4.1.1 The Three Global Events of 1979: Iranian Revolution
In terms of global politics and international media coverage the 1979 Iranian Revolution, and 
the subsequent hostage crises created by the occupation of the U.S. embassy, was the most 
significant event to take place that year. However its direct and lasting effect on the Islamist 
movement under study are less clear.6 The Western-backed and modernizing monarchy of 
Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was swept away by an alliance of the devout middle classes, 
the ulema, the bazaar merchants, the student movement, and the rural and urban poor. The 
secular constitution was replaced by a theocratic constitution, and with the creation of the 
position of the Supreme leader and the Council of Guardians the Islamic Republic of Iran was 
bom—a country that superficially resembled al-Banna’s vision of an Islamic state.
3 Giles Kepel “Islamists versus the State in Egypt and Algeria”
4 For different reasons the logic of the Cold War era also meant that die Americans were eager supporters of the 
anti-Soviet jihad.
5 A fourth event not discussed here was the 1979 peace treaty signed by Israel and Egypt.
6 The revolution and the Islamic Republic, its proximate causes and its immediate and long-term effects have 
been the subject of large swathes of scholarship but space restricts us from attempting an in-depth analysis in 
this work, however we shall permit ourselves a few brief remarks on its influence on the Sunni Islamist 
movement.
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From the start of the modem Islamist movement al-Banna had placed the idea of unity at the 
centre of the Islamist ideology and in theory this included international, intra-communal and 
cross-denominational unity. In practice however, even the radical utopianism of Qutb, with 
his entirely reconceived idea of the Islam and the umma, had failed to bridge the gap between 
the Sunni and Shi’ite denominations. State-sponsored attempts to export the Islamic 
revolution were for the most part restricted to the Persian Gulf states with large Shi’ite 
minorities and repressive monarchs. Thus despite the iconic symbolism of the first successful 
Islamic Revolution and the Islamists’ rhetoric of unity, the ideological influence on the Sunni 
Islamist movement was limited. As Walter Lacquer laconically remarks, ‘it was, alas, the 
wrong sort of Islam; the differences between Sunnis and Shi’ites were too deeply rooted in 
history to make close cooperation possible.’7 Although the ideological fallout may have been 
restricted the galvanising and stimulating effect on the Islamists must have been important 
especially since at this point the movement’s morale and momentum had reached a low ebb.
4.1.2 Occupation of Grand Mosque
The second 1979 event occurred on the 20th November (or more significantly, on the first day 
of the Islamic calendar’s fifteenth century) when several hundred militants belonging to a 
Wahhabi sect, and their followers including women and children, occupied the Great Mosque 
of Mecca during early morning prayers.8 The messianic sect was led by Juhaiman ibn Said al- 
Utaiba who claimed his brother-in-law as the Mahdi—a prophesised redeemer of Islam who 
would rid the world of injustice before the Day of Judgement. Of more importance than the 
beliefs of the sect was the challenge that the occupation raised to the legitimacy of the Saudi 
regime. The Saud family’s Islamic credentials had rested on their custodianship of the two 
holy places of Mecca and Medina and their ability to administer the hajj (pilgrimage). They 
had attempted, through their political control of the Muslim World League, and aggressive 
funding with petro-dollars of ultra-conservative Wahhabism throughout the Muslim world, to 
embody the very idea, and dominate the discourse, of orthodox Islam.9 The Saudi royal 
family had anticipated challenges to their authority to come from either secular Arab
7 Walter Lacquer No End To War: Terrorism In The Twenty First Century p.50
8 Jason Burke Al-Qaeda: The True Story o f Radical Islam p. 56
9 Gilles Kepel Jihad: The Trail o f Political Islam pp.61-62
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nationalism or Soviet-sponsored Marxism—or the latest threat of the Iranian revolution—but 
certainly not from native Sunni Islamists.
Although the occupation was put down by several thousand Saudi security personnel the fact 
that it took two weeks, and that Pakistani and non-Muslim, French anti-terrorist operatives 
were required, undermined the central pillar of Saudi Islamic credentials: their ability to keep 
the holy cities secure. Although the proximate effect of the insurrection was restricted—the 
violent hostage taking at the holiest site of Islam failed to gamer wider support—the long 
term effects were more profound. The undermining of their religious credentials by inviting 
non-Muslims to enter Mecca exposed the Saudi’s dependence on the West and their inability 
to protect the holy sites and by extension the global umma in general. This dependency would 
be replicated with an even more profound impact in the prelude to the first Gulf War and the 
positioning of around half a million U.S. troops on Saudi soil. It also exposed, in the 
Islamists’ mind, the fact that Saudi power rested on the sale of oil to the West and the 
reciprocal protection afforded by the West, a fact that the House of Saud tried to disguise 
with the aura of religious orthodoxy hypocritically paid for with petro-dollars.
4.1.3 Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan
The immediate outcome of the occupation of Mecca, in common with the Iranian revolution, 
was to provide a galvanising effect on the Islamist movement and to undermine Saudi 
legitimacy and by extension the Islamic credentials of all the other conservative regimes in 
the Middle East. The final event of 1979, however, provided a slower burning and more 
profound defining influence on the Islamist ideology, its organizational shape and modus 
operandi for the next two decades and into the 21st century. Of the three major events of 
1979, this would be the one that provided the conditions and the impetus for the Islamist 
movement to transcend its localised roots and transform itself from a restricted parochial 
endeavour to a globalized, potentially limitless one.
The timing of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan to prop up an ailing communist 
government was not without significance. A month after Islamist students stormed the U.S. 
embassy in Tehran on 4th November 1979, marking the start of a 444 day hostage crisis; the 
Soviets deployed the 40th Army Division into Kabul. They finally withdrew nine years later
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in 1989 just two years before the final collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The resistance to 
the client communist government and Soviet occupation was cast within an Islamic 
framework and primarily conducted by Afghan mujahedeen (freedom fighters). Their ranks 
were composed of mostly rural Afghans who followed a traditional Sufi Islam and who had 
been alienated by the communist’s regime of ‘radical agrarian reform, compulsory literacy, 
and the imposition of socialism, through thousands of arrests and summary executions.’10
From the beginning of the insurgency that had started in the previous year to the Soviet 
involvement a trickle of foreign Islamists arrived in Pakistan to aid the mujahedeen. Their 
jihad however was formed along very different lines to that of the Afghans. The grand 
narrative that inspired their involvement was one of an Islam under attack by the atheist 
communists, which in itself was a subplot of a much more fundamental story of Islam’s clash 
with the jahili world of unbelief. This was an extension of Qutb’s doctrine of the unending 
and existential battle of Islam versus jahiliyya; finally the world depicted in Milestones had 
come to pass in reality. Qutb’s binary narrative, was in the end however, too idealistic to 
capture this new world and so would need to be reformulated by the new generation of 
ideologists: Abdullah Azzam, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden.
The Islamists were not the only ones to view the USSR’s occupation within a grander 
narrative. The conflict was naturally interpreted within the Cold War paradigm and the 
response by the U.S. and their allies was determined by its logic. American support for the 
resistance invoked the Cold War zero-sum logic that stated that what was bad for the Soviets 
must therefore be beneficial for the U.S. The American strategists led by Zbigniew 
Brzezinski reasoned that trapping the Soviets in Afghanistan with a long war of attrition 
would sap their political and military strength. Brzezinski later claimed that the U.S. had 
acted proactively through the use of covert operations in Afghanistan earlier in the year, to 
tempt the Russians to intervene; Afghanistan was to be for the Soviets, what Vietnam had 
been for the U.S.11 It was in America’s interest, therefore to support an insurgency style of 
asymmetric warfare that, although not expected to defeat the Soviets, would at least be very 
resilient against eradication and thus would draw out the length and cost of the conflict. The 
two very different motives of the U.S. and the Islamists segued together to produce strange
10 Gilles Kepel Jihad: The Trail o f Political Islam p. 138
11 Noam Chomsky 9-11 p.82
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bedfellows and paradoxical alliances and, eventually, some unforeseen and unintended 
consequences.
A marriage of convenience would not have been possible however without an intermediary 
that could facilitate the cooperation of two ideological adversaries and this role was fulfilled 
by General Zia ul-Haq’s Pakistan and their intelligence agency, the Directorate for Inter- 
Services Intelligence (ISI).12 By channelling weaponry and finance through the ISI the 
American and Saudi source of the aid was sufficiently disguised to be accepted by the 
mujahedeen. However it also ensured that there was a massive leakage of weaponry from 
every shipment onto the black market and into the unaccountable hands of the international 
jihadists and various other criminal elements and tribal warlords in the region. Once the 
remainder had reached the intended Afghan recipients, the trucks were loaded with heroin 
and from Pakistan were distributed into the lucrative international drug trade. This mixture of 
an unfettered drug trade, influx of committed Islamists and flood of weapons and cash, 
combined with the harsh topography of the mountainous border area, resulted in creating one 
of the world’s most violent and lawless regions to the present day.13
The reaction of the Muslim states was more complex than that of the U.S. In general the 
bipolar world order meant that states that were beneficiaries of Soviet largesse, such as Syria 
and Algeria, would not protest against the occupation and meant that the Islamic states were 
unable to act as a coherent political bloc.14 Support, therefore, for the Afghan refugees and 
mujahedeen came primarily in the form of financial donations (charity or zakat) from 
conservative U.S. allies in the Middle East, principally Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, and 
from Muslim individuals around the world. For some, however a monetary contribution did 
not suffice; they wished to participate in the physical jihad against the atheist aggressors. The 
trickle of foreign, primarily Arab, Islamists into Afghanistan via Pakistan increased in the 
mid-1980s as it became clear that the Afghan resistance was long-lasting and resilient enough 
to provoke the Soviets into employing a scorched earth strategy and other repressive 
measures that had a deleterious impact on the civilian population. The narrative discourse of 
‘Islam under attack’ gained currency amongst many Muslims worldwide and thus provided a 
popular, theological, and geopolitical justification for a defensive jihad. This ultimately
12 Shaun Gregory “The ISI and the War on Terrorism”
13 Overseas Security Advisory Council “Pakistan Crime and Safety Report 2010: Peshawar”
14 Gilles Kepel Jihad: The Trail o f Political Islam pp.209-211
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resulted in the physical and ideological relocation of the Islamists from Egypt and the Middle 
East to Pakistan and Afghanistan.
4.2 Analysis of the Afghan Jihad on the Islamist Movement
To understand the modem history of the Islamist movement it is essential to examine in some 
detail the Afghan jihad. This campaign profoundly affected all aspects of the Islamist 
movement: its ideological structure, its organizational and operational form and the self- 
identify or worldview of its adherents. These are not, however, autonomous categories, but 
are intrinsically linked and interdependent on one another. For example, the organizational 
forms, its structures and hierarchies that the Islamist groups took on had a determining effect 
on the ideological shifts within the movement. The reverse was equally true; the new 
ideological forms that, for instance, emphasized a defensive, asymmetric jihad, and had a
formative influence on the shape of the new organizations. In this study we are principally
interested in the ideological evolution, but when useful we shall also refer to the changing 
modes of organisation and self-identification. One method of charting these changes is to 
examine to examine them as they occurred under the influence of the principal protagonists 
of the Afghan jihad: Abdullah Azzam and Ayman al-Zawahiri.15
4.2.1 Abdullah Azzam (1941-1989)
The logistics of harnessing non-state support was left to non-governmental organisations that 
were able to provide the bureaucratic networks necessary to recruit and channel money and 
enthusiastic volunteers keen for the opportunity to participate in what was presented as an 
unambiguously legitimate and urgent jihad}6 For these volunteers their port of entry into the 
conflict was Peshawar, near the border with Afghanistan and henceforth the hub of Islamist 
activities in the region. This was also the area where approximately three million Afghan 
refugees had settled into displacement camps after having fled the conflict.17 Just as the 
Muslim states were reluctant to become directly involved with the logistics of exporting 
volunteers to Pakistan so too were they unable and unwilling to directly organize them once 
they arrived. The massive Saudi financial commitment, however, meant that they needed
15 For the sake of style we shall discuss the third main protagonist Osama bin Laden later in the chapter.
16 Gilles Kepel Jihad: The Trail o f Political Islam p. 139
17 Gilles Kepel Jihad: The Trail o f Political Islam p. 137
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reliable agents on the ground to control its distribution to the Afghan mujahedeen. To this end 
they dispatched Arab volunteers, under the aegis of the Saudi Red Crescent and other 
humanitarian organizations, to the region to administer the distribution of aid in the chaotic 
environment of the camps. As the conflict continued some of these foreign volunteers left the 
refugee camps in order to organize the growing number of Arabs who arrived in Pakistan to 
participate in the jihad.
Amongst these volunteers was the university professor Abdullah Azzam. Azzam was bom in 
Palestine in 1941 and received the same mixture of religious and secular education as al- 
Banna and Qutb. He went on to study shar’ia at the University of Damascus where he joined 
the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood.18 A year after graduating, and now an influential figure in 
the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, the 1967 Six-Day war ended with the Israeli occupation 
of the West Bank. Azzam was one of the few Palestinian Brothers at the time that favoured 
armed resistance against Israel and thus was one of a small number of Islamists who 
participated in the war. In the aftermath he joined the Palestinian exodus to Jordon and 
became involved with the Palestine Liberation Organization’s (PLO) paramilitary activities 
but soon became frustrated with their secular Marxist ideology.19 Consequently, he enlisted in 
al-Azhar where he gained a doctorate in 1973 in Islamic Jurisprudence. During this period 
Azzam would almost certainly have become aware of Qutb’s radical Islamist philosophy as 
his books and pamphlets were beginning to be printed and widely distributed.
At the outbreak of conflict with King Hussein’s forces in September 1970 Azzam was 
teaching in the University of Jordon but was expelled from the country along with the rest of 
the PLO. Azzam, who was already at an ideological distance from the PLO, accused its 
leadership of fighting the wrong enemy, and broke off contact with the group. He also 
gradually became disillusioned with the Palestinian Muslim Brothers—the predecessors of 
Hamas—who were pursuing a quietist agenda of social work, charity and preaching in the 
Occupied Territories that he believed had wilfully acquiesced to the fundamental problem of 
the existence of the Jewish State. Allowed back into Jordon as a professor of shar’ia in 1973, 
he was once again required to leave a few years later when his Qutbian-inspired radical 
Islamist philosophy clashed with the conservative agenda of the Jordanian royal family. 
Continuing in his nomadic academic career he moved to teach at Abd al-Aziz University in
18 Gilles Kepel Jihad: The Trail o f Political Islam p. 139
19 Jeni Mitchell “The Contradictory Effects of Ideology on Jihadist War-Fighting: The Bosnia Precedent”
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Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.20 At the same time Osama bin Laden was attending the same university 
but was studying a non-religious course. It is unlikely, therefore, that Azzam taught him 
directly but there does appear to have been some contact between them as it was Azzam who 
later persuaded bin Laden to join him in Afghanistan.21
4.2.2 The Ideology of Abdullah Azzam
The circumstances surrounding Azzam’s own decision to move to Peshawar are also unclear. 
Following the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan he released a pamphlet entitled The Defense 
o f Muslim Lands: The First Obligation After Iman in which, clearly inspired by Qutb, he 
argued the idea of a pan-Islamic jihadist movement that transcended the parochialism of the 
Muslim Brotherhood movements constrained by the Middle Eastern borders drawn by 
Western colonisers.22 In this fatwa and a later essay, Join The Caravan, Azzam sets out the 
theological and geopolitical case for a compulsory jihad in Afghanistan. Quoting from ibn 
Taymiyya, the Qur’an and several hadith, he argues that an attack on dar al-Islam (Muslim 
land) necessitated a response by the umma. However, unlike some conservative Muslim 
jurists he claimed that as this was a defensive jihad  the responsibility to participate in the 
physical fight fell upon all able-bodied Muslims as a ford ayn (individual duty) as opposed to 
a collective or fard kifayah (sufficient duty) that may be delegated by the community to a 
group such as the army. This narrative of a defensive jihad also meant that merely donating 
money was insufficient as a substitute for physical participation.
In these pamphlets Azzam also addressed the question of why the jihad in Afghanistan 
should take precedence over the Palestinian struggle against the Zionists, despite his personal 
attachment to his native country. He linked the two conflicts together, along with all other 
acts of aggression against Muslims and Islamic land, by claiming that they are all part of the 
same global struggle between forces of jahiliyya and Islam. The fusing together of different 
conflicts is an important step for Azzam and the Islamist ideology. It allowed the Islamists to 
imagine themselves as global actors where an attack on any Muslim in the world constituted 
an attack on the entire umma. Azzam was adamant that the Palestinian cause remained at the
20 Jason Burke Al-Qaeda: The True Story o f Radical Islam p.73
21 Gilles Kepel Jihad: The Trail o f Political Islam p. 145
22 ‘Iman’ approximately translates as ‘faith.’
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heart of this globalised discourse and as a unifying, motivating symbol of the jihadist 
movement:
Our presence in Afghanistan today, which is the accomplishment of jihad and of 
our devotion to the struggle, does not mean we have forgotten Palestine. Palestine 
is our beating heart, it comes even before Afghanistan in our minds, our hearts, 
our feelings and our faith 23
Unlike Qutb, Azzam was not dealing with idealised abstractions; at the peak of his power in 
Afghanistan it is estimated that he had between 8,000 and 25,000 committed armed activists 
under his influence in the training camps.24 It was therefore necessary for him to consider the 
limited capabilities and resources of the jihadist movement and to prioritise one arena of 
jihad over others. The reasons that Azzam provides for prioritising Afghanistan over 
Palestine are all pragmatic, geopolitical considerations. For example, he says that in 
Afghanistan the conditions are more conducive for asymmetric warfare as there are ‘3000kms 
of open border ... and regions of tribes not under political control... however, in Palestine ... 
the borders are closed.’25 He also provides the political consideration that in Palestine the 
resistance was first seized by ‘communists, nationalists and modernist Muslims’ who are 
fighting the battle under ‘the banner of a secular state’ whilst in Afghanistan the ‘Islamists ... 
[were] the first to take control.’26
The translation of Qutbian theory into practice meant a reorientation away from the 
utopianism of Qutb towards the pragmatism of Azzam. This was a shift that was discernable, 
in the opposite direction, from al-Banna to Qutb. However, as practice also shapes and 
constrains theory, there is also a discernable realignment of the ideology from Qutb to 
Azzam. Although there is a brief mention at the beginning of The Defense o f Muslim Lands 
of the fard kifayah for the umma to depose of corrupt Muslim leaders he immediately 
dismissed this obligation by quoting ibn Taymiyya: ‘the defensive jihad, which is repelling an 
aggressor, is the most tasking type of jihad.’27 Azzam adds that ‘expelling the Kuffar 
[unbelievers] from our land ... is the most important of all the compulsory duties.’28 By 
emphasizing the crucial importance of a defensive jihad Azzam downplays the utopianism of
23 Abdullah Azzam cited in Gilles Kepel Jihad: The Trail o f Political Islam p. 147
24 Gilles Kepel Jihad: The Trail o f Political Islam p. 147
25 Abdullah Azzam The Defense o f Muslim Lands: The First Obligation After Iman
26 Abdullah Azzam The Defense o f Muslim Lands: The First Obligation After Iman
27 Abdullah Azzam The Defense o f Muslim Lands: The First Obligation After Iman
28 Abdullah Azzam The Defense o f Muslim Lands: The First Obligation After Iman
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Qutb and his radical goal of destroying all jahili institutions and ideas. Furthermore, Azzam 
solidifies the abstract narrative of ‘Islam under attack’ into the more precise, but still radical, 
notion of Muslim lands, or former Muslim land, under the occupation or control of the kajir.
4.2.3 Afghan-Arabs
It was around Azzam and others like him, that the influx of foreign jihadists gathered. They 
initially required a place to stay in Peshawar where several guesthouses had been created to 
accommodate and register the Islamists, before being transferred to training' camps along the 
border. Here the recruits received several weeks of ideological indoctrination and basic 
physical and arms training. For many o f the sons of wealthy Saudi families their actual 
participation in the jihad  would be a trip across the border in an all-terrain vehicle to have a 
photograph taken posing with an AK47.29 Other, more serious jihadists, however, did form 
small units and fought alongside the Afghan insurgents earning them the nom de guerre of 
‘Afghan Arabs.’ This latter group were mainly comprised of militants who had previously 
been arrested in their own country for activities connected with Islamist groups such as the 
Muslim Brotherhood and whose passage to Peshawar was sanctioned by governments only 
too willing to get rid of a problem.
The mythology that Azzam created around the Afghan Arabs was more important than the 
reality of their contribution to the war. There were probably fewer than three thousand 
fighters and the majority of these either failed to leave Peshawar or did not take part in actual 
combat.30 However, Azzam through a relentless propaganda campaign, rendered the jihad in
• * 3 1Afghanistan as a ‘primeval, metaphysical [battle] fought in a landscape of miracles.’ Tales 
of martyred Islamists whose bodies lay intact and did not decay circulated freely and even 
nature was depicted as intervening with flocks of birds rising in anticipation of Soviet air 
strikes. The narrative that Azzam brilliantly constructed cast the Muslim Afghans as a 
pristine, unsullied and righteous people, fighting with the aid of God and the selfless Muslim 
umma, against the atheist ‘brutal, soulless, mechanized force of modernity,’ played by the
29 Gilles Kepel Jihad: The Trail o f Political Islam p. 148
30 Lawrence Wright The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda’s Road to 9/11 p. 105
31 Lawrence Wright The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda’s Road to 9/11 p.96
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•  32  , .  ,j  •Soviet aggressors. This was the emblematic, pure and unproblematic jihad of Islam against 
jahiliyya that Qutb had dreamt of in his Cairo cell two decades previously.
4.2.4 Ayman al-Zawahiri (1951-present)
The second main protagonist in Peshawar during this period was the Egyptian physician 
Ayman al-Zawahiri. It is worth looking briefly at Zawahiri who would not only become an 
important ideologist and leader o f an Islamist movement in Egypt and al-Qaeda, but whose 
Islamist career mirrored the general developments of this period. Zawahiri, like most radicals 
after the 1960s was deeply influenced by Qutb but became increasingly frustrated with the 
failure of the Islamists to make any progress in Egypt. Zawahiri had joined the Muslim 
Brotherhood at a young age but when Qutb was executed Zawahiri, along with several 
classmates, pledged to ‘put Qutb’s vision into action.’33 To this end he formed an 
underground cell that was later subsumed under the umbrella of Faraj’s group, Jihad, before 
forming into Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ)—sometimes referred to as the Jihad group or al- 
Jihad.
After the assassination of Sadat, Zawahiri was arrested along with hundreds of others, and the 
leaders of the plot were hanged. The sentencing, however, for the three thousand other 
militants was more lenient, with Zawahiri serving just three years in prison. In prison 
Zawahiri and the other Islamists suffered intense physical and psychological torture including 
long stretches of isolation in Cairo’s notoriously brutal prisons. The corporal and mental 
wounds suffered during this period is often cited by the members of the Islamist movement in 
the 1980s and 90s as one of the key motivating factors in pursuing the jihad to Afghanistan 
and as an explanation for the escalating brutality of the Egyptian campaign. Montasser al- 
Zayyat, a member of the Jihad group and later a lawyer for Gama ’a al-Islamiyya (the Islamic 
Group), recollects that Zawahiri left Egypt to travel to Jeddah in 1985 because of the ‘painful 
memory’ of being forced to give up the location of an Islamist associate to the Egyptian 
Armed Forces ‘under the pain of torture.’34
32 Lawrence Wright The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda’s Road to 9/11 p.96
33 Lawrence Wright The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda's Road to 9/11 p.37
34 Montasser al-Zayyat The Road To al-Qaeda: The Story o f bin Laden’s Right Hand Man p.31
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4.2.5 The Near and Far Jihad: Gama’a al-Islamiyya and Egyptian Islamic Jihad
Following the repressions Jihad split into two groups. EIJ was primarily based in Cairo and 
Gama’a al-Islamiyya that operated in southern Egypt. The latter engaged in a sporadic and 
disjointed campaign of terrorism mainly against Copts in the south and Western tourists, 
whilst the core of militants of EIJ fled to Pakistan following their release from prison. 
Gama’a al-Islamiyya by pursuing the violent utopian ideology of Qutb at home eventually 
isolated itself from its potential popular base—the natural supporters of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in the past—and became excluded from any role in the political process. 
Zawahiri observed this regression into directionless, arbitrary violence and realized that the 
goals of the Islamists were only going to be frustrated by pursuing an unpopular asymmetric 
war against a strong repressive state.
Zawahiri and other EIJ members had travelled to Pakistan, via Saudi Arabia where he first 
met Osama bin Laden, in order to join the resistance against the Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan.35 He swiftly superseded the nominal leader of EIJ, Abdul al-Zumur, who had 
been imprisoned for life, and began to exert his own ideas on the group. It was around this 
time in Peshawar in the mid-1980s that Zawahiri befriended and became the physician of bin 
Laden.36 For the first few years Zawahiri’s role in Afghanistan is not well documented and it 
is unclear if he played an important role in the conflict, this changed however as the Afghan 
jihad drew to a close. The proximity of Zawahiri to bin Laden allowed him to impart his 
ideas for the future direction of the displaced international Islamists who were unsure of their 
place, purpose and direction after Afghanistan.
The Soviets withdrew in 1989 and Afghanistan descended into a civil war with competing 
factions of the mujahedeen and other groups fighting for power but unable to finally dislodge 
the communist government from power in Kabul. For the international jihadists the 
internecine conflict of various tribes and warlords did not hold much ideological interest and 
the funding from the U.S. and Saudi Arabia dropped away with the Red Army exodus.
4.2.6 The Ideology of Ayman al-Zawahiri
35 Montasser al-Zayyat The Road To al-Qaeda: The Story o f bin Laden's Right Hand Man p.31
36 Ayman al-Zawahiri Knights Under The Prophet’s Banner
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According to the Islamists’ narrative the U.S. and other Western powers were mere ‘paper 
tigers’ that could be felled with a well-placed blow. Zawahiri later boasted that ‘the jihad 
battles in Afghanistan destroyed the myth of a [superpower] in the minds of the Muslim 
Mujahedeen young men. The USSR, a superpower with the largest land army in the world, 
was destroyed and the remnants of its troops fled Afghanistan before the eyes of the Muslim 
youths and as a result of their actions.’37 As well as testifying to the physical strength of the 
Islamists it also provided tangible proof of the superiority of the Islamist ideology over the 
atheist, jahili ideology of communism and by extension other Western, manmade ideologies. 
These dual strands of the Afghan-Arab’s mythology gave credence to Qutb’s grand narrative 
of the eternal and inevitable battle of Islam and jahiliyya and lent the international Islamists’ 
ideology a transcendental aura.38
The effect that Zawahiri had on the Islamist ideology can be understood by examining what 
can be thought of as his retrospective manifesto written around the time of the U.S.-led 
coalition’s invasion of Afghanistan. Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner was smuggled out 
of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region in December 2001 and serialised by the London- 
based, Arabic and English language newspaper Al-Sharaq Al-Aswat in early 2002. Although 
the pamphlet is not written as a coherent whole there are several useful sections that explain 
and justify the actions of one strain of the international Islamists following the jihad in 
Afghanistan. It also sets out the future direction for the Islamists and so has earned the 
moniker ‘al-Qaeda’s manifesto.’ Whilst Qutb’s grand narrative of the inevitable and 
inexorable clash of Islam and jahiliyya still provides the overall framework for Zawahiri’s 
interpretation of the ideology he introduces some novel features and provides a distinctive 
new orientation for the new century. The two most striking features of Zawahiri’s 
contribution are the explicit reorientation towards the U.S. as the principal target for the 
international Islamists and the endorsement of the use of terrorism as the preferred tactic.39
The explanation and justification for these new directions can be broken down into four 
interlocking strands. The first and broadest form of justification for the Islamists’ new target
37 Ayman al-Zawahiri Knights Under The Prophet’s Banner
38 Marc Sageman Understanding Terror Networks p.22
39 Zawahiri avoids using the word ‘terrorism’ to avoid its obvious pejorative connotations and instead prefers 
the phrase ‘martyrdom operations.’ We use the word ‘terrorism,’ divorced from any moral judgement, according 
to our previously settled upon definition: “Violence, deliberately directed against noncombatants, for political or 
related ends.”
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is based on the Qutbian paradigm of the existential battle of Islam and jahiliyya. However, 
demonstrating the influence of Azzam, Zawahiri expresses this in terms of Islam under attack 
from the West, thereby necessitating a defensive jihad. By cleverly incorporating the cliched, 
pejorative language utilized by Western politicians, academics and media, to denigrate the 
Islamists Zawahiri claims: ‘The western forces that are hostile to Islam have clearly identified 
their enemy. They refer to it as Islamic fundamentalism.’40 Another feature of Zawahiri’s 
contribution to a familiar narrative is his use of a conspiratal mode of language to describe 
the omnipresent enemy and their nefarious tactics.41 He states that there is a ‘global Jewish 
government’ acting as a puppet master behind the United States, who, after realising that 
‘Islam is the popular demand of the nations of this [Arabic] region ... the United States has 
decided to dictate its wishes by force, repression, forgery, and misinformation ... finally it 
has added direct military intervention to all the foregoing methods.’42
The second strand of Zawahiri’s Islamist ideology is the symbolic importance that he attaches 
to the existence of Israel and the support that it receives from the U.S. Although Zionism and 
Israel had been important to the previous generations of Egyptian Islamists it had always 
been of secondary importance to the domestic struggle and was primarily used as a 
demonstration of the impotence of secular Arab governments in their attempts to destroy the 
Jewish state. This can be most clearly seen in the notable absence of the question of Israel in 
Qutb’s Milestones. With the relocation of the Egyptian Islamists to Pakistan and the 
globalisation of the ideology, and the internationalization of the movement’s activists, 
Zawahiri recognised that it was necessary to re-centre the movement so that it remained 
anchored in the real world. He recognised that without the permanency of a fixed 
geographical base the jihadists would be directionless, it was crucial, therefore, to have an 
imagined centre that would serve in the place of Egypt as an enduring and unifying force for 
the displaced Islamists. Azzam had already identified Palestine as the ‘beating heart’ of the 
jihadists but Zawahiri built on this by forging U.S. foreign policy and their ideological, 
political, financial and military support for Israel into a singular insoluble nexus.
The third strand of Zawahiri’s reasoning offers a more direct justification for targeting the 
U.S. than the first two more abstract arguments. In Knights Under The Prophet’s Banner
40 Ayman al-Zawahiri Knights Under The Prophet’s Banner
41 Steve Bruce Fundamentalism p. 111
42 Ayman al-Zawahiri Knights Under The Prophet’s Banner
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Zawahiri is convinced of the imperative to establish an ‘Islamic’ state. The need for a 
permanent, physical base is both a necessary means and an end for the Islamist movement. 
This goal is so important that Zawahiri claims that failure to achieve the ‘ultimate goal of 
establishing the Muslim nation in the heart of the Islamic world,’ would mean that ‘the 
successful operations against Islam’s enemies and the severe damage inflicted on them... will 
be nothing more than disturbing acts, regardless of their magnitude, that could be absorbed 
and endured.’43 Zawahiri’s concern with securing a permanent base for the Islamist 
movement was rooted in pragmatism. Just as he tried to re-centre the imagined focus onto 
Israel in order to anchor the global movement, he reasoned that only by obtaining a physical 
base could a deterritorialized movement be organizationally grounded. He wrote that ‘a 
Jihadi movement needs an arena that would act like an incubator where its seeds would grow 
and where it can acquire practical experience in combat, politics, and organizational 
matters.’44 Zawahiri’s ambition for attaining a base was not entirely based on practical 
grounds but was also motivated by an ideological impulse. He inherited from Qutb the belief 
that no existing land was truly Islamic as jahili concepts and practices had infiltrated and 
irredeemably corrupted the notional Muslim world. Only by starting afresh could an authentic 
Islamic society and state be established and from whose example the rest of the Muslim 
world could be guided and rejuvenated. In this respect Zawahiri briefly mentions the need to 
restart the institution of the ‘rational caliphate’ that would provide a central authority for the 
umma,45
The imperative to secure and Islamize a piece of land provided the fourth important 
justification for the targeting of the United States and its interests abroad. Zawahiri’s 
narrative—couched in his characteristic conspiratal language—argued that the major obstacle 
between the Islamist movement, and its goal of securing a base, was the U.S., either acting 
directly on its own, or with its allies in the Muslim world. Just as Britain used to be the 
principle imperial actor, frustrating the ambitions of al-Banna in the early 20th century, now 
the Americans prevented the establishment of a true Islamic state.46 This narrative acts in 
conjunction with the other components of Zawahiri’s ideology to reconceptualise the 
Islamists’ cause within an interconnected globalized structure. Zawahiri was determined to
43 Ayman al-Zawahiri Knights Under The Prophet’s Banner
44 Ayman al-Zawahiri Knights Under The Prophet’s Banner
45 Ayman al-Zawahiri Knights Under The Prophet’s Banner
46 Rohan Gunaratna Inside Al Qaeda: Globed Network o f Terror p.60
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settle the dualist distinction between local and global, or the internal and external enemy, that 
had tom the Jihad grouping of the EIJ and Gama ’a al-Islamiyya apart. Accordingly it was 
counterproductive to distinguish between the Egyptian government and the Americans (or the 
Saudis and Americans) as they effectively act as one against the Islamists. ‘The struggle for 
the establishment of the Muslim state,’ Zawahiri explains, ‘cannot be considered a regional 
struggle, certainly not after it had been ascertained that ... the crusader alliance led by the 
United States will not allow any Muslim force to reach power in the Arab countries.’47
A crucial contribution that Zawahiri made to the remodelling of the Islamist ideology is his 
comprehensive justification for acts of terrorism, and claims of their utility, in pursuit of the 
Islamist goals. There are three grounds that Zawahiri uses to justify the use of terrorist tactics, 
or ‘martyrdom operations’ as he euphemistically describes them. The first is on the grounds 
of efficacy—faced with a much more powerful enemy the weaker party must employ an 
indirect means of fighting. Terrorism requires the expenditure of a small number of 
committed activists, who are prepared to give up their lives as part of the operation, thus 
resulting in a high success rate. The resulting benefit of the violence is often 
disproportionately large, therefore, using a crude cost-benefit analysis, Zawahiri concludes 
that ‘the method of the martyrdom operations as the most successful in inflicting damage on 
the opponent and the least costly in terms of casualties among the Islamists.’48 Zawahiri 
argues for the effectiveness of a war of attrition where the weaker force continuously 
provokes the stronger and in doing so wears down their material resources and their political 
and moral resolve. Comparing the U.S. superpower to a volcano Zawahiri writes: ‘The 
persistence of the resistance will keep the volcano in a state of continual eruption and ready 
to blow up at the least provocation.’49
The second is an argument from ethical equivocacy—the United States and its allies employ 
despicable tactics including torture, imprisonment without trial and other brutal acts of 
violence, on a greater scale, against the Islamists, therefore they are justified in using similar 
tactics. ‘We must acknowledge,’ writes Zawahiri, ‘that the west, led by the United States, 
which is under the influence of the Jews, does not know the language of ethics, morality, and 
legitimate rights. They only know the language of interests backed by brute military force.
47 Ayman al-Zawahiri Knights Under The Prophet’s Banner
48 Ayman al-Zawahiri Knights Under The Prophet’s Banner
49 Ayman al-Zawahiri Knights Under The Prophet’s Banner
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Therefore, if we wish to have a dialogue with them and make them aware of our rights, we 
must talk to them in the language that they understand.’50 The third argument, that Zawahiri 
apparently thought of as the weakest justification and therefore only briefly mentions, is that 
as the United States, and its Western allies including Israel, are democracies, the citizens of 
those countries are legitimate targets as they either voted in their governments, and are 
therefore responsible for their actions, or they can, in principle, remove the administration, 
but have not done so.51
4.2.7 Dispute between Azzam and Zawahiri
Towards the end of the Afghan jihad  a rivalry developed between Azzam and Zawahiri over 
whose vision would guide the globalised Islamist movement into the future. This took the 
form of a competition between the two men for influence over bin Laden with his 
organizational skills, funding streams and the database of contacts that he had created in al- 
Qaeda. The dispute was as much a power struggle as an ideological one, but it is the doctrinal 
differences that concern us here. For Azzam the scope of the jihad after Afghanistan was 
drawn along ‘more limited and defensive’ lines than that of Zawahiri.52 He argued in his 
magazine Al Jihad that fighting only became obligatory when the enemy occupied Muslim 
land, and was not, as Qutb and Zawahiri claimed, a struggle that extended over the entire 
globe.53 Azzam also objected to jihadists interfering in the internal politics of Islamic states 
and during the Afghanistan campaign insisted on targeting only the Soviets not the Afghan 
government. Zawahiri by contrast ultimately wished to depose of the leaders of Muslim lands 
who did not rule by the tenets of Islam.
The epicentre of the future jihad  was, for Azzam, Jerusalem; for Zawahiri it was Cairo. 
Azzam recognised the danger of fitna in the Muslim umma that would inevitably result if the 
jihadists carried their campaigns to Muslim communities. In particular Azzam held the 
longstanding Sunni reservation over the practice of pronouncing takfir—the declaration of 
non-belief against a fellow Muslim that forfeited their life—that he believed Zawahiri and his 
followers were employing. Finally, Azzam objected to some of the military training that was
50 Ayman al-Zawahiri Knights Under The Prophet’s Banner
51 Johnny Ryan “The Four P-Words of Militant Islamist Radicalization and Recruitment: Persecution, Precedent, 
Piety, and Perseverance”
52 Fawaz Gerges The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global p. 135
53 Fawaz Gerges The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global p. 135
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taking place in one of bin Laden’s camps near Peshawar that included instruction on the 
hijacking of aeroplanes, a tactic that Azzam considered terroristic and illegitimate according 
to shar’ia. He pronounced in a fatwa that the deliberate killing of civilians, and in particular 
women and children, was against Islam.54 The outcome of the battle between these two 
visions for the future of direction of the Islamist jihad  and the competition over bin Lad n’s 
mind, would eventually decide the ideological framework of al-Qaeda.55
Osama bin Laden had been taken under the wing of Azzam when he arrived in Afghanistan 
and it was reported that their relationship was that of a student to a professor.56 As the jihad 
proceeded and bin Laden’s reputation for bravery in the field was established it became clear 
that bin Laden’s ambitions exceeded those of his mentor. Eventually bin Laden moved away 
from Azzam’s conception o f a limited and defensive international jihadist force and drew 
closer to the vision of his rival. Zawahiri still harboured the hope for the overthrow of the 
Egyptian government with a swift coup d ’etat with the aim of establishing an Islamic state. 
Having reached a dead end after the assassination of Sadat and the splintering of the 
indigenous Islamist movement he reached the conclusion that a radically new methodology 
was required and he sought to find this in the new internationalist movement that developed 
in Afghanistan. Crucial to this venture was the networks and funding that bin Laden could 
provide, and eventually, bin Laden sided with Zawahiri. Whatever the intricacies of the 
internal dispute the matter was settled a few months after the Soviet withdrawal when Azzam 
and his two sons were assassinated by three landmines as they drove to a mosque on 
November 24th, 1989. Although it is tempting to interpret the assassination in the light of the 
unfolding rivalry for bin Laden’s patronage, there is no conclusive evidence unveiling the 
identity of the perpetrators of the attack. In any case it is clear that the international Islamists 
did not search too hard to uncover the identity of the assassins. The divisions that would have 
inevitably occurred in the aftermath of such a discovery could have severely damaged the 
unity of an already dangerously factious movement.
4.3 The Twin Islamist Movements under Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri
54 Lawrence Wright The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda’s Road to 9/11 p. 130
55 Jeffrey Haynes “A1 Qaeda: Ideology and Action” pp.76-77
56 Fawaz Gerges The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global p. 134
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With the removal of Azzam and the retreat of the Soviets, the shape of the international 
Islamist movement, gathered under the two major groupings of EIJ and al-Qaeda, was 
determined by the leadership o f bin Laden under the ideological influence of Zawahiri. The 
picture that we have of this period is one of the disintegration and decentralization of the 
international Islamists. Although sporadic lines of communication and loyalties were 
maintained by some with the central groups of al-Qaeda and EIJ the idea that they were 
active ‘organizations’ in is misleading. In particular Zawahiri seems to become increasingly 
distant from bin Laden until circumstances forced the two back together in 1997.
The experience of the Islamists in Afghanistan demonstrated that the battlefield did not 
necessarily provide a safe haven for the Islamists during the conflict or a welcoming home 
following the end of hostilities. This period is therefore marked by the lack of a clear 
ideological direction and the contradiction between the imperatives of actively pursuing jihad 
and survival. We can thus observe a move away from the grounded and pragmatic jihad 
envisaged by Azzam, towards the Qutbian inspired transcendent and symbolically-orientated 
ideology of Zawahiri and bin Laden. To put it in Weberian terminology there was a shift 
from instrumental to value rationality. This latest ideological evolution would witness a shift 
from a concern with short-term political and economic issues towards a consistent 
preoccupation with the timeless and fundamental conflict of ‘religion and antireligion.’57 It 
would, however, be a mistake to push this point too far. Bin Laden, as we shall see, did not 
see al-Qaeda operating in an otherworldly dimension and was certainly not oblivious to the 
political, social and economic forces within which he operated. Olivier Roy makes this 
mistake when he argues that bin Laden’s ‘aim is simply to destroy Babylon’58 and that there 
is a ‘lack of genuine strategic goals.’59 A more accurate characterisation of his ideology 
would therefore recognise his tendency to morph or frame real world political events and 
strategies into a transcendent, polarised framework of belief against unbelief. Above all bin 
Laden was keenly aware of the emotional pull of a Qutbian grand narrative and the 
harmonising and unifying force it could potentially exert on the consciousness of the global 
umma. Bin Laden not only endeavoured to operate within this ideological framework, but 
also, through his actions, to bring it into being for both Muslims and non-Muslims alike.
57 Mark Juergensmeyer Terror In The Mind o f God: The Global Rise o f Religious Violence p. 157
58 Olivia1 Roy Globalised Islam: The Search fo r a New Ummah p. 5 7
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The intermediary gestation period saw the Islamists travel around the world in search of 
places where the jihad, in the Afghan mould, could be continued. The obvious conflicts were 
those clashes involving Muslim and non-Muslim forces in irregular warfare or insurgency- 
type conflict. In the 1990s this included, amongst others: Chechnya, Bosnia, Kashmir and 
Algeria. All of these conflicts shared a basic property: they were all examples, in the minds of 
the Islamists of the occupation of Muslim lands by a non-Muslim invader. Thus, whether as a 
result of a conscious decision or not, the Islamists’ identification of arenas of jihad had 
shifted from Qutb’s unrestricted global battleground to Azzam’s more limited delineation of 
occupied Muslim lands.
During the 1990s we begin to see the first signs of yet another splintering in the movement 
between those who saw the ideological future of the movement in Azzam’s ideology and 
those who aligned themselves with the new Islamist ideology forged by Zawahiri and bin 
Laden. The imperative to continue the campaign of jihad  was tempered by Zawahiri’s 
pragmatic search for a safe haven for the movement. As a return to Egypt was excluded by 
the threat of persecution and incarceration or worse—many of the leaders, including 
Zawahiri, were sentenced to death in absentia during the 1990s—the core of the bin Laden’s 
and Zawahiri’s followers moved to Sudan and Yemen. These countries were geographically 
close enough to Egypt and the Middle East so that Zawahiri could continue to exercise some 
control over al-Qaeda and EIJ. Crucially the governments of these countries were too weak, 
wracked by their own civil wars and internal power struggles, to bother the Islamists and 
tolerated their presence in exchange for the economic investment that bin Laden brought 
along with the tacit agreement that the Islamists would not challenge their sovereignty.
4.3.1 Creation of the Taliban
Before we advance to study the creation of al-Qaeda it will be useful to tie up the historic 
loose ends of the Afghan conflict and the formation of the Taliban. The communist People’s 
Democratic Party of Afghanistan did not fall following the withdrawal of Soviet troops but 
consolidated into the major cities and towns. As a result the previously unified insurrection 
collapsed into competing ethnic and tribal factions led by local warlords and the country 
descended into a period of civil war.60 In this complex climate the role of the Islamists as
60 Montasser al-Zayyat The Road To al-Qaeda: The Story o f bin Laden’s Right Hand Man p.55
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foreign fighters became unclear and although they continued to fight against the beleaguered 
government their increasingly bloody style of warfare following the fall of Kabul in 1992 
alienated them from the various indigenous mujahedeen groups and the civilian population.61 
Any last vestiges of the Arab-Afghans seeped away with the arrival of the Taliban who 
finally put an end to the civil war. Under the leadership of Mullah Omar, the Taliban (literally 
‘students’) were composed principally of Pashtun boys who had been educated in Saudi- 
sponsored Deobandi madrassas in the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan. These were 
young men from poor families who had been displaced by the fighting in the wake of the 
Soviet invasion and had received a Salafist education in the madrassas that doubled up as 
boarding houses and schools. Their isolated upbringing, cut-off from their family and 
traditional tribal structures, meant that they were loyal only to their teachers and thus were 
able to mobilise quickly and effectively at the end 1994 and captured Kabul two years later.62 
In the areas that the Taliban controlled a strict and unorthodox version of shar’ia was 
implemented and enforced by the newly created religious police.63
Despite superficial religious affinities, in ideological terms the Taliban, with their ultra­
conservative and Salafist interpretation of Islam, were very different from the outward- 
looking radical Islamists. The Taliban were only concerned with ending the civil war and 
creating a perfect Islamic state based on the Wahhabi teachings of their madrassas. The 
internal politics and economics of their own country did not overly concern them and the 
opium trade was allowed to grow subjected only to an informal export tax on the outgoing 
shipments. The centre of power similarly shifted from the government buildings of Kabul to 
the religious seminaries of Kandahar. As disinterested as the Taliban were in their non­
religious internal affairs they were even less concerned with international politics. Clearly, 
Qutb’s globalized and radically utopian Islamism was of an entirely different scope and 
trajectory to the Taliban’s inward-looking Islamic state. Despite their ideological 
incongruities the Talban and al-Qaeda were able to forge a strategic alliance upon the 
Islamists’ return to Afghanistan after their expulsion from Sudan in 1996.
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4.4 Formation of al-Qaeda
Whilst some Islamists continued their struggle as freelance jihadists in various conflicts 
another distinct strand was developing in the formation and evolution of al-Qaeda. Unlike 
Zawahiri, bin Laden was still a well respected figure in his homeland of Saudi Arabia. His 
father, who had died several years earlier in a plane crash, had created the Bin Laden Group, 
an engineering conglomerate that won many of the prestigious civil engineering contracts 
from the Saud family including the refurbishment of the Grand Mosque in Mecca. Having not 
yet fallen out with the Saudi establishment his outlook for the international jihadists was 
quite different from that of Zawahiri. Although much has been written about the formative 
period of al-Qaeda’s development the details are often contradictory and because of its covert 
mode of operation little can be known for certain.64 However what we shall attempt to 
understand here is the ideological development of this strand of the Islamist movement and 
the intimately related organizational changes.
In contrast to Zawahiri’s advocacy of terrorism bin Laden preferred the sustained pressure of 
irregular warfare tactics in line with the model utilized in the Afghan jihad. In bin Laden’s 
mind the Islamists would form a dedicated vanguard to be used in cooperation with Muslim 
governments to advance the Islamist cause around the world. Al-Qaeda al-Askariya (the 
military base) was formally created in Peshawar in August 1988 as the administrative and 
executive nucleus of the imagined vanguard.65 One distinctive feature was that al-Qaeda 
members, who at its conception numbered fewer than 100, swore a ba ’yah to bin Laden who 
became the undisputed emir (leader) of the group. The ceremony of fealty not only cemented 
the loyalty and hierarchy of the group but also purposefully echoed the ba’yah that the 
Prophet Mohammad’s followers swore when they joined Islam.
Osama bin Laden returned to Jeddah as a popular folk hero in the middle of 1989 credited 
with—alongside the Arab-Afghans—having brought down the Soviet empire. Tales of his 
exploits in Afghanistan—and his social standing as a member of the respected and well- 
connected bin Laden family along with the contacts that he had created as a conduit for funds
64 See Jason Burke Al-Qaeda: The True Story o f Radical Islam; Rohan Gunaratna Inside Al Qaeda: Global 
Network o f Terror, Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon The Next Attack: The Globalization ofJihad for a range 
of perspectives on al-Qaeda’s history.
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for the mujahedeen meant that he had privileged access to the royal family and was warmly 
welcomed back. What bin Laden lacked, however, was a cause on which he could put into 
practice his vision of an Islamist vanguard. His patience was not tested for long; within a few 
months of his arrival home the leaders of north and south Yemen—having long been 
embroiled in a civil war—signed a unification treaty creating the Republic of Yemen in May 
1990. Bin Laden had been alarmed at what he saw as a Marxist government in South Yemen 
in his father’s ancestral homeland and had approached Prince Turki—the head of Saudi 
intelligence—with the offer o f overthrowing the government.66 This was the first chance that 
bin Laden spotted to put al-Qaeda into action. At this point the model of al-Qaeda in bin 
Laden’s mind was one of elite Islamist irregulars that could be mobilised anywhere on the 
global stage—in the service of an Islamic country—as a vanguard against the encroaching 
forces of communism and Western secularism. The offer was politely refused by the Prince 
who was disturbed by the idea of a freelance Islamist army with its own personal foreign 
policy and bin Laden’s talk of ‘my mujahedeen.’67
Bin Laden was not so easily deterred and began to covertly sponsor armed raids from the 
north against the south even after the unification agreement had been signed. With the new 
Republic on the brink of breaking up the president protested directly to king Fahd of Saudi 
Arabia to bring bin Laden into line. The head of the Saud family passed on these instructions 
but bin Laden, in defiance of the regal command ignored him and escalated the campaign of 
political assassinations. Once again the Yemenite head pleaded with the king, and this time, 
furious with bin Laden’s disobedience, sent Prince Naif—who had previously worked with 
bin Laden in the Afghanistan campaign—to confiscate his passport68 This was the beginning 
of an escalating friction between the Saudi establishment and bin Laden eventually reshaping 
al-Qaeda’s agenda from the relative conservatism of a vanguard working in the service of 
Islamic states to a radical ideology that sought to depose those same governments. The 
Yemenite quarrel, however, was soon eclipsed by far more significant and spectacular events 
in the height of the summer the following year.
4.4.1 Iraqi Occupation of Kuwait
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With the invasion of Kuwait on August 2nd, 1990 the Arab world was split between the 
triumphant display of Arab defiance and strength represented by Iraq, and their loyalty and 
dependence on Saudi Arabia. Saddam Hussein’s explosive mix of popularist Islamism and 
third-workl ideology, anti-American and anti-Zionist vitriol, stood in stark contrast the long­
standing sponsor of Islamic conservatism, and guarantor of economic and political stability 
represented by the Saud royal family. Despite years and billions of dollars spent by the Saud 
royal family on cultivating its Wahhabi credentials of Sunni Islamic orthodoxy when the dust 
settled in Kuwait City the Saudi’s were shocked to discover how fragile their political base 
had become. The challenge to the Islamic credentials of the Saud family came, ironically, 
from a man whose power base rested on the secular Ba’ath party and whose own ideology 
was closer to pan-Arabism than Islamism. Although Saddam Hussein had adopted Islamist 
slogans during the eight years of stalemate in the Iran-Iraq war, his religious legitimacy was 
undermined by his propensity to attack other Muslim states, which, in this instance, was 
manifested in Iraq’s annexation of their neighbour Kuwait.
Despite the swift condemnations of Hussein’s belligerence the greater concern for the 
international community was the direct and immediate threat to the rich oil fields of eastern 
Saudi Arabia. Saddam’s rhetoric justifying the annexation of Kuwait was imbued with 
Islamic slogans and the populist theme of Islam’s yearning for justice against the aggressive 
neo-imperialism of America. According to his narrative Kuwait was an artificial construct of 
the British Empire designed to divide and restrict the economic and geopolitical power of the 
Arabs, a system that was now maintained by U.S. military and economic power to ensure 
access to oil and subdue the restive impulse of Islam. Hussein accused the emirs of the A1 
Sabah family of expropriating the wealth of the region to enrich themselves at the expense of 
its citizens in particular and the Arabs in general; a theme that could also be easily levelled 
against the Saud family. In a televised broadcast of Hussein praying on the shore of Kuwait 
City Saddam spoke directly to the frustrations ordinary, disenfranchised Arab people, 
presenting himself as the natural leader of a ‘moral and social jihad.’69 This contrasted starkly 
with years of elite and aloof hypocritical decadence that the princes and emirs of the Saud 
family had revelled in whilst imposing a strict and repressive Wahhabist doctrine on the 
populace.
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With the invitation of American troops to defend the Saudi border in Operation Desert Shield 
former staunch allies were forced to decide where their ultimate loyalties rested. In the Arab 
world the ‘Palestinians, Sudanese, Algerians, Libyans, Tunisians, Yemenis and ... Jordanians 
openly supported Saddam Hussein.’70 The fissures that were created in the edifice of Saudi 
orthodox hegemony would eventually force bin Laden to make a choice that had repeatedly 
split the Islamist movement in the past. He could either join his former sponsors and work 
within the legitimate confines of the Saudi state; or turn against it and continue his Islamist 
career as a persecuted outsider and outlaw. At this point bin Laden’s financial ties, loyalties 
and faith in his homeland meant that he was not yet ready to cross over this boundary; 
however the unfolding events of the next few months would compel him into taking an 
unambiguous and irreversible stance.
4.4.2 Bin Laden’s Offers of Support in the Gulf War
Immediately following the invasion of Kuwait bin Laden made a plea directly to the king 
imploring him not to call on American troops. Although the royal family was initially divided 
on the matter, the promise given by the then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, that the 
troops would leave when the threat had subsided, convinced the king to accept the American 
forces. A few weeks later a despairing bin Laden again approached the Saudi regime with a 
plan to defend the peninsula using his own shock troops and to rapidly raise and mobilise an 
army of irregular Muslim volunteers.71 Whatever the political and propaganda utility that an 
all-Muslim force represented king Fahd knew that an untrained and ill-equipped army would 
be decimated by Hussein’s mechanized and professional standing forces. He pointed out to 
bin Laden that ‘there are no caves in Kuwait’ and was unimpressed by his promise to fight 
the Iraqis ‘with faith.’72
Having been spumed twice by the Saudis, bin Laden’s disappointment and anger was 
intensified when the government put pressure on the clergy to issue fatwas justifying the 
arrival of the infidel soldiers in the land that the Prophet, on his deathbed, forbade the 
presence of two religions. In just a few weeks approximately five-hundred thousand mixed 
sex American and coalition troops, including their Christian and Jewish chaplains, along with
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an entourage of hundreds of international journalists reporting on the build-up to the 
confrontation with Saddam arrived. Although they were quartered in bases outside of the 
cities their sheer number, combined with the intensive and intrusive press coverage, and 
meant that they would be a very public and conspicuous presence in what had previously 
been a closed and private society.
For ordinary Saudis, depending on one’s social and political standing, the presence of foreign 
troops had either a humiliating or liberating effect, but in both cases served to weaken the 
royal family’s authoritarian control over society. This emboldened the progressive liberals, 
prompting several women in Riyadh to publicly break the informal norm that banned female 
drivers. At the other extreme the more reactionary clerics who composed an open ‘Letter of 
Demands’ with a list of stipulations to further Islamise the state, redistribute power to the 
ulema, implement strict conformity to shar’ia and create an ‘Islamic army’ through the 
conscription of young males. The foreign troops polarized the conservative clerics and the 
progressive liberals, and brought to the surface tensions that had been previously suppressed 
under a veil of silence by the repressive royal family in collaboration with the compliant 
ulema. The rebellious clerics were unable and unwilling to directly confront the Saudi 
establishment but the public provocation of the female drivers provided an easy surrogate 
target for their complaints of the spread of corrupting Western liberal decadence.
As the defensive mission of Operation Desert Shield evolved into the offensive Operation 
Desert Storm the situation became intolerable for bin Laden. He had been fervently lobbying 
for his passport to be returned on the pretext that he could travel to Afghanistan to mediate an 
end to the escalating civil war. The authorities finally conceded but only returned his papers 
on the condition that bin Laden signed a document stating that he would not interfere in Saudi
affairs again.74 He departed for Peshawar in March 1992 and briefly entered into the
negotiations conducted between the two leading warlords Massoud and Hekmatyar and the 
representatives of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. The talks collapsed when Massoud’s forces 
covertly occupied Kabul provoking a violent backlash by Hekmatyar. Bin Laden found 
himself backing the opposite side to the Saud’s preferred proxy leader—Hekmatyar—and, 
now fearing for his life, slipped out of Pakistan to hide in Afghanistan. It was, however, too 
dangerous for the dissident to stay for too long. Fortuitously the Islamist coup in Sudan, led
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by Omar al-Bashir and the charismatic leader of the National Islamic Front party Hasan al- 
Turabi, had extended an invitation of a safe haven for bin Laden and his followers, in 
exchange for the considerable engineering expertise and investments that he could still 
provide. In the middle of 1992 he once again relocated, this time to Khartoum and another 
critical juncture was reached in the ideological and organizational evolution of al-Qaeda.
4.4.3 Al-Qaeda’s Incubation in Sudan
Bin Laden was not the first Islamist guest in Sudan. Zawahiri’s EIJ had also begun to gather 
there and had been buying up land south of Khartoum to replace the training camps lost after 
the evacuation of Afghanistan. Bin Laden moved into one of these farms with his family of 
four wives and several children and the inner circle of al-Qaeda members. Although a 
training camp was established it seems that this was for relatively low-level small arms and 
explosives training.75 The militant activity of al-Qaeda was wound down during this period as 
bin Laden concentrated on winning big civil engineering projects and establishing his 
family’s Bin Laden Group presence in Sudan. He used the proceeds of these lucrative 
contracts to buy large swathes of farming land and create numerous small start-up companies. 
At this point al-Qaeda represented a diverse business empire with trusted members being 
awarded managerial positions in the group’s various concerns. The sense of divine purpose 
that had inspired bin Laden to establish al-Qaeda in Afghanistan was now lacking in Sudan. 
His idealistic vision of an international Islamist brigade had foundered on the rocks of Saudi 
politics; al-Qaeda became a group without a mission. The lack of direction, combined with 
the pleasures of running a successful business and farming group, meant that for a few years 
it seemed likely that bin Laden would retire his more radical Islamist ambitions and settle 
into the comfortable rhythm of his Sudanese family life.
4.4.4 Al-Qaeda as an Islamist Funding Body
Whilst temporarily subdued bin Laden’s Islamist passions did not die out altogether and his 
numerous contacts with international jihadists meant that he was never entirely cut off from 
the Islamist currents that were flowing around the Muslim world. Al-Qaeda’s model, insofar 
as it was involved in Islamist activities during the early Sudanese period, was one where
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groups or organisations would arrange a meeting with bin Laden and his inner circle to apply 
for funding for a particular specific operation or cause. This would then be considered by the 
al-Qaeda committee and the application would be accepted, modified or rejected. The money 
that was distributed to external groups would be considered seed-funding rather than an open- 
ended commitment to finance an entire campaign.76 One example of this process is the 
funding that was provided to two Algerian Islamists who approached al-Qaeda in the early 
1990s and won forty thousand dollars of funding. At the start of 1992 the cancelling by the 
army of the second round of a democratic election where the Islamic Salvation Front—an 
Islamist party—were likely to be returned to power, resulted in a violent civil war. The 
Islamist factions, primarily the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), fought an increasingly violent 
campaign that began by targeting Francophone politicians, officials, police, non-Muslims and 
intellectuals but escalated into the indiscriminate butchering of entire village populations. 
Although bin Laden initially funded the movement, he eventually baulked at the incredible 
intensive mindless brutality of the GIA and withdrew his support, claiming that it sullied the 
image of Islamists.77
Bin Laden noted the lack of focus and discipline in Algeria and the violence that had taken on 
a logic of its own. Although the later terrorist actions initiated by him tended towards the 
transcendent-symbolic mode he never understood violence as solely an end in itself. His 
background in business meant that he viewed terrorism primarily within the instrumental 
rational framework of cost-benefit analysis. Each operation represented a certain cost, both in 
human and capital terms, and was expected to produce a result larger than the cost. Certain 
types of actions, bin Laden speculated, for example suicide operations or spectacular 
bombings, had a disproportionate outcome, thus increasing the marginal profit. The 
Afghanistan jihad had proved to be the example par excellence of this idea. From bin 
Laden’s perspective a relatively modest amount of funding and manpower, in the form of the 
Arab-Afghans and mujahedeen had managed, when efficiently organized and focused on 
their task, to not only cause the evacuation of one of the world’s greatest armies, but had also 
precipitated the collapse of the entire Soviet empire. For bin Laden and the Afghan Arabs this 
represented an almost unimaginable achievement. Aside from the theological explanations of 
this extraordinary victory, bin Laden identified the use of repeated and unrelenting irregular 
warfare tactics as having acted as a force multiplier—to use Western military jargon—that
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had brought about the Islamist’s success. The technologically advanced but soulless and 
atheist Soviet monolith had been politically and economically unable to tolerate the 
thousands of small cuts inflicted by the divinely-inspired Islamists.
4.4.5 Al-Qaeda in Somalia
The chance to affirm his theory arose a year later in Somalia. The civil war that had begun in 
1991 resulted in the arrival of a UN peacekeeping taskforce charged with averting a 
humanitarian catastrophe compounded by famine in the south. The Americans, as the lead 
force, presented bin Laden with the opportunity to avenge the humiliation of the continued 
presence of foreign troops in his ancestral homeland. Just as with the Afghan jihad the 
historical facts of the events that followed are of less importance than the mythological 
narrative they were woven into. It seems that bin Laden sent a handful of al-Qaeda fighters to 
assist the Somali insurgents in their efforts to expel the UN forces. They were to provide 
training in bomb-making and other guerrilla warfare activities but were reportedly 
unsuccessful in this role.78 On October 3rd, 1993 their luck changed; two al-Qaeda operatives 
witnessed the downing of two Black Hawk helicopters by rocket-propelled grenades marking 
the beginning of the Battle of Mogadishu that resulted in the deaths of eighteen U.S. soldiers
• 70and several hundred Somali militia fighters and citizens in the ensuing rescue mission.
The loss of life and the televised images of the bodies of American soldiers being dragged 
through the streets of Mogadishu marked the turning point for support of the humanitarian 
intervention. A few months later in March 1994 all of the U.S. troops were withdrawn, 
swiftly followed by the evacuation of the remainder of the UN forces. For bin Laden and his 
supporters the narrative and its parallels with the Afghan jihad  were easy to draw. A small 
cadre of dedicated Islamist warriors and the deaths of just a few U.S. soldiers had managed to 
precipitate the evacuation of the sole remaining superpower that had looked, just two years 
earlier, triumphant and invincible in the Gulf War.80 The difference between the Soviets and 
the Americans was that the former had managed to sustain far greater losses over an eight 
year period before withdrawing from Afghanistan; but for the Americans it took only a single 
bloody loss. The conclusion that bin Laden barely needed to draw was that the American
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state and society were so decadent and internally corrupt that the illusion of its power could 
be shattered with a few, well directed blows. The democratic openness of the West made 
them more vulnerable to the images of loss and destruction that terrorism could create; this 
was an idea that would ferment in bin Laden’s mind for the following few years.
4.4.6 Hosni Mubarak Assassination Plot
In June 1995 the old Jihad alliance of EIJ and Gama’a al-Islamiyya was resurrected for an 
assassination attempt on the Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak.81 With the cooperation of 
Sudanese intelligence officials, Zawahiri conspired with members of Gama ’a al-Islamiyya to 
kill the president on his trip to a meeting in Addis Ababa. The plotters reasoned that the 
resulting power vacuum would offer an opportunity to seize power in the forthcoming 
Egyptian elections. Hasan al-Turabi secretly approved of the plan as he hoped that it would 
allow him to export his Islamist revolution to Sudan’s northern neighbour. The leader of the 
conspiracy was a senior al-Qaeda member, Mustafa Hamza, and given his role it seems likely 
that bin Laden either actively aided with the planning or at least gave his consent. The style 
of the proposed ambush of the president’s car certainly fitted in with the modus operandi of 
al-Qaeda with its calculated aim of destroying a high-value target using a minimal human and 
capital cost in the expectation of disproportionately profitable outcome—the Islamization of 
Egypt. The operation also seemed to be inspired by bin Laden’s belief that non-Islamic 
political systems are inherently unstable and can therefore be toppled with a crisis induced by 
a sudden shock applied to the correct place. Finally, apart from the utilitarian considerations, 
the symbolic value of assassinating Mubarak would not have been lost on bin Laden. He 
represented, in common with other Arabic leaders, the repression, corruption, weakness and 
hypocrisy of a government that dresses itself in the legitimising garbs of Islam but fails to 
rule by its tenets and had recognised, and even normalised its relations with, Israel.
Whatever the expectations of bin Laden, the al-Jihad cooperative and Turabi the ambush was 
unsuccessful when a grenade-launcher failed and Mubarak escaped with his life. The actual 
outcome of the assassination attempt therefore was very different from the one envisaged by 
the conspirators. Not only did it lead to a new, vigorous wave of persecutions of Islamists in 
Egypt but once the involvement of Sudan had been established—a fact that Turabi made no
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attempt to deny—there was an international outcry denouncing the leader who had previously 
been tolerated by the international community. Although protestations of Sudan’s innocence 
came from lower level officials, Turabi’s public praise for the would-be assassins sealed the 
country’s fate and a UN resolution was passed imposing economic sanctions on the already 
struggling state. In Egypt over the next four years an estimated 20,000 suspected members or 
supporters of Gama’a al-Islamiyya were rounded up with many being incarcerated in new- 
purpose built detention centres effectively crippling the group and eventually leading directly 
to the 1997 cease-fire initiative.82 The Egyptian authorities knew, however, that it would be 
insufficient to only subdue the Islamists at home. They had learnt from a plot that had been 
devised in Sudan, by several groups whose membership was composed of different 
nationalities, and staged in Ethiopia that the Islamist movements now operated on the global 
stage.
4.4.7 Expulsion from Sudan
Pressure from Egypt eventually forced Sudan to expel Zawahiri and EIJ; however bin Laden 
as an important businessman was allowed to stay. Having failed to directly pressurise Sudan 
into punishing bin Laden Egypt changed tact. The ongoing violence in its southern neighbour 
was a continuous source of instability for the country. Bin Laden was viewed, second only to 
Zawahiri, as the source of this trouble and the Egyptians complained vociferously to Saudi 
Arabia to bring their rebellious son under control. For the second time King Fahd ordered that 
bin Laden’s passport be confiscated; however on this occasion he went further, decreeing that 
his citizenship also be revoked.83 This was the final breaking-point for the strained 
relationship between bin Laden and the Saud family. Although he had been severely at odds 
with Saudi foreign policy, in particular with events surrounding the Gulf War, bin Laden still 
considered himself an exiled loyal citizen of the state and was shocked when an emissary 
arrived to deliver the news. The actions of Egypt and Saudi Arabia had turned bin Laden 
away from his idea of international jihadists working in conjunction with Muslim 
governments to Zawahiri’s ideological perspective of a direct and irreconcilable conflict with 
corrupt Islamic regimes.
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Osama bin Laden was now on a collision course with the Saud family and the state-sponsored 
ulemas that endowed religious legitimacy on their power. He commissioned the creation of 
an office in London that composed and distributed by fax countless denunciations of the 
regime included the familiar litany of accusations of the royal’s corruption, decadence and 
dependency on the Americans. The Saudis responded by ordering the Bin Laden Group to cut 
off bin Laden from the family company and seize his share of the assets. As diverse as his 
business interests were in Sudan bin Laden had relied on income from the Bin Laden Group 
to provide the regular cash flow on which his investments depended. The sudden severing of 
this source effectively bankrupted bin Laden and al-Qaeda. Starved of the cash flow 
guaranteed by the income from his family’s company the Islamist funding model swiftly 
collapsed. The extent of the crisis became evident when one member, Jamal al-Fadl, defected 
and sold his knowledge of al-Qaeda to the CIA, after he was caught siphoning funds from the 
dwindling reserves.84
4.4.8 Riyadh Truck Bomb
The spat between the Saud family and bin Laden finally reached a public climax. In August 
1995 he faxed an angry diatribe directly attacking King Fahd and the Saud family going as 
far as labelling the monarch an infidel. The letter included the familiar litany of complaints of 
the hypocritical disparity between the ostentatious displays of wealth by the royals and their 
patrons in contrast to the poverty of ordinary Saudis, as well as a scathing attack on the 
despoilment of the holy peninsular with the continued presence of American soldiers. 
Although the content was familiar the directness of the attack on King Fahd—including a 
demand for his abdication—scandalised the Saudi establishment.85 The following week a 
veteran of the Afghan war, who had been convicted of attacking a Saudi official, was 
summarily executed by the regime. It was a barely veiled response to bin Laden’s visceral 
rhetoric and once again ratcheted up the tension between the two parties. The response came 
on November 13th, 1995 when a large truck bomb destroyed a Saudi National Guard 
communications centre in Riyadh that operated with the aid of American military 
personnel.86 The impact of the attack was heightened when six days later Zawahiri’s group 
destroyed the Egyptian embassy in Pakistan, giving the impression of a global network of
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Islamists with the capability of striking around the world. Although bin Laden could not be 
linked directly with the attack the Saudis quickly rounded up several suspects—some of 
whom had participated in the Afghan jihad—and extracted videoed statements out of them to 
the effect that they had been influenced by bin Laden. After the ‘confessions’ were aired on 
national television fbur of the men were publicly beheaded.
The culmination of Saudi, Egyptian and American pressure on Sudan was finally making bin 
Laden’s presence intolerable. The expulsion of Zawahiri and the severing of his cash lifeline 
had left the Saudi vulnerable. Without the ability to invest generously in his various Sudanese 
enterprises there was little economic incentive for his continued presence. This was 
especially true when weighed against the loss of political capital, economic isolation and the 
diplomatic freeze that Sudan suffered as a result. Any ideological affinities counted for very 
little in the face of tangible short-term political and economic costs. Although Sudan resolved 
to expel bin Laden at the beginning of 1996 it was unclear where he would go. Bin Laden had 
made many enemies, but at this point he was viewed as the bankroller of Islamist movements 
rather than the mastermind. The Sudanese offered to hand him over to America but they 
declined due to a lack of evidence that he had committed a crime against the U.S. or its 
citizens. The Saudis also refused him after assurances were sought by the Sudanese that he 
would not be prosecuted.87 Furthermore, either out of sense of loyalty to the powerful bin 
Laden family or a fear of turning bin Laden into a martyr like Qutb, the Saudis did not want 
to execute him; the benefit of accepting his return was outweighed by the potential costs. 
Finally, bin Laden was stripped of all his remaining Sudanese assets and on May 18 , 1996 
was put on a plane with a few members of his inner circle and his family and was flown to 
Jalalabad in eastern Afghanistan.88 The remainder of al-Qaeda members were either 
dispatched back to their home countries or fled before the authorities could catch them.
4.4.9 Return to Afghanistan
In the end the difficult choice that bin Laden had faced between a comfortable, existence in 
Sudan and his commitment to the Islamist movement had been made for him. Shorn of most 
of his material assets bin Laden was now entirely committed to his imagined fate as the 
leader of the global Islamist revolution. Once more bin Laden recognised, and actively
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manipulated the powerful symbolism to establish himself as an Islamist figurehead. Soon 
after arriving in Jalalabad he was on the move again, relocating to the Tora Bora caves. The 
rugged caves reflected the refuge that the Prophet had sought on his journey to Medina and 
bin Laden sought to recast his flight from Khartoum as a latter-day hijra (migration).89 Bin 
Laden also contrasted the pure and authentic austerity of his day-to-day existence with the 
consoling but meaningless trappings of materialism that corrupted the rest of humanity. At 
the aesthetic level bin Laden’s life was now a dramatization of the morality play that had long 
been played out in the collective imagination of the jihadists: true authentic Islam—stripped 
of all manmade additions and accumulations of history—confronted by, and confronting, 
Western modernity. Over the next five years bin Laden and al-Qaeda conspired to turn this 
symbolic confrontation that occupied their minds, and defined their reality, into a real-life 
struggle that would mesmerise the rest of the world.
At the same time as bin Laden was returning to Afghanistan the Taliban were on the verge of 
completing their takeover of most of the country and ending the long civil war that had 
followed the Soviet withdrawal. As we explored earlier the Islamists and the Taliban had 
quite different ideological outlooks. The uncertainty and mutual suspicion that had prevented 
a political alliance at the end of the Afghan jihad  still prevailed when bin Laden arrived 
uninvited from Sudan. Mullah Omar a veteran o f the Soviet campaign and the man, who had 
emerged as the leader of the Taliban, was initially concerned by the residency of a man with 
such a noxious international reputation. Although Kabul had not yet fallen Omar recognised 
that once political control of Afghanistan had been won the Taliban would need regional 
allies to hold onto power. One of their most important sponsors was Saudi Arabia, who 
sought a politically stable buffer in Afghanistan as a counterbalance to any Iranian influence, 
and it was their advice that Omar sought when he heard of bin Laden’s arrival. The Saudi 
response was to stick with the containment strategy that had spectacularly failed with the less 
pliable Sudan regime—allow bin Laden to stay, but keep him quiet.90 Bin Laden’s attitude 
towards the Taliban was broadly based on ignorance. Unaware of who they were, and having 
been burnt by his alliance with the Sudanese government, he sought to isolate al-Qaeda 
geographically, materially and politically from the regime but quietly sent out feelers in order 
to see what could be learnt about the black-turbaned movement.
89 Gilles Kepel Jihad: The Trail o f Political Islam p.318
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Although keeping quiet was an important imperative on the local stage—bin Laden did not 
want to unnecessarily antagonise his hosts—and was well aware of the balance-of-power that 
meant that he required their tolerance of his presence more than they needed him, he certainly 
did not plan on a descent into obscurity in the mountains of east Afghanistan. Only one 
month after his arrival on June 25th, 1996 a massive truck bomb exploded outside the Khobar 
towers complex in Saudi Arabia resulting in the death of 19 Americans and one Saudi, and 
injured several hundred others.91 As the truck had been planted by Lebanese nationals and 
members of Hezbollah, the attack was linked to Iran. The Saudis, however, also claimed that 
the wider conspiracy included several Arab veterans of the Afghan jihad and so suspicion fell 
on bin Laden that he had at least known of the attack, even if he had not been actively 
involved in its planning. The motivation behind the bombing certainly segued with bin 
Laden’s pressing concern with the continued presence of the American servicemen in Saudi 
Arabia and he praised the attack numerous times in his first major fatwa published later that 
year.
Regardless of the actual extent of bin Laden’s involvement with the Khobar attack he was 
certainly not fulfilling the Saudi directive that demanded his gagging.92 Despite the persona 
that bin Laden actively crafted of a total rejection of modernity he did continue to utilize its 
technologies to create and disseminate an idealised image. The cave, and later the farm 
compound, from which he worked was filled with technologies of mass communication: a 
satellite telephone, faxes, computers and various media recording equipment. Some of the 
most important skills that bin Laden personally utilized in running al-Qaeda were those of the 
administrator and propagandist. He was less successful as an original ideologue, and worse as 
a theologian, tending to haphazardly combine a salafi version of Islam with elements of Qutb, 
Azzam and Zawahiri.93 These strengths and weaknesses were reflected in the two infamous 
fatwas that he released over the next two years.
4.4.10 1996 Fatwa
91 Gilles Kepel Jihad: The Trail o f Political Islam p.317
92 Hie 9/11 Commission Report p.65
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The first fatwa published in August 1996 was written by bin Laden and printed by an Arabic- 
language newspaper based in London.94 The lengthy document broadly consists of a list of 
charges levelled against the Saudi regime in particular, and other Muslim governments in 
general, and is a call to arms to correct these problems. The substantive rhetoric that conveys 
the central messages is interspersed with a mixture of quotations from the Qur’an, hadith, Ibn 
Taymiyya and short verses of poetry composed by bin Laden. He recounts the past successes 
of the Islamist movement claiming that the jihad  in Afghanistan had destroyed the ‘myth of 
the superpower’ and praised the actions of Islamists in Beirut, Somalia and Aden that had 
forced the U.S. to withdraw after suffering light losses in minor attacks. America, as the sole 
superpower in the post-Co Id War world had become ‘like Rome ... degenerate and 
demoralized, ready to be overthrown.’95 The most pressing problem now facing the Islamists 
was the stationing of U.S. service personnel in the Arabian Peninsula. Their continued 
presence was both a cause and a symptom of a host of other ills that bin Laden diagnosed in 
the Saudi political, economic and social systems.
The list of complaints is similar in content to the Letter of Demands that king Fahd had 
ignored in the lead up to the Gulf War. They include accusations that the royal family had 
allowed the country’s infrastructure to deteriorate, legislated with manmade law instead of 
shar’ia, failed to protect the country by training a competent army and subsequently invited, 
and continued to host American troops, seriously mismanaged the economy and plundered 
the nation’s wealth for their own material gain. Not only had the regime neglected their basic 
civic, economic and Islamic duties but when the concerned citizens, scholars and ulema 
pointed out their transgressions and suggested an alternative course of action, their 
protestations were ignored and the authors and supporters were persecuted for speaking out. 
The culmination of these failures, and the active harm and humiliation being inflicted on the 
people due to the presence o f American troops had forced the Islamists into using violence to 
correct these wrongs.
Aside from an instruction to boycott Western goods the fatwa is less clear on the more 
nefarious methods that should be used. In several places the jihadists’ bombings and other 
violent activities are praised and it is clear that bin Laden thinks that these are the most
94 The translation of the fatwa has been published by Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/tCTrorism/intemational/fatwa_1996.html
95 Bernard Lewis The Crisis O f Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror pp. 125-126
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efficient and effective tools available to the movement. Following the tradition of Ibn 
Taymiyya and Abdullah Azzam he states that Islam is under attack, the most conspicuous 
example being the presence of infidels in the Arabian Peninsula. Restating Azzam’s dictum 
he states that the most important duty after belief, incumbent on individual Muslims, is to 
expel the Americans from the Land of the Two Holy Places. The only way that this can be 
done, as there is an imbalance of power, is to use ‘guerrilla warfare ... with complete secrecy 
... [and avoid engaging] in conventional fighting.’
Although the burden of jihad  falls on all the umma bin Laden makes a direct appeal to the 
new generation of Muslim youths. This is in line with the themes that run through the fatwa 
that claimed the impending jihad  both necessitated, and simultaneously precipitated, a 
religious and political awakening of the umma. As al-Banna and Qutb had previously argued, 
bin Laden believed that Muslims needed a jolt to their collective consciousness to realise the 
perilous existential situation o f Islam in the modern world, and the irreconcilable conflict it is 
embroiled in with the forces o f jahiliyya, that define the condition and essential unity of the 
global umma.96 Al-Banna had created a mass-movement to achieve this awakening, Qutb had 
imagined a dedicated and pure Islamist vanguard, Zawahiri hoped to topple the Egyptian 
government to create an Islamist state; for bin Laden hope lay in the new generation of 
Muslim youths committed to the Islamist project and willing to sacrifice their lives, in violent 
terrorist actions, to achieve its ends. Thus, the central significance of the fatwa and probably 
bin Laden’s most infamous message, directed at William Perry the then U.S. Defense 
Secretary, and also the American public: ‘These [Muslim] youths love death as you loves 
[sic] life.’
In contrast with the clarity of purpose for dealing with the Americans bin Laden’s attitude 
towards the Saudi and other Muslim regimes the language and arguments used are more 
ambiguous. He stops short of pronouncing the Saudis takfir—essentially bin Laden remains 
conservative when faced with the prospect of revolt although he does obliquely suggest that 
the failure to implement shar’ia ‘would strip a person [of] his Islamic status.’ Despite 
castigating the regime he does not openly incite revolution. Although this is a function of bin 
Laden’s pragmatism—he does not believe in the utility of fighting several enemies at once 
and his patronage in Afghanistan depended on Saudi acquiescence—it is also a result of his
96 Bernard Lewis The Crisis O f Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror p. 124
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ideological conservatism. Recreating the imagined unity of the global umma is of more 
importance than the disutility caused by corrupt Muslim governments. In this regard bin 
Laden couches a Qutbian historical perspective within the familiar register of the modern 
Islamist’s conspiratorial worldview. Thus the fatwa claims that the umma have been tricked, 
manipulated and coerced by the forces of jahiliyya (now variously relabelled as the ‘Zionist- 
crusader alliance;’ ‘American-Israeli;’ ‘Christians army’) into internecine fighting that has 
prevented them from recognising the crucial mission of ‘unification ... under the divine law 
of Allah.’ Although bin Laden poses the discrete challenge of expelling American troops 
from Saudi Arabia and introducing Islamist reform, the much more grandiose goal is to effect 
a change of shared consciousness in all Muslims, and even non-Muslims, of uncovering the 
ultimate conflict between Islam and the West.97 The method that he dedicates the following 
five years to achieving this awakening is to create a spark that will bring the war into the 
open by provoking the symbol and superpower of the West into openly attacking Islam.98 
Before this could happen bin Laden would need to rebuild al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and 
reunite with his old friend, Ayman al-Zawahiri.
4.4.11 Gama’a al-Islamiyya Cease-Fire Initiative
It is interesting that one of the events that led up to the allying of Zawahiri’s EIJ organization 
with al-Qaeda, occurred in Egypt, where EIJ had effectively ceased operational activities 
since Zawahiri’s move to Afghanistan. Zawahiri had left Egypt frustrated with the failure of 
the alliance between EIJ and Gama’a al-Islamiyya with other, smaller Islamist groups, to 
overthrow the Egyptian government in a coup d ’etat. As we have previously seen this 
failure—that expressed itself most clearly in the conspicuous absence of a revolutionary 
uprising following Sadat’s assassination—resulted in an extensive crackdown on the 
Egyptian Islamists and the breakup of the coalition. After serving a three year prison sentence 
Zawahiri decided to leave the country to continue the jihad  in Afghanistan. Many members 
of EIJ, however, remained in Egypt and Gama ’a al-Islamiyya continued a campaign of 
terrorist violence but this time they targeted softer targets including Egyptian Copts, police
97 Jason Burke Al-Qaeda: The True Story o f Radical Islam pp. 165-166
98 At approximately the same time as writing the 1996fatwa bin Laden met Khalid Sheik Mohammed the uncle 
of Ramzi Yousef—the man who planned the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center. At the meeting Khalid 
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and in particular foreign tourists, in the hope of undermining the power of the government by 
destroying a crucial segment of the economy. Although they did not succeed in inflicting 
sufficient damage on the government they certainly managed to wreak havoc on the tourist 
industry through sporadic attacks on targets including Nile cruise ships in the early 1990s.
The failure to achieve their primary target of destabilising the government, and with most of 
their leadership, including the spiritual leader of the group the blind cleric Omar Abdel- 
Rahman, imprisoned or actively persecuted by the state, resulted in the demoralization of its 
members. Their choice of target in the tourist industry only resulted in a huge public backlash 
especially from the vast numbers of the urban poor who had barely managed to eke out a 
livelihood on the edges of the tourism economy. Cruise ships were banned from sailing 
between Cairo and Luxor, a measure that remains in effect at the time of writing, and tourists 
were forced to travel in police-escorted convoys between the major cities and were forbidden 
from visiting others. Having isolated their natural constituents, generated widespread public 
resentment and with the membership in disarray, the imprisoned leaders were effectively 
forced into negotiating a ceasefire agreement with the government. In 1996 Kahled Ibrahim, 
the leader of Gama’a al-Islamiyya, called for the cessation of armed operations for a year."
The sudden reversal of tactics, combined with the decentralized organisational structure and 
outside interference from Zawahiri, meant that not all members could be brought into line 
with the leader’s initiative and just a few months later the bloodiest attack in Egypt’s modem 
history was executed in Luxor.100 Early in the morning on the November 17th, 1997 several 
gunmen belonging to Gama ’a al-Islamiyya entered the Temple of Queen Hatshepsut and over 
the course of an hour killed fifty-nine foreigners and four Egyptians. It is likely that the attack 
was intended to derail the cease-fire agreement but instead it reinforced the trends that had 
made the initiative a necessity for the group. It also brought into stark contrast the split that 
was occurring in the Islamist movement between those who subscribed to the Islamic 
legitimacy and efficacy of terrorist violence as a tactic and those who renounced it in favour 
of political dialogue.101 The backlash caused by this attack was not, therefore, restricted to the 
response of the government and the public; it also evoked an angry response from the 
leadership of Gama’a al-Islamiyya. Montasser al-Zayyat, the group’s lawyer and
99 Montasser al-Zayyat The Road To al-Qaeda: The Story o f bin Laden’s Right Hand Man p.70
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spokesperson, describes how Zawahiri’s close relationship with bin Laden had changed him, 
reporting that upon returning to Afghanistan from Sudan Zawahiri ‘had become completely 
different from the man we once knew.’102 Instead of being committed to the overthrow of the 
Egyptian state, Zayyat accused Zawahiri o f turning EIJ into a mere tool for al-Qaeda. The 
Gama’a al-Islamiyya's cease-fire initiative, Zawahiri’s response, and Zayyat’s critique, 
demonstrated once again the dramatic and recurring polarization of the Islamist movement 
into groups who renounce violence and wish to engage in the mainstream political discourse 
and those who entirely reject any form of ideological compromise.
Following the Luxor massacre it became clear that Zawahiri and the EIJ had failed to bring 
the Gama’a al-Islamiyya's leadership around to his way of thinking. It was also clear that 
Zawahiri’s scope for acting within Egypt had narrowed. Since his move to Afghanistan the 
EIJ had effectively ceased operation in Egypt as Zawahiri’s focus had moved to the ‘external 
enemy’ who he reasoned were in fact the real power behind the Egyptian government. Now 
that the Soviets had been defeated this increasingly meant the United States. Nevertheless, 
Zawahiri, like Azzam, was keen to eliminate what he thought of the false dichotomy of the 
‘internal’ and ‘external’ enemy and his overall aim remained the overthrow of the Egyptian 
government and its replacement with an Islamist regime. Now that Zawahiri and the EIJ had 
become isolated in Egypt he was forced into reformulating his ideology, bringing it into line 
with his associate bin Laden and al-Qaeda group. This also entailed an organizational change 
that had become necessary because of EIJ’s inability to operate within Egypt. Zawahiri and 
his followers were effectively caught in a pincer movement that is characteristic of the history 
of the Islamist movement. The renouncement of violence by one section of the movement or 
group causes the other half to reinvent its identity and reassert its power by avowing to follow 
an even more radical and violent path. It is the schism that creates the new outbreak of violent 
energy, normally in the smaller and politically isolated group, as it is put in a position where 
it needs to fight for its ideological existence and tries to retain its marginal followers, 
sponsors, membership and constituents. In February 1998 these ideological and 
organizational upheavals were formalized in the creation of bin Laden’s Global Front for
•  103Fighting Jews and Crusaders and the merging of the remnants of EIJ with al-Qaeda.
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4.4.12 1998 Fatwa
The second of bin Laden’s fatwas was printed in the same month as the formation of the 
Global Front and so served as a de facto manifesto for the group.104 It continues with most of 
the major themes of the 1996 fatwa but in a more concentrated and circumscribed form. The 
opening sentence pays tribute to Allah as one who ‘defeats factionalism’ emphasising the 
importance that bin Laden attaches to the unity of the umma as well as celebrating his reunion 
with Zawahiri. The fatwa is largely a rehash of the 1996 document, using the same language 
but this time concentrating on the particular crises of the American presence in the ‘Arabian 
Peninsula ... [occupied by] the crusader armies ... eating its riches’ as well as the more 
general complaint that this is taking place ‘at a time in which nations are attacking Muslims.’
One accusation new to the 1998 fatwa is the claim that America is using the Peninsula as a 
‘staging post ... [to commit] continuing aggression against the Iraqi people.’ The major 
difference between the two, however, is what is missing rather than what is added. In stark 
contrast with the earlier fatwa no mention is made of the Saudi regime’s complicity with the 
U.S. presence on its land nor are any other Muslim governments criticised. Presumably when 
drafting the document bin Laden, by holding the balance-of-power, managed to convince 
Zawahiri to redirect his jihadist ambitions away from his long held objective of toppling the 
Egyptian government, and concentrate instead on the least controversial or divisive, external 
enemies: America and Israel. The necessity of recreating the unity of the global umma and 
uniting them against a singular enemy, in a single cause has, in this document, silenced the 
virulent rhetoric that bin Laden had directed against the Saudi establishment over the 
previous six years.105 The actual imperative of the fatwa—justified by the American 
occupation and aggression committed against Muslims in Iraq and across the globe—is ‘the 
ruling to kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and military—is an individual duty for 
every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible.’ Six months later al-Qaeda 
would put these words into devastating action.
104 The translation of the fatwa has been published by Public Broadcasting Service (PBS)
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105 Jason Burke Al-Qaeda: The True Story o f  Radical Islam p. 165
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4.4.13 Two Tactical Strands: Propaganda of the Deed and the Videotape
In the two years between his return to Afghanistan and the release of his 1996 fatwa; and his 
reunion with Zawahiri and the publication of the 1998 fatwa, bin Laden had been carefully 
consolidating his position in Afghanistan. The parochialism and provincialism of the Taliban 
contrasted sharply with the globalised ideology of Zawahiri and bin Laden. Despite their 
ideological incongruities Mullar Omar, after several meetings with bin Laden, formed a 
tentative friendship— initially defined and circumscribed by political considerations—and 
invited his family to move to a compound near Kandahar. Here the Taliban had formed the 
seat of their government in the spiritual capital of Afghanistan they could keep a careful 
watch on their guests and, at least attempt to, regulate their media campaign against the 
Taliban’s main sponsors, Saudi Arabia. The relationship between Omar and bin Laden 
continued to improve at the same time as the Taliban consolidated power and thus decreased 
their dependency on their Saudi and Pakistani sponsors. Proof of the shift in Omar’s loyalties 
came in September 1998 just after the embassy bombings in Africa, when he politely, but 
firmly refused a direct request by Prince Turki and General Naseem Rana, the head of the ISI, 
to hand over bin Laden.106
At the same time as bin Laden was consolidating his position with the Taliban he also 
undertook the restructuring of al-Qaeda. The model that had prevailed in Sudan of a business 
empire with a philanthropic interest in sponsoring and aiding Islamist activities evolved into 
an exclusive focus on bin Laden’s jihadist ambitions. Although now entirely committed to 
fulfilling the pledges of the 1996 fatwa bin Laden was aware of the limitations of his group, 
especially now that his main sources of income had been cut. With limited funds and a small 
number of al-Qaeda members it was decided that greater use would have to be made of a 
previously established tactic: the harnessing of technologies and utilization of destructive 
techniques that resulted in disproportionate benefit-to-cost ratio. Bin Laden struck on two 
main ways of following this model, through the use of modern propaganda techniques— 
where the majority of the cost was borne by the broadcaster—and the designing and 
sponsorship of spectacular and symbolically-oriented terrorist attacks. These two stands were 
united by three elements: both supported the narrative that was described in the 1996 fatwa,
106 The 9/11 Commission Report pp. 121-122
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they utilised a shared and powerful symbolic language, and they were cheap to execute and 
effective in their outcomes.
4.4.14 Propaganda Campaign
The propaganda strand was an evolution of the volley of faxes that had been sent to London 
prior to al-Qaeda’s expulsion from Sudan. Shortly after arriving in Afghanistan bin Laden 
sought out a more targeted and effective method of communicating the ideology that had 
been disseminated in the 1996 fatwa. A carefully orchestrated media campaign was devised 
whereby foreign journalists from both the Western and Muslim world were invited to 
interview the leader.107 At this point bin Laden was an obscure figure, especially to a Western 
audience, but his fatwa was a virtual declaration of war on America and this piqued 
journalistic interest enough to ensure that some were prepared to make the journey with a 
camera crew. The interviews were carefully framed by bin Laden’s team and they paid 
particular attention to the visual imagery. The first interviews took place in Jalalabad where 
the symbolism of the stark aesthetic of the caves conveyed the sacrifices and dedication of 
bin Laden who could otherwise have been living an easy life in Saudi Arabia. Later on, after 
the relocation to Kandahar, the less subtle but more arresting technique of introducing bin 
Laden with a burst of automatic gunfire was used to convey the violent intent behind his 
message. Interestingly the first interview was with CNN—in the cave—whilst the latter was 
with a Pakistani news organisation suggesting that the message was being tailored towards its 
audience. In the first instance the narrative presented was of a pure, authentic Islam 
struggling against the destructive, all-consuming march of modernity; whilst in the latter the 
strength and bloody intent of the jihadists was the key message aimed at its Muslim 
audience.108
4.4.15 Violent Campaign
The propaganda campaign was successful on both of the criteria set by bin Laden. It was 
cheap to implement as most of the costs of filming and distributing the footage was paid for
107 Osama bin Laden “March 1997 CNN Interview” cited in Jason Burke Al-Qaeda: The True Story o f Radical 
Islam p.164
108 Ben Venzke and Aimee Ibrahim eds. The Al-Qaeda Threat: An Analytical Guide to al-Qaeda s Tactics and 
Targets p. 139
by the networks, and it was effective in attracting donations and new recruits of young men 
who once again began to arrive in Peshawar and transported across the border for inculcation 
and training in the reopened al-Qaeda camps and guest houses. The strategy was also 
effective in facilitating the second strand of al-Qaeda’s campaign: the utilisation of 
spectacular violent attacks against symbolic U.S. targets. By attracting publicity bin Laden 
was showing that al-Qaeda, after a period of relative inaction, was once again open for 
business. As well as receiving a fresh round of recruits, more experienced jihadists began to 
approach al-Qaeda with proposals for Islamist operations. These would be considered by an 
al-Qaeda committee and then either accepted, rejected or amended—a model that one 
commentator likened to a research grant committee.109 If successful a small amount of seed 
money would be provided to facilitate the plan as well as any logistical or personnel aid that 
was required.110 The outcome of one of these applications resulted in the 1998 bombings of 
two U.S. embassies in Africa. The two strands effectively worked in tandem, the propaganda 
facilitated the terrorist operations and the spectacle of the violence served as powerful 
propaganda, creating a positive feedback loop.111
The way we interpret terrorist violence is important for how we understand bin Laden’s 
ideology and the attacks on the U.S. embassies and 9/11. There are two broad competing 
theories. The first, advocated by social scientist Olivier Roy, is that al-Qaeda understands 
themselves as operating on a transcendent plane whereby they are embroiled in a grand 
conflict between the forces of belief and unbelief.112 According to this view there is no point 
in trying to negotiate with bin Laden as political compromises and promises hold no value to 
him; they simply do not impinge on his worldview. Al-Qaeda operatives act for ‘the sake and 
pleasure of Allah, ... for the sake of self-achievement (in death), for escaping a corrupt world 
... [and with a] strange mix of deep personal pessimism and collective millenarianist 
optimism.’113 From this perspective to kill Americans and other Westerners is an end-in-itself 
and only a means towards the utopian—and impossible—goal of winning the ultimate battle 
of Islam against jahiliyya by eliminating the latter. These would-be martyrs therefore have 
‘no compunction about employing chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons
109 Jason Burke Al-Qaeda: The True Story o f Radical Islam pp.232-233 
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against population centers.’114 The second camp, by contrast, claim that far from being 
nihilist madmen, al-Qaeda, as an organization are rational actors who utilize terrorism as the 
most effective means of achieving their ends.115
Neither of these interpretations of al-Qaeda’s terrorist violence is entirely satisfactory. As we 
have suggested earlier bin Laden seeks to mould the everyday politics of the world in which 
he operates into a transcendent framework, but this does not mean that he is fundamentally 
opposed or oblivious to political opportunities and constraints. As we shall see both the 
embassy bombings and 9/11 can be reasonably interpreted as provocations for America to 
openly attack a Muslim country; to this extent both the attacks can be understood within the 
instrumental framework. Accepting this is correct we must pose the additional question of 
why he wanted to target the U.S. One answer that we have previously entertained follows the 
instrumental logic: bin Laden believed that the U.S., like the Soviets, were ‘paper tigers’ who 
could be defeated on the battlefield using the same asymmetric, guerrilla warfare techniques 
that had, according to the jihadists ’ mythology, destroyed the Soviet Union. Once militarily 
exhausted the economic, political and social structures would quickly collapse, forcing 
America to withdraw its support for Israel and corrupt Muslim regimes. The second answer, 
utilising the transcendent framework, is that by compelling America to respond to a 
provocation by openly attacking Muslims the real nature of the existential battle of Islam 
versus jahiliyya would be unveiled to the world. In Zawahiri’s words ‘[the Americans will] 
personally wage the battle against the Muslims, which means that the battle will turn into 
clear-cut jihad against infidels.’116
Only by utilizing interpretive understanding and taking ideology seriously can the 
instrumental and value rationality of Islamist terrorist actions be reconciled and understood. 
This allows us to claim that the answer to this dispute resides in a mixture of the two modes 
of interpretation; that the violence should be understood both within an instrumental and 
value-rational framework. The modem Islamist ideology contained and to some extent 
ameliorated the contradictions of al-Banna’s strategic pragmatism and Qutb’s transcendent 
value-rational utopianism. Both elements of the ideology are present in the texts and 
statements of the globalised jihadists and there is no reason why one view should be given
114 Rohan Gunaratna Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network o f Terror p. 15
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priority over the other. David Charters calls this ambiguity at the heart of al-Qaeda ‘Janus 
faced’ explaining that ‘it espouses long-term goals that reflect its radical ideology, while in 
the short-term it behaves as a realpolitik-guided rational actor.’117 The flexibility in bin 
Laden’s ideology explains the longevity of the movement and the ability of the globalised 
Islamist ideology to adapt easily to new political situations.
4.4.16 U.S. Embassy Bombings
Apart from the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, that could only be weakly linked to 
bin Laden’s original training camps in Afghanistan, the first major manifestation of this new 
ideological imperative and organizational alliance, came on August 7th, 1998. Within just a 
few minutes of each other two massive truck bombs exploded outside the U.S. embassies in 
Nairobi and Dar es Salaam killing in total approximately 223 people and wounding several 
thousand.118 The majority of the casualties were locals who either worked in the embassies or 
just happened to be nearby; however 12 Americans were also killed. In a statement released 
three days before the attack Zawahiri claims that the bombings were in revenge for the arrest 
and extradition of three EIJ members. He wrote ‘The Americans should read [the message] 
carefully because we will write it, God willing, in the language they understand.’119 The 
moral equivalence that Zawahiri draws between his own group’s terrorist violence and the 
violence committed by the United States as a shared ‘language’ is important. In order to 
justify bombings in which many of the casualties were not the direct target (and many of 
whom will also be Muslims), Zawahiri and bin Laden claim that they are merely borrowing 
the tactics of their enemy. Furthermore they claim that due to their relative weakness they can 
only engage in violence using irregular tactics.
Although the proximate justification of the embassy bombings was the extradition—with the 
aid of the CIA—of three EIJ activists from Albania to Egypt, the underlying explanation for 
the attack lies deeper. The embassy bombings marked an important change in the tactics 
employed by the Islamists under the aegis of al-Qaeda, although it is crucial to recognise that 
this was once again, an evolutionary, rather than revolutionary, development. In common 
with the Luxor massacre, the attackers selected soft targets, tourists and embassies, rather
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than military targets. This represented a continuation of the trend starting with the Egyptian 
embassy bombing in 1995, in line with Zawahiri’s doctrine of selecting targets based on the 
material and technological capability of the group and employing methods, such as the 
suicide bomber, that resulted in the fewest number of casualties for the Islamists and was 
least likely to fail. The use of suicide attacks, where the perpetrator either dies directly as a 
result of the action, or is not expected to survive, has symbolic significance, both in the 
theological symbol of the martyr and as a material demonstration of the ideology’s 
transcendent belief in glory in death over shame in life.
Despite the continuities the embassy bombings also marked an important shift in the modus 
operandi of al-Qaeda operations. All previous attacks had taken place in countries where the 
Islamists’ perceived that a Muslim land had been occupied by an infidel army—including 
Afghanistan, Algeria, Bosnia, Chechnya and Saudi Arabia.120 The U.S. embassy bombings 
therefore represent a shift away from the defensive, territorially-confined, idea of jihad 
espoused by Azzam towards the offensive, unlimited ideology that had been jointly imagined 
by Qutb, bin Laden and Zawahiri.121 They also demonstrate the fulfilment of the second 
strand of al-Qaeda’s operational tactics outlined in 1996—terrorism as propaganda. The U.S. 
embassy bombings also differed from previous attacks in their scale and spectacle. The use of 
huge truck bombs, simultaneously detonated was guaranteed to achieve a visually spectacular 
result in the decimated remains of the buildings. This demonstrated the power of the group 
and their technical and organizational ability to achieve near simultaneous attacks over a 
great distance. The spectacle of terrorism—and the harrowing spectre of future attacks—were 
not lost on bin Laden. Zawahiri explicitly stated in the communique before the bombings that 
they were intended as a message to the Americans in a ‘language’ they can understand. It 
seems very likely that they also understood that the message had more than one recipient. Not 
only was the American government to receive the message but so too were the American 
public, and by extension other Western citizens, but so too were fellow Muslims and 
Islamists.
4.5 The Path to 9/11
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It is beyond the scope of this work to study the detailed history of the attacks on September
th  • •11 , 2001. Instead it is important to interpret the significance, justification and meaning of 
9/11 within the paradigm of the globalized Islamist ideology. Although the nexus of events 
that constitute 9/11 can be interpreted in several ways and framed within different narratives 
we shall utilize the ideological prism through which Osama bin Laden and the international 
Islamists understood the operation. Furthermore, although 9/11 is unquestionably the most 
important single act executed by Islamists we must not make the mistake of analysing it out 
of context. In the run up to 9/11 al-Qaeda continued to operate according to its methodology 
established from its expulsion from Sudan, pursuing the twin complementary objectives of 
propaganda and acts of symbolic violence, which together were intended to achieve the 
ultimate objective of an unveiling to the world of the grand Qutbian conflict that informed the 
worldview and actions of bin Laden and his fellow Islamists. Within this context the events 
of 9/11 can be viewed as the pinnacle of the process that began with the embassy bombings, 
passed through the unsuccessful millennial attacks on Los Angeles International airport and 
USS The Sullivans and the partially successful USS Cole operation, and culminated in 9/11.
For bin Laden the anticipated response to al-Qaeda operations were as important as the actual 
act. Within a Hegelian framework the synthesis or final outcome of an operation was a 
product of the operation—the thesis—and the response—the antithesis. The eventual 
synthesis that bin Laden imagined was something like the transcendental battle of Islam and 
jahiliyya that fired Qutb’s imagination. Bin Laden however, unlike Qutb, was also a 
pragmatist and realist, and so was aware this grand conflict would not reveal itself to the rest 
of the world if left to its own devices. A further difference to Qutb was that bin Laden, as a 
former pupil of Azzam, was attuned to the ethical power that a narrative of ‘Islam under 
attack’ had with Muslims who were uncomfortable with militancy and violence. He therefore 
had the paradoxical mission of realising Qutb’s vision but reorienting the conflict so that 
Islam would appear imperilled by the West and yet somehow achieve this through offensive 
means. Bin Laden wanted to show that Islam was under attack—thereby justifying a 
defensive jihad—but could only do this by first attacking the West. From this perspective we 
can appreciate the importance of the propaganda strand to al-Qaeda and how vital it was that 
the response to their provocations was robust enough to give force to the narrative of a 
defensive jihad in the face of Western aggression.
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There is a strong possibility that the embassy bombings were intended to provoke America 
into invading Afghanistan. In any case the American response, Operation Infinite Reach, was 
to fire several cruise missiles at suspected training camps in Afghanistan and at a 
pharmaceutical factory in Sudan.122 Aside from the failure of the missiles to kill any senior 
al-Qaeda operatives the retaliation was also a propaganda success because it propelled bin 
Laden’s status as a heroic figure of resistance against the long reach of the American military. 
Bin Laden capitalised on the propaganda value by boasting in an audio broadcast: ‘by the 
grace of God, I am alive.’123 This was shortly followed by Zawahiri’s taunt:
Tell the Americans that we aren’t afraid of bombardment, threats, and acts of 
aggression. We suffered and survived the Soviet bombings for ten years in 
Afghanistan .... The war has just begun; the Americans should now await the
124answer.
4.5.1 Millennium Plots
In the run up to the millennium anticipation o f a spectacular terrorist attack was high. The 
unspecified threat of an unknown terrorist attack including speculation about the use of non- 
conventional weapons segued with the general hysteria over the Y2K bug created a febrile 
atmosphere that al-Qaeda were keen to exploit.125 The changing methods of al-Qaeda had 
begun several years earlier with the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993 masterminded 
by Khalid Sheik Mohammed’s nephew Ramzi Yousef. Yousef had passed through one of the 
original al-Qaeda camps during the Afghan jihad  where he received ordnance and explosives 
training.126 He was one of an estimated ten to twenty-thousand trainees that passed through 
the camps where they received ideological indoctrination, physical conditioning and firearms 
instruction.127 The vast majority left the camps without being formally recruited by al-Qaeda, 
thus allowing it to remain an elite and highly centralized organization and provided an 
effective barrier to infiltration by intelligence agencies. As with many others Yousef was not 
recruited, but unlike the majority he went on to become a successful, freelance terrorist. He 
travelled to the U.S., recruited a cell in New York and after receiving a fatwa from Sheik
122 John Davis “Implications of Preventive Wars for Collective Security”
123 Osama bin Laden cited in Lawrence Wright The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda’s Road to 9/11 p.285
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125 Also known as the Year 2000 problem, it concerned the expected problems when the abbreviated year in 
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126 Lawrence Wright The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda’s Road to 9/11 p. 177
127 Lawrence Wright The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda’s Road to 9/11 pp.301-302
211
Omar Abdel Rahman (the spiritual leader of al-Gama *a al-Islamiyya) he devised, funded and 
executed a truck bombing of the World Trade Center that killed six and injured over a 
thousand people. Al-Qaeda as an organization and funding body was barely needed in this 
instance. Their main contribution was the training that Yousef had received but more 
importantly the ideology that was fostered and disseminated in the Afghan camps. The 
operationally and financially autonomous—but ideologically inspired—form of terrorist 
attack, pioneered by Yousef, would later evolve into the phenomenon known as self-starter 
terrorism.
The first failed millennial operation was planned and unsuccessfully executed by Ahmed 
Ressam. Ressam, in many respects was an incompetent, or at least unlucky, version of 
Yousef. An Algerian asylum-seeker in Canada, and a petty criminal, Ressam attended an al- 
Qaeda training camp in 1998 where he received the standard training programme in light 
arms and explosives. After returning to Canada he single-handedly assembled a large 
fertilizer bomb with the intention of bombing Los Angeles International Airport timed to 
coincide with the new millennium. The plot was disrupted when an alert border official 
stopped the nervous-looking Ressam when he disembarked from a car ferry and the 
detonation timers were discovered in the car boot. It later transpired that he had attempted to 
contact al-Qaeda leaders before the attempted attack to see if they would care to take the 
credit for the operation—an offer that was ignored by bin Laden.129 The incident pointed the 
way in which not only al-Qaeda as a form of the Islamist ideology would inspire self-starter 
jihadists across the world but also the way in which the ‘brand’ of al-Qaeda could be utilized 
as a propaganda and marketing tool.
4.5.2 USS The Sullivans and USS Cole
The first millennial operation directly planned by al-Qaeda was the failed attack on USS The 
Sullivans on January 3rd, 2000. The skiff that was to bomb the guided missile destroyer in 
Aden harbour sank under the weight of the explosives. Although bin Laden had wanted to 
abandon the plot after this inauspicious failure the leader of the cell, the Yemeni Tewfiq bin 
Attash (who later changed his name to Khallad) insisted on repeating the attempt when an 
opportunity next presented itself. Illustrating the interactive dynamic between the leaders and
128 Lawrence Wright The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda's Road to 9/11 p.262
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the operatives, bin Laden bowed to Khallad’s superior local knowledge and ten months later 
on October 12th the mission was reattempted. This time it was a success blowing a hole in the 
side of the USS Cole, killing seventeen sailors and injuring thirty-nine. The stunning 
asymmetry of the attack made the bombing, despite the failure to sink the warship, 
propaganda success. The multi-billion dollar destroyer clad in heavy armour shielding and 
angular panels designed to absorb radar waves thus making the ship “invisible” was 
hopelessly vulnerable to a small fibreglass skiff packed with shaped charges.
The two Islamists piloting the skiff reportedly waved at lookouts aboard the USS Cole before 
exploding their boat in a mocking gesture of the rules of engagement that prevented the navy 
from opening fire as they approached. The juxtaposition of the huge, high-tech, expensive, 
militarised, menacing and superficially mighty product of Western modernity with the small, 
simple but devastating skiff was a perfect metaphor for al-Qaeda to exploit.130 Furthermore, 
the purity and dedication of the two Islamist martyrs dedicated to sacrificing their lives for 
their cause contrasted with the professional sailors who hoped to preserve theirs. Osama bin 
Laden later commented: ‘the destroyer represented the capital of the West, and the small boat 
represented Mohammed.’131 The final measure of success was the cost-benefit analysis that 
had always concerned bin Laden. For the USS Cole mission the billion dollar warship was 
severely damaged and disabled for an outlay that ran into several thousand dollars and so 
represented an impressive return on the investment. The same type of economic analysis was 
also considered when the 9/11 plot was being devised.
As with the embassy bombings bin Laden probably intended to provoke the U.S. into 
retaliating with a disproportionate response and he certainly planned for a volley of guided 
missiles. He sent his most important deputies, Mohammed Atef, Khalid Sheik Mohammed 
and Ayman al-Zawahiri into three separate locations so they could not all be killed in the 
same strike.132 The anticipated reaction did not materialize but bin Laden still sought to 
extract the maximum propaganda value from the mission. In the following months a multi­
format media campaign, headed by Khalid Sheik Mohammed, was launched that linked 
together images of the suffering of Muslims in Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya and other 
territories with a vitriolic re-enactment of the Cole bombing. The success of the operation
130 An operative was sent to film the attack for propaganda purposes but overslept and so missed the explosion.
131 Osama bin Laden cited in Lawrence Wright The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda’s Road to 9/11 p.319
132 The 9/11 Commission Report p. 191
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was demonstrated with a fresh wave of willing volunteers arriving in Peshawar and then 
travelling to the Afghan training camps with the hope of participating in the globalised jihad 
of bin Laden’s imagination. Much needed new funds also flowed in from wealthy supporters 
in the Gulf states.133
The absence of a retaliation may have simultaneously irked and pleased bin Laden. It 
demonstrated the lack of resolve behind the massive U.S. military machine and indicated 
political impotence at the head of the superpower—this supported the ‘paper tiger’ model that 
had gained traction in the Islamists’ worldview in the wake of the Afghan jihad. New funds 
and recruits, however—as welcome as they were— fell far short of the almost apocalyptic 
encounter between Islam and jahiliyya that filled bin Laden’s imagination. For this to occur 
an overwhelming transgression would have to be committed that the West would find 
impossible to ignore.134 Although it is unlikely that it had been a conscious grand plan, the 
pattern of the al-Qaeda attacks followed an interesting schema. The embassy bombings were 
an attack on U.S. politics, specifically foreign policy, the USS Cole was directed at the U.S.
military, and finally the 9/11 bombings would culminate in a strike at the iconic symbols of
1U.S. political, legislature, economic and military systems in a single, overwhelming blow.
4.5.3 9/11
The planning of 9/11 was organised in a similar way to the USS Cole attack. The targets and 
broad structure of the mission was decided by bin Laden, Khalid Sheik Mohammed 
(henceforth KSM) and Mohammed Atef, but the operatives used the knowledge that they 
gleaned locally to finesse the operational details of the plot. The original proposal had been 
developed by KSM and his nephew Ramzi Yousef, and a version was presented to bin Laden 
in 1996. The outlandish ‘bojinka’ mission envisaged the hijacking of 12 transatlantic 
aeroplanes the first 11 of which would be exploded in midair; the last, piloted by KSM would 
be landed in an Arab country where he would kill all of the male passengers and deliver an
133 Lawrence Wright The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda’s Road to 9/11 p.331
134 Lawrence Wright The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda’s Road to 9/11 p.331
135 The symbolic political and legislature target was to be the United States Capitol building: the intended target 
of Flight 93. Bin Laden wished to crash the fourth aeroplane into the White House but Mohammed Atta and 
Khalid Sheik Mohammed decided that this would be too difficult to achieve.
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Islamist diatribe to the waiting global media.136 Bin Laden had dismissed the plot in 1996 as 
he had just arrived in Afghanistan and thought that the mission would be impossible to bring 
to successful fruition. KSM approached bin Laden again in late 1999 with a scaled-down 
version of the plot that planned to hijack several flights and crash them into multiple 
symbolic buildings on the east and west coast of the U.S. One of the targets selected was the 
World Trade Center, at least in part because KSM wished to achieve their destruction that 
had eluded his nephew.
Osama bin Laden, in consultation with KSM and Mohammed Atef, further refined the scope 
of the mission to include only high-value targets on the east coast although there is some 
evidence that a second wave of strikes was planned for the west with targets including the 
Sears tower in Chicago.137 The first operatives personally selected by bin Laden and Atef for 
the mission were all long-serving and trusted members of al-Qaeda. They included two Saudi 
nationals Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Midhar; and two Yeminis one of whom was 
Khallad, the mastermind behind the USS Cole mission. The original plan called for these four 
to be the pilots that would crash hijacked aeroplanes into their targets. The mission, however, 
soon ran into difficulty when the two Yeminis were denied visas despite their numerous 
applications. The Saudis who found it easier to enter into the U.S. also faced a daunting task 
as they spoke poor English and were ill-equipped and socially isolated for their initial job of 
enrolling in flight schools. Even the simplest tasks such as renting out an apartment proved 
difficult due to the language barrier and their unfamiliarity with U.S. norms. It soon became 
clear that new recruits would need to be found who were better able to integrate with the 
society they wished to attack.
Fortuitously for bin Laden at about this time four young men who had been studying in 
Germany arrived at the Khaldan training camp.138 Mohammed Atta, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, 
Marwan al-Shehhi and Ziad Jarrah were typical of the second wave of jihadi volunteers that 
had been arriving since al-Qaeda had relocated to Afghanistan in 1996. The first wave were 
primarily composed of men from the Gulf States, Egypt and Algeria, often with an Islamist 
past in their own country, and were seeking a way out of persecution at home. The second
136 Further details of the plot included assassinating Pope John Paul II and crashing an aeroplane into the CIA 
headquarters.
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wave by contrast was more likely to be young, single men who were first-generation 
emigrants, often to a Western state. What they had in common was a sense of isolation and 
identity crises where they were unable to fully identify with either their homeland or that of 
their new society. Their lives were marked by feelings of displacement, marginality, exile and 
alienation which were exacerbated by their illegal or temporary right to residency. Neither 
authentically British nor Pakistani, to use one example, it was common for these men to 
search out a new, pristine identity that could be found in their local mosque.139 Many 
gravitated to the Wahhabi-sponsored mosques that offered the simple purity of the Islamic 
identity that they sought.140 From here they were sometimes directed towards the Islamist 
ideology with its coherent, comprehensive, comforting and compelling worldview through 
which they could make sense of their lives and the world, especially since the ideology cast 
the dispersed global umma as the victims of a grand conflict with the West.141
Despite their alienation many of these first and second generation immigrants were 
superficially integrated into their host society to the extent that they were familiar with 
Western norms and spoke their host nation’s language and often English as well. This was the 
case with the Egyptian Mohammed Atta and his friends who had were all studying at 
university and had met at the Wahhabi al-Quds mosque. In November 1999 they travelled 
together to Pakistan and then to Afghanistan.142 In the training camp they were spotted for 
their urbanity, English language skills and their ability to live unobtrusively in the West. Bin 
Laden personally selected the group and told them about the ‘planes operation.’ Their 
commitment to martyrdom having been established the second cell of the plot was formed. 
They were to fly back to Germany and then on to America where they would enrol in flight 
training schools. Upon their return they all applied for replacement passports, claiming theirs 
had been lost, presumably to cover the tracks of having visited Pakistan for several weeks. 
Three of the four successfully applied for US visas, but the Yemeni al-Shihb was rejected on 
several applications.143 These three, together with a Saudi, Hani Hanjour, would be the pilots 
for the operation. Ramzi bin al-Shibh stayed in Germany and played an important role 
coordinating between KSM and Atta as well as wiring funds to the operatives.
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At the end of May, 2001 all four pilots, along with a suspected fifth pilot, Zacarias 
Moussaouri, had arrived in America and were busy enrolling in flight training schools and 
practicing on computer simulators. Mohammed Atta, as the lead operative took a number of 
scouting flights where he observed cabin procedure, taking note of when access to the cockpit 
could be gained, as well as testing what could get through airport security and then used as an 
improvised weapon. He also compiled timetables of flights to work out the optimal routes 
that could be simultaneously crashed into the selected targets. One result of his research was 
the decision that the US Capitol presented a more realistic target than the White House and 
thus changed the target list despite bin Laden’s preference for the latter, more iconic building.
With the mission finalised the hijackers waited for the approval of the final date—selected by 
Atta—from bin Laden and then purchased first class tickets for the four flights between the 
end of August and first week o f September.144 The total cost of the operation has been 
calculated at approximately $400,000-$500,000.145 Although minute in comparison to the 
incredible economic damage inflicted on America and the Western financial systems, the 
outlay was significant for al-Qaeda whose previous missions had cost far less. The scarcity of 
funds is indicated by the fact that an excess $26,000 was wired to an al-Qaeda operative in 
UAE a few days before 9/11.146
Back in Afghanistan final preparations were also taking place. Unbeknownst to their hosts 
Zawahiri had been devising a separate plot to assassinate the leader of the Northern Alliance 
and the Taliban’s last obstacle to control over the entire country, Ahmed Shah Massoud. On 
September 9th, 2001 two al-Qaeda operatives in the guise of journalists interviewing the 
leader, exploded a camera killing the two assassins and their target.
There are several possible motivations that could to be attributed to the mission and the 
proximity in the timing is certainly important. Massoud had become America’s unofficial 
partner in Afghanistan and had been contacted by the CIA to devise a plot to capture or kill 
bin Laden. The Northern Alliance, as the Taliban’s only significant obstacle to sole 
sovereignty, was naturally also a target for al-Qaeda who depended on Mullah Omar’s good 
will for their continued protection in Afghanistan that came at a considerable political and
144 The 9/11 Commission Report p.249
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economic cost to the Taliban. In previous years al-Qaeda had lent fighters to the Taliban in 
their offensives against the Northern Alliance and therefore had good reason for targeting 
their leader. However the contemporaneous assassination with 9/11 would indicate a more 
specific reason for mission. It has been widely suggested that al-Qaeda wished to weaken the 
Northern Alliance in anticipation of the American retribution for 9/11 that saw the Alliance, 
in conjunction with US Special Forces sweep through the country deposing the Taliban from 
power and displacing al-Qaeda. This however seems to use retrospective reasoning that 
presupposes that al-Qaeda was able to foresee the American response. It is more likely that 
Massoud was targeted as a kind of pre-emptive compensation to the Taliban for the negative 
effects that they would certainly suffer in response to 9/11. In the months leading up to 9/11, 
the Taliban’s leadership council were divided over the hosting of al-Qaeda for similar reasons 
that had upset the Saudis and Sudanese previously. An independent body autonomously 
conducting belligerent foreign policy against far stronger foes would be a radical challenge to 
any state’s sovereignty and it was only Mullah Omar’s personal support for bin Laden that 
allowed al-Qaeda to stay.
With its execution the global audience of 9/11 watched in real time the unfolding drama that 
for several hours held the rapt attention of hundreds of millions. This was exactly what bin 
Laden had in mind when he wanted to unveil the real but hidden conflict of Islam and the 
West. The stunning visual image of the towers being struck, then smoking against a pristine 
blue New York skyline before their final dramatic collapse will remain a defining image for 
the 21st century. A week after the attack Karlheinz Stockhausen—a German composer— 
provocatively claimed that 9/11 constituted ‘the greatest work of art ever.’147 Although the 
particular confluence of events that conspired to create the unique aesthetics of 9/11 were 
largely outside of the control of the organizers—and thus we must resist imputing the 
omniscience that would have been necessary to construct the event in all its details—the 
broad structure of the attacks were certainly planned with its symbolic and aesthetic impact. 
The rhetoric prior to 9/11 that had constantly invoked the language of ‘war’ was made 
indisputably real and writ large on the New York skyline. Finally the entire world was forced 
to literally see the battle that had been taking place in the collective consciousness of the 
international Islamists since Qutb. In this sense 9/11 served as the grand unveiling of the
147 TimesOnline “Obituary: Karlheinz Stockhausen”
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underlying reality of the conflict between Islam and jahiliyya that the international Islamists 
had been attempting to bring about for years.
The seemingly endless repeated cycle of images scorched itself on the consciousness of the 
globalized audience as it watched— in anticipation of the next attack—in mesmerised horror. 
The expectation of further attacks during the day, the ‘what next’ of the unbridled 
imagination of the audience, was the source of the real drama of 9/11. This was the future 
anticipatory dissonance of terror played out in an intense single day; but would continue to 
haunt the imagination for years afterwards. In the short term this effected a kind of national 
paralysis in the United States as a heightened security alert manifested itself in numerous 
restrictions and checks hastily created in 9/1 l ’s wake. Networks were closed, in particular 
aviation traffic and the stock exchanges, as the nation effectively seized up in shock. In the 
following years an indefinite and unspecific state of diffused tension marked public life, a 
state reflected, and partly maintained by, the Homeland Security Advisory System that 
publishes a colour-coded alert that has to date never fallen below the yellow ‘elevated’ 
level.148
Shortly after 9/11, in a tape released to the al Jazeera network on October 7 , 2001 bin Laden 
summed up the attack in a telling comment: ‘These events have divided the whole world into 
two sides—the side of believers and the side o f infidels. May God keep you away from them. 
Every Muslim has to rush to make his religion victorious. The winds of faith have come.’149 
Bin Laden hoped that the spectacularly stark attack would unveil, and simultaneously realise, 
the dualisms that had haunted al-Banna and were crafted into violent rhetoric by Qutb. The 
scale of the conflict that bin Laden had imagined was both transcendent in scale—a war of 
Islam against the West, authentic faith against materialism and modernity—and 
simultaneously grounded in a keen realism that sought a war of attrition to defeat the 
Americans using the same methods that had precipitated the collapse of the USSR.
An armed intervention against Afghanistan was anticipated but Zawahiri’s downcast response 
in Knights Under The Prophet’s Banner suggests that there was a schism between the two 
men concerning the utility of provoking the superpower. As we have previously explored,
148 Department of Homeland Security—Homeland Security Advisory System 
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Zawahiri’s pragmatic impulse to secure a stable base for the jihadists had to take priority over 
striking the enemy. His experience of the Egyptian Islamist movement provided him with a 
salutary lesson. By continuously provoking the government with violent attacks and thus 
facing successive waves of repression the movement eventually had to capitulate. Zawahiri 
was certain—as were many other commentators—that the Taliban and al-Qaeda would be 
swiftly destroyed by the US-led invasion o f Afghanistan. Typical of these prematurely 
written obituaries was Kepel’s claim: ‘within a hundred days the U.S. army had wiped the 
Taliban regime from the face o f the earth, and bin Laden was on the run, his secret cells 
dismantled or disbanded.’150
This paradox at the heart of 9/11 was also manifested in the suicidal death of the perpetrators 
of the attack. Although this was necessary for its successful completion and therefore can be 
explained in terms of pragmatic utility, the suicide of the attackers was also indicative of the 
concept of shame that was a novel feature of bin Laden’s ideology. ‘It becomes clear to us,’ 
bin Laden claimed in a video found on a computer of a member of the Hamburg cell, ‘that 
shying away from the fight, combined with the love of earthly existence that fills the hearts of 
many of us, is the source of this misery, this humiliation, and this contempt.’151 The idea of 
an intolerably shameful existence meant that the wish for martyrdom and self-annihilation 
were also present in the act of 9/11 and other suicide attacks. Taking part in jihad, for at least 
some of the hijackers, was a means of escaping their shameful existence with the sublime 
dignity of the martyr. Mark Juergensmeyer claimed: ‘I can imagine a line with “strategic” on 
the one side and “symbolic” on the other, with various acts of terrorism located in 
between.’152 However it is our contention that acts of Islamist terrorism can simultaneously 
occupy both ends of this spectrum in the same instance. Once again the transcendent, 
otherworldly and self-destructive spirit o f jihad  was welded together through the Islamist 
ideology with the calculated rationality of the al-Qaeda planners.
4.6 Conclusions
Throughout this study we have argued that Islamist movements and terrorism—so 
spectacularly exhibited in 9/11— can be usefully understood by examining the evolution of
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the Islamist ideology. We identified and rejected the reasons why ideology has frequently 
been ignored or downplayed in both the academic and lay discourse on terrorism. This led us 
to propose a methodology that took the Islamist ideology seriously in order to understand the 
meaning of acts of terrorism. We saw how terrorism was frequently studied as an abstract 
mode of action. This, we argued, was a mistake as devoid of its historical, intellectual and 
social context the meaning of terrorism was lost. These theorists studied how terrorism 
worked but did not seriously question what it meant or why it happened. From both the 
neoconservative and left wing perspectives the ideology of the Islamists was either dismissed 
as fanaticism or substituted for with the theorist’s political perspective. Psychological and 
socio-economic accounts also fell flat because of their exclusive focus on the dispositions or 
backgrounds of the actors or the inner workings of the groups. Rational-choice models also 
failed to account for why certain ‘preferences’ or ideas were held by the actors and 
movements. All of these accounts failed, in their own way, to take seriously the Islamist 
ideology as a way of understanding terrorism.
Historical and joumalistic-style accounts of the Islamist movement often do pay some 
attention to the ideology but even in these works there is a strong tendency relegate the 
ideology to the sidelines; explaining it away as a rationalisation for more powerful forces. In 
this way the ideology is dismissed as ‘extremism,’ ‘fundamentalism,’ or ‘radicalism’ rather 
than being taken seriously as a coherent, comprehendible and comprehensive ideology. Some 
accounts that do take notice o f the ideology over-emphasize one aspect such as 
Juergensmeyer on the Islamists use of symbolism and transcendent violence. Shortly after 
9/11 one of the foremost theorists of the Islamist movement, Giles Kepel wrote: ‘In spite of 
what many hasty commentators contended in its immediate aftermath, the attack on the 
United States was a desperate symbol of the isolation, fragmentation, and decline of the 
Islamist movement, not a sign of its strength and irrepressible might.’153 As we argued in the 
first chapter Kepel makes the mistake of underestimating the strength, depth, resilience and 
importance of the Islamist ideology in the continuing practice of the Islamist movement. By 
failing to take the ideology seriously these analysts ultimately fail to understand the Islamist 
movement, or account for its dynamism and longevity.
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Our claim was not that the Islamist ideology caused terrorism, but that understanding the 
ideology was crucial for understanding the meaning of terrorism. Our starting claim was that 
understanding the Islamist ideology was essential for understanding the Islamist movement. 
We also claimed that the relationship between the ideology and movement was interactive 
and dynamic. Furthermore, we argued that neither the movement nor the ideology could be 
usefully examined on their own but would need to be understood simultaneously. This could 
be done by using an ideology-narrative methodology that studied the development of the 
movement and the ideology at the same time and drew out the links between them. In the 
second, third and fourth chapters we critically examined the history of the modem Islamist 
ideology and charted its evolutionary stages as it progressed through different historical, 
social and political situations. We saw how the interaction between the Islamist movement 
and the ideology—theory and practice—can be used to understand how the ideology evolved 
in the direction that it did.
The success of the ideology-narrative methodology can be seen in several ways. It allows us 
to account for the longevity of the ideology and its ability to allow the movement to evolve to 
new political and pragmatic situations. It also helps explain how the movement can 
simultaneously pursue seemingly contradictory paths—that of symbolic violence and 
pragmatic strategies. We saw how theological concepts were appropriated by the movement’s 
intellectual leaders and used to comprehensively understand the contemporary world and 
their place within it. We also demonstrated the importance of a singular conceptual 
framework that could be used to cogently link various problems together into a single nexus 
that required the single solution of Islam. An interesting aspect of the ideology was the way 
in which the Islamists interpreted the world—the descriptive element of the ideology— 
remained relatively stable during the period that we studied, and was always comprehensive 
and expansive. By contrast the prescriptive element of the ideology evolved rapidly from one 
period to the other and was also lacking in relative detail. This could explain (and be 
explained by) the drastic shifts in the tactics and actions of the Islamists but the relative 
stability of their worldview.
Two features of the ideology can help explain its longevity. The first is the irreducible and 
permanent core that has remained a critical feature of the ideology since al-Banna: the 
conviction on the unity and perfection of Islam as a complete and comprehensive system for
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governing all o f life. This core gives it the ideology a recognisable form irrespective of its 
particular manifestation and partly accounts for its durability. By contrast the second feature 
of the ideology is its ability to adapt to new circumstances and situations, and evolve to meet 
new challenges. This evolutionary flexibility is both a cause of, and reflected, in the way in 
which Islamist movements have been able to adapt their organizational structures and 
operations to rapidly changing realities. As we have argued the ideology exists and evolves in 
an ever-changing two-way relationship with the movements that have adopted and adapted it. 
Just as the various Islamist movements and their behaviour have been defined and shaped by 
the ideology; so too has the ideology been moulded and reformulated by movements, and in 
particular their ideological and intellectual leaders. The fluidity of the ideology lies in the fact 
that the core premise allows for a remarkable range of interpretations of what this entails. The 
core belief forms the basic structure of the ideology whilst the content that follows varies 
according to the particular version of the ideology.
These features of the ideology help us to understand the progress of the Islamist movement 
after 9/11. It is beyond the scope of this study to examine the post-9/11 period so we shall 
restrict ourselves to a few general observations. Following the attacks and the subsequent 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq the Islamist ideology and movement have demonstrated their 
extraordinary ability to evolve and this has been manifested in several ways. In some 
instances the ideology has radically decentralized once again becoming largely detached from 
the main organizational structure of al-Qaeda resulting in the phenomena of self-starter 
terrorism.154 This was exemplified in the 2004 Madrid and 2007 London bombings, when the 
perpetrators autonomously formed cells that planned, organized, funded and executed the 
attacks without significant help from al-Qaeda. In these instances the ideology (and technical 
information available through the Internet) was sufficient for successful terrorist attacks in 
the absence of a supporting organization. The rise of self-starter terrorism did not mean the 
end of the larger movements which since 9/11 have continued to adapt to new situations and 
have formed and reformed in areas of the world where the geopolitical situation has allowed 
such as north Africa and Pakistan.
In a variety of guises and arenas around the world the Islamist ideology and movement has 
continued to evolve and adapt to new conditions. Only by recognising the importance,
154 See Aidan Kirby “The London Bombers as “Self-Starters”: A Case Study in Indigenous Radicalization and 
the Emergence of Autonomous Cliques”
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coherence and resilience of the ideology can Islamist terrorism be fully understood. In this 
work we have studied one crucial historical narrative of the ideology; however there are other 
methodologies that could be applied to gain further insights into the Islamist movement and 
ideology. Further research would be necessary for understanding different histories of the 
Islamist movement and alternative perspectives on one of the most significant political, social 
and philosophical issues of the 20th and 21st century.
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